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Abstract
We develop a general, tractable framework of multilateral vertical contracting,
which places no restriction on tari¤s and fully accounts for their impact on down-
stream competition. Equilibrium tari¤s are cost-based and replicate the outcome
of a multi-brand oligopoly, a nding in line with the analysis of a recent merger.
We provide a micro-foundation for this framework, before analyzing the e¤ect of
RPM and price parity provisions, and of resale vs. agency business models. Finally,
we extend the framework to endogenize the distribution network; we also consider
mergers and show that their impact on the distribution network can dominate price
e¤ects.
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1 Introduction
We propose a exible, tractable model of multilateral vertical contracting between up-
stream and downstream competitors, and extend it to endogenize the channel network.
Wholesale markets often involve interlocking multilateral relations. For instance, com-
peting supermarkets carry the same rival brands, health insurers deal with the same care
providers, and pay-TV operators o¤er the same channels. In intermediate goods markets,
PC OEMs develop computers based on Intel and AMD chips, and Airbus and Boeing of-
fer a choice of engines from General Electric, Rolls Royce and Pratt & Whitney. Yet, the
vertical contracting literature mostly focuses on simpler market structures. For instance,
much of the early literature focuses on an upstream or downstream monopolist,1 or on
competing vertical structures (e.g., franchise networks).2
Several papers consider multilateral relations, but with various restrictions. For in-
stance, upstream competition comes from fringe suppliers3 or perfect substitutes,4 or
contracts are restricted to linear or two-part tari¤s.5 Other papers, prompted by merger
waves and policy debates in pay-TV6 and healthcare7 markets, either assume away the
interplay between wholesale agreements and downstream outcomes (by restricting atten-
tion to lump-sum transfers), or account for it only partially (by assuming that upstream
and downstream prices are set simultaneously).8
In the rst part of this paper, we develop a model of multilateral interlocking relation-
ships with upstream and downstream price competition,9 allowing for any distribution
of bargaining power. We do not restrict the tari¤s that can be negotiated, and take into
account their impact on downstream competition. As wholesale contracts are usually not
publicly observable, we suppose that the negotiation outcomes are private information.
Modelling secret contracting raises complex issues, even in simple bargaining settings
with ultimatum o¤ers. When receiving an out-of-equilibrium o¤er, a rm must conjec-
1See, e.g., Mathewson andWinter (1984) and Rey and Tirole (1986) on vertical coordination, Hart and
Tirole (1990), OBrien and Sha¤er (1992) and McAfee and Schwartz (1994) on suppliers opportunism,
and Bernheim and Whinston (1985, 1986, 1998), Marx and Sha¤er (2007), Miklòs-Thal et al. (2011) and
Rey and Whinston (2013) on exclusive dealing.
2See, e.g., Bonanno and Vickers (1988) and Rey and Stiglitz (1988, 1995) on strategic delegation, and
Jullien and Rey (2007) and Piccolo and Miklòs-Thal (2012) on facilitating practices.
3This is a frequent assumption in the literature on private labels (see, e.g., Mills, 1995, and Gabrielsen
and Sørgard, 2007). See also Hart and Tirole (1990) and Innes and Hamilton (2009).
4See, e.g., Salinger (1988), Ordover et al. (1990), de Fontenay and Gans (2005, 2014), and Nocke and
White (2007, 2010).
5See, e.g., Dobson and Waterson (2007), Rey and Vergé (2010) and Allain and Chambolle (2011).
6See, e.g., Chipty and Snyder (1999) on the impact of horizontal mergers, Crawford and Yurukoglu
(2012) on bundling, and Crawford et al. (2018) on vertical integration.
7See, e.g., Gowrisankaran et al. (2015) on hospital mergers, and Ho and Lee (2017) on competition
among health insurance providers.
8Among the most recent papers, Gowrisankaran et al. (2015) and Ho and Lee (2017) focus on lump-
sum transfers, whereas Crawford et al. (2018) assume that all (linear) prices are set simultaneously.
9Nocke and Rey (2018) study multilateral relations with Cournot downstream competition.
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ture about the contracts signed by its rivals. As Bayesian updating does not restrict
o¤-equilibrium beliefs, there are typically many (perfect Bayesian) equilibria. This has
led the literature to rely on reasonablebeliefs, such as passive or wary beliefs. Unfor-
tunately, when downstream rms compete in prices, equilibria based on passive beliefs
may not exist, and wary beliefs are rather intractable.10 We dene instead a bargaining
equilibrium as follows. First, upstream negotiations are modelled using a Nash-in-Nash
approach, which relies on the contract equilibrium concept developed by Crémer and
Riordan (1987) and Horn and Wolinsky (1988): each contract is bilaterally e¢ cient given
the other equilibrium contracts, and the gains from trade are shared according to the par-
tiesbilateral bargaining power.11 Second, given their negotiated contracts, downstream
rms compete in prices.
We rst establish the existence of an equilibrium, and show that (as long as tari¤s
induce a smooth behavior, in a sense made precise), equilibrium tari¤s are cost-based,
in that marginal input prices reect marginal costs of production; as a result, downstream
prices are the same as in a multi-brand oligopoly where downstream rms could produce
all the inputs. The intuition is simple. To maximize their joint bilateral prot, which
ignores the other rmsmargins, rms adopt low input prices to enable the downstream
rm to price aggressively. Conversely, if the other marginal input prices reect marginal
costs, then pricing at marginal cost makes the downstream rm a residual claimant
for the joint bilateral prot and thus induces it to charge the bilateral optimal prices.
Interestingly, this insight is in line with the results of Nilsen et al. (2016) who nd
that an upstream merger between Norwegian egg producers did not a¤ect marginal input
(and therefore retail) prices but only infra-marginal prices (e.g., franchise fees). Di¤erent
tari¤s generate di¤erent divisions of the equilibrium industry prot, however, more convex
(resp., concave) tari¤s giving a larger share to upstream (resp., downstream) rms.
We then provide a micro-foundation for these bargaining equilibria, which relies on
a (non-cooperative, sequential) game of delegated negotiations: each rm has di¤er-
ent agents negotiating with its di¤erent partners and, for each channel, one of the two
agents is randomly selected to make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er. Any bargaining equi-
librium outcome can be sustained by a sequential equilibrium of this game of delegated
negotiations; conversely, any regularequilibrium outcome of this game (in a sense made
precise) corresponds to a bargaining equilibrium. Compared with the direct negotiation
gamein which rms would directly engage in bilateral negotiations (with the same ran-
dom selection for the right to make a nal o¤er), the candidate equilibria that survive
10Both issues arise even in the absence of upstream competition; see Rey and Vergé (2004).
11OBrien and Sha¤er (1992) apply this approach in an upstream monopoly setting. Since then, it
has been used with various restrictions, both in the theoretical literature (e.g., Gans, 2007; Milliou and
Petrakis, 2007; Allain and Chambolle, 2011) and the empirical literature (e.g., Crawford and Yurukoglu,
2012; Grennan, 2013; Gowrisankaran et al., 2015). Because it combines the cooperative Nash-bargaining
solution (for each vertical channel) with a non-cooperative Nash-equilibrium concept (across channels),
Collard-Wrexler et al. (2019) have coined the terminology Nash-in-Nash bargaining.
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single-channel deviations are the same in the two games; assuming delegated negotiations
however ensures existence, by ruling out multi-channel deviations. Adding a preliminary
stage in which one side gets to make an o¤er, with the above lottery being used only if
that o¤er is rejected, moreover generates deterministic outcomes and provides a similar
micro-foundation for linear tari¤s and/or publicly observable contracts.
To illustrate the exibility of our approach, we study the impact of classic vertical
restraints such as resale price maintenance (RPM) and price parity agreements (PPAs).
Allowing RPM generates many equilibria: as retail prices are separately negotiated, rms
can agree on any arbitrary marginal transfer prices (and share the prots as desired
through, e.g., lump-sum fees), which however a¤ect their negotiations with other partners.
Furthermore, if price oors can sustain supra-competitive prices when brands are more
substitutable than stores, price ceilings can do the same in the opposite case. This
nding challenges the current antitrust approach towards RPM, which views inter-brand
competition as likely to prevent anti-competitive e¤ects, and treats maximum RPMmore
favorably than minimum RPM. By contrast PPAs, which require retailers to charge the
same price for all brands, have no substantial impact on retail prices. They may limit the
joint prot that a retailer can generate with a given supplier, but pricing at marginal cost
still makes the retailer the residual claimant on this joint prot; as a result, equilibrium
contracts are again cost-based. This contrasts with the view, common in policy circles,
that retail PPAs are akin to RPM and should therefore be banned; it also suggests that
the anti-competitive e¤ects highlighted by the literature depends on the nature of the
contracts that are considered (e.g., linear vs. non-linear tari¤s).
We also use our approach to compare business models. Switching from the tradi-
tional resale model to the agency model often used by online marketplaces (where retail
platforms obtain transaction-based commissions from suppliers) amounts to turning the
model upside-down. Platforms now play the role of upstream rms selling distribution
services to suppliers who control the nal prices and thus act as downstream rms. Equi-
librium tari¤s are again cost-based and the nal outcome is the same as if suppliers were
directly competing against each other at all retail locations. Whether equilibrium prices
are higher under the wholesale model or the agency model is thus driven by whether
competition is ercer among suppliers or retailers.
In the second part of our paper, we endogenize the channel network. As the Nash-in-
Nash approach implies that every channel is active in equilibrium,12 we add a preliminary
stage where each rm can choose which channels to activate. This determines the relevant
network and the associated bargaining equilibrium. To avoid coordination issues, we focus
on the coalition-proof Nash equilibria (CPNE) see Bernheim et al. 1987.
In a setting with symmetric duopolies, we rst show that, when downstream rms are
12See, e.g., de Fontenay and Gans (2014) and Collard-Wexler et al. (2019).
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largely di¤erentiated, each supplier deals with both to maximize demand. When instead
they are close substitutes, each supplier deals with a single rm, to avoid prot dissipation
through intrabrand competition. For the case of linear demands, there is always a unique
CPNE, with the complete network if downstream rms are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated, and
exclusive dealing (each supplier dealing with a di¤erent downstream rm) otherwise.
Finally, we study the impact of mergers on prices and on the channel network. For any
given network, and absent any e¢ ciency gains, a downstream merger raises prices (by
eliminating downstream competition between the merging parties), whereas an upstream
merger has no impact on nal prices (as marginal input prices remain cost-based). How-
ever, accounting for the possible impact on the distribution network can give rise to very
di¤erent insights. Pre-merger, rms may limit the number of active channels to avoid
prot dissipation through intrabrand competition. A downstream merger eliminates this
concern and thus encourages rms to expand the network ; as a result, such a merger
may actually benet consumers and increase social welfare. By contrast, an upstream
merger enables the suppliers to coordinate their distribution decisions and can trigger
vertical foreclosure, which harms consumers and decreases social welfare. Finally, a ver-
tical merger induces the integrated supplier to charge higher (marginal) prices to rivals,
which tends to raise retail prices and reduce consumer surplus and social welfare, but it
may also expand or restrict the distribution network.
The paper is organized as follows. We rst outline our setting (Section 2), char-
acterize the bargaining equilibria (Section 3), and provide a micro-foundation (Section
4), before studying vertical restraints and alternative business models (Section 5). We
then endogenize the channel network (Section 6), and examine the impact of mergers in
this extended setting (Section 7). Finally, we apply our approach to publicly observable
contracts (Section 8), before providing concluding remarks (Section 9).
2 The model
2.1 Setup
We consider a vertical chain in which n  2 di¤erentiated manufacturers, M1; :::;Mn,
distribute their goods through m  2 di¤erentiated retailers, R1; :::; Rm.13 For the sake
of exposition, we assume constant returns to scale14 and denote Mis unit cost by ci, for
i 2 I  f1; :::; ng, and Rjs unit cost by j, for j 2 J  f1; :::;mg.15 The demand
for brand i at store j (i.e., for channel i   j) is given by Dij (p) and is continuously
di¤erentiable in the price vector p = (pij)(i;j)2IJ whenever it is positive.
16
13The analysis can be transposed to other vertically related industries.
14Allowing for non-linear cost functions is straightforward but notationally cumbersome.
15For ease of exposition, we use subscripts i and h for manufacturers, and j and k for retailers.
16This allows for kinkswhere demand becomes zero (e.g., when demand is linear).
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We assume that wholesale contracts are purely vertical: the contract between Mi
and Rj species a transfer, tij, based solely on Mis sales through Rj, qij. This excludes
horizontal clauses such as exclusive dealing or market-share discounts,17 but allows
for any non-linear tari¤ tij (qij). We moreover focus on secret contracting: the terms
negotiated between Mi and Rj (including whether they reached an agreement) are pri-
vate information to the two parties. Finally, we assume that wholesale negotiations can
inuence retail pricing decisions. This leads us to consider the following timing:
Stage 1: Each Mi negotiates with each Rj a non-linear tari¤ tij (qij); these bilateral
negotiations are simultaneous and secret.
Stage 2: Retailers simultaneously set retail prices for all the brands that they carry.
2.2 Bargaining equilibrium
As mentioned in the introduction, for tractability we follow the contract equilibrium
approach pioneered by Crémer and Riordan (1987) and Horn and Wolinsky (1988), which
requires contracts to be bilaterally e¢ cient. We moreover allow for balanced bargaining,
and denote by ij 2 [0; 1] the bargaining power of Mi in its bilateral negotiation with
Rj. Specically, in stage 2, each Ri chooses its prices, given the contracts it negotiated in
the previous stage, and assuming that its rivals set the equilibrium retail prices. In stage
1, each Mi and each Rj negotiates a tari¤ that: (i) maximizes their joint prot, given
the other equilibrium contracts and Rjs induced retail pricing behavior; and (ii) gives a
share ij of the resulting gains from trade to Mi (and thus a share 1  ij to Ri).
To state this formally, let us express the price vector as p = (pj;p j), where pj =
(phj)h2I = (pij;p i;j)18 is the vector of Rjs prices and p j the vector of all other retailers
prices. A bargaining equilibriumis then dened as follows:
Denition 1 (bargaining equilibrium) A bargaining equilibrium is a vector of price
responses (pRj (tj))j2J , together with a vector of equilibrium tari¤s t
e = (tej )j2J and a
vector of equilibrium prices pe = (pej )j2J , such that:
 In stage 2, for every j 2 J , the price response pRj ():
maximizes Rjs prot for any tj = (tij)i2I negotiated by Rj in stage 1,19 given
rivalsequilibrium prices, pe j:
pRj (tj) 2 arg max
pj
X
i2I
[(pij   j)Dij(pj;pe j)  tij(Dij(pj;pe j))];
 satises pRj (t
e
j ) = p
e
j .
17We consider price parity and other provisions in Section 5.
18With the convention that pij =1 when Rj does not carry Mis brand.
19We assume that a tari¤ can be successfully negotiated only if it induces a well-behaved retail pricing
problem. Alternatively, we could restrict attention to continuous tari¤s and bounded demands (e.g., the
monopoly demand for channel i  j is nite for pij = 0 and becomes null for pij large enough).
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 In stage 1, for every (i; j) 2 I  J , the equilibrium tari¤ teij:
maximizes the joint prot of Mi and Rj, given Rjs other equilibrium tari¤s,
te i;j, its rivalsequilibrium prices, p
e
 j, and Rjs price response, p
R
j (tj):
teij 2 arg max
tij
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
[pRij(tij; t
e
 i;j)  ci   j]Dij(pRj (tij; te i;j);pe j)
+
X
k2Jnfjg
"
teik(Dik(p
R
j (tij; t
e
 i;j);p
e
 j))
 ciDik(pRj (tij; te i;j);pe j)
#
+
X
h2Infig
"
[pRhj(tij; t
e
 i;j)  j]Dhj(pRj (tij; te i;j);pe j)
 tehj(Dhj(pRj (tij; te i;j);pe))
#
9>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>;
;
 gives Mi and Rj shares ij and 1   ij respectively, of the additional prot
generated by their relationship.
2.3 Benchmark: multiproduct oligopoly
For future reference, it is useful to consider a hypothetical multiproduct oligopoly in
which m di¤erentiated rms j 2 J could each produce at cost the n brands i 2 I. Let:
ij(p)  (pij   ci   j)Dij(p) and j(p) 
X
i2I
ij(p)
denote the prot that rm j then derives from brand i and in total, and let:
prj(p j)  arg max
pj
j(pj;p j)
denote its best-response. We maintain the following regularity conditions:20
Assumption A (multiproduct oligopoly) There is a unique price vector p satisfying
pj 2 prj(p j) for j 2 J ; this vector is moreover uniquely characterized by the rst-order
conditions, and such that pj = p
r
j(p

 j) for j 2 J .21 Furthermore, for every (i; j) 2 IJ :
(i) Dij(p
) > 0; and,
(ii)
X
h2Infig
hj((1;p i;j);p j) >
P
h2Infig hj(p
); and
(iii) j((1;p i;j);p j) has a nite maximum in p i;j.
Assumption A asserts that the hypothetical multiproduct oligopoly would have a
unique equilibrium, with the usual features of product di¤erentiation: each rm sells all
20See Vives (1999) for a discussion of the underlying assumptions on demand.
21That is, p is the unique solution to the set of rst-order conditions f@j=@pij = 0gi2I;j2J , and
best-responses to equilibrium prices are also unique.
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brands, but if it were to drop one brand, then it would earn more on the others. This
implies that the contribution of any brand i to any rm js prot, given by
ij  j(p) max
p i;j
j((1;p i;j);p j);
is positive but lower than the equilibrium prot (see Lemma 1 in Appendix A):
0 < ij < ij(p
): (1)
3 Equilibrium analysis
OBrien and Sha¤er (1992) show that, in the case of an upstream monopoly, secret con-
tracting yields cost-basedequilibrium tari¤s: marginal wholesale prices reect marginal
costs. We now show that this insight carries over when there is upstream competition.
3.1 Two-part tari¤s
We rst establish the existence of a bargaining equilibrium in cost-based two-part tari¤s,
yielding the same retail outcome as the above hypothetical multiproduct oligopoly:
Proposition 1 (cost-based two-part tari¤s) There exists a unique equilibrium in which
contracts are cost-based two-part tari¤s; in this equilibrium:
(i) pe = p and, for every (i; j) 2 I  J , teij (qij) = tij (qij)  ijij + ciqij;
(ii) for every (i; j) 2 I J , Mis and Rjs equilibrium prots are respectively equal to:
eMi = 

Mi

X
j2J
ij
i
j  0 and eRj = Rj  j(p) 
X
i2I
ij
i
j > 0:
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition is simple. If the other channels adopt such tari¤s, then the joint variable
prot of Mi and Rj accounts for the full margins on Rjs sales of all brands, and only
for those. To maximize this prot, it su¢ ces to make Rj the residual claimant, which a
cost-based tari¤ precisely achieves. All retailers then behave as if supplied at cost.
Mi obtains a share ij of the gains from trade, ij > 0, and its prot is thus positive
whenever ij > 0. However, as tari¤s are cost-based, if Rj were to delist Mi, then
Rj would benet from the increase in the sales of rival brands, whereas Mi would not
benet from the increase in the sales of its brand through the other retailers. As a
result, Rj obtains more than suggested by its intrinsic bargaining power: ij (p)  
ij
i
j > (1  ij) ij (p); in particular, it always obtains a positive prot, regardless of
its bilateral bargaining power.
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3.2 Equilibrium prices
Proposition 1 establishes the existence of a bargaining equilibrium in two-part tari¤s, in
which tari¤s are cost-based. We now show that, conversely, as long as they induce a
smoothretail behavior, equilibrium tari¤s must be cost-based.
To introduce the notion of smooth retail behavior, x a candidate bargaining equilib-
rium with tari¤s te and retail prices pe, and suppose that the negotiation between Mi
and Rj over the tari¤ tij induces instead Rj to sell a given quantity
qij 2 Qij  fDij(pj;pe j) j pj 2 Rn+g:
As the tari¤ tij a¤ects Rjs prot only through tij (qij), Rjs price response, conditional
on selling qij and regardless of the tari¤ tij used to induce qij is given by:22
p^ijj (qij)  arg max
pj2Pijj (qij)
f(pij   j)qij +
X
h2Infig
(phj   j)Dhj(pj;pe j)
 tehj(Dhj(pj;pe j))
g: (2)
where Pijj (qij)  fpjjDij(pj;pe j) = qijg denotes the set of prices yielding qij. Let
q^ijhk(qij)  Dhk(p^ijj (qij);pe j)
denote the resulting quantities and
r^ijj (qij) 
X
h2I
[p^ijhj(qij)  j]q^ijhj(qij)
denote the associated revenue for Rj, net of retail costs.
We say that the equilibrium tari¤s tej induce Rj to adopt a smooth retail behavior if
the conditional price responses p^ijj (qij) satisfy the following conditions:
Denition 2 (smooth retail behavior) For any j 2 J , the equilibrium tari¤s tej in-
duce a smooth retail behavior if they are di¤erentiable and, for every i 2 I:
(i) in the range qij 2 Qij, p^ijj (qij) is unique and di¤erentiable;
(ii) qeij 2 Int (Qij) and the diversion ratiosijjk   (q^ijik)0(qeij), for k 2 J nfjg, satisfy:
ijjk  0 for every k 2 J n fjg and
X
k2Jnfjg
ijjk < 1: (3)
That is, when a retailer contemplates a marginal increase in the sales of a brand, it
only marginally adjust its prices; condition (3) moreover asserts that total sales of the
22The superscript ij refers here to the bilateral negotiation between Mi and Rj .
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brand would increase despite reduced sales through rival retailers.23 The next Proposition
shows that if the equilibrium tari¤s induce a smooth retail behavior, then they must be
cost-based, implying that the retail outcome remains the same as before:
Proposition 2 (cost-based tari¤s) Whenever the equilibrium tari¤s induce all retail-
ers to adopt a smooth retail behavior:
(i) (teij)
0  qeij = ci for every (i; j) 2 I  J ; and
(ii) pe = p.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The insight of Proposition 1 thus carries over to any equilibrium based on marginal
considerations. The intuition is more involved and relies on an equilibrium argument:
when negotiating with one retailer, a manufacturer has an incentive to undercut the
margins charged to the other retailers; thus, in equilibrium, all upstream margins must
be zero. To see this, consider a candidate equilibrium with arbitrary (smooth) upstream
margins, ueij  (teij)0
 
qeij
 ci. In their negotiation,Mi and Rj seek to induce the quantity
qij that maximizes their joint prot, taking as given that Rj will adjust its prices so as to
maximize its own prot. However, qij must also maximize Rjs prot given the tari¤s it
faces; Mis upstream margin must therefore neutralize the marginal impact of qij on its
own prot. As decreasing qij by one unit would increase Mis sales through every other
Rk by 
ij
jk, the negotiated margin must satisfy:
ueij =
X
k2Jnfjg
ijjku
e
ik:
From (3), the sale lost by Rj would only partially be compensated by the other retailers
additional sales, and thus ueij is a contraction of Mis other margins that is, the margin
negotiated with Rj undercuts the margins that Mi charges to Rjs rivals. Hence, in
equilibrium, all upstream margins are zero.
Remark: smooth retail behavior. In the case of an upstream monopoly, OBrien and
Sha¤er (1992) show that equilibrium tari¤s always induce a smooth retail behavior. Un-
fortunately, their reasoning does not carry over to the case of upstream competition, as
Rjs response to Mis tari¤, say, now depends on Mis rivalstari¤s; hence, Rjs response
may no longer be smoothif, for instance, the other tari¤s are discontinuous. Yet, we
suspect that equilibrium tari¤s are indeed likely to induce a smooth retail behavior.
Remark: two-part tari¤s. Under standard regularity assumptions on demand, two-
part tari¤s induce a smooth retailer behavior; the equilibrium of Proposition 1 is then
the unique equilibrium in two-part tari¤s.
23Condition (3) is natural but not necessary; a weaker su¢ cient condition is the invertibility of the
mm matrix i with entries i (j; j) = 1 and i (j; k) =  ijik for k 6= j.
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3.3 Division of prots
Proposition 2 shows that, as long as tari¤s induce all retailers to adopt a smooth retail
behavior, there is a unique equilibrium outcome in terms of prices and quantities, and
industry prot. Together with Proposition 1, it shows further that the division of this
prot is also unique when two-part tari¤s are used. However, other tari¤s can sustain
di¤erent prot allocations. For instance, under mild regularity assumptions24, there exist
bargaining equilibria that rely on the quadratic tari¤s, tij (qij) = t

ij (qij) + (qij   qij)2,
where (tij)(i;j)2IJ are the cost-based two-part tari¤s identied in Proposition 1 and
qij  Dij (p) denote the equilibrium quantities. Introducing the quadratic term does
not a¤ect the amount paid by Rj if it sticks to qij, but increases the amount that Rj would
have to pay if it were to modify its prices and/or stop carrying another brand. It follows
that introducing this convex term weakens Rjs bargaining position in its negotiations
with the other suppliers. Conversely, manufacturers obtain a smaller share when the
tari¤s are concave (i.e., when  < 0).
4 Micro-foundation
We now show that a bargaining equilibrium is an equilibrium outcome of a non-cooperative
game in which each side makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er with a probability reecting its
bargaining power.25 As already mentioned, with secret contracting these games have
many equilibria; for example, any individually rational outcome can be sustained by
pessimisticbeliefs that interpret a deviant o¤er as a signal of aggressive o¤ers to rivals,
making the deviant o¤er likely to be rejected. This has led the literature to focus on
specic beliefs. The above contract equilibrium approach is in line with passive beliefs:
a channel assumes that the others stick to the equilibrium tari¤s when negotiating its
own contract.26 Unfortunately, when downstream rms compete in prices, multi-sided
deviations may destroy all candidate equilibria with passive beliefs even in the simpler
case of an upstream monopoly.27 To avoid this, we adopt a setting in which rms del-
egate the negotiations to partner-specic agents.28 Specically, each Mi has m agents,
M1i ; :::;M
m
i , each Rj has n agents, R
1
j ; :::; R
n
j , and the negotiation between Mi and Rj is
handled by M ji and R
i
j, each agent seeking to maximize the prot of its rm. The rms
and their agents play the following delegated negotiationsgame  :
24For a complete analysis, see Online appendix A.
25See Collard-Wexler et al. (2019) for a micro-foundation of the Nash-in-Nash approach when the
gains from trade are determined by the network of active channels. In our setting, however, the tari¤s
themselves also a¤ect these gains, through their impact on downstream competition.
26See McAfee and Schwartz (1994); Hart and Tirole (1990) call it market-by-market bargaining.
27See McAfee and Schwartz (1995) and Rey and Vergé (2004), as well as footnote 35.
28See the remark at the end of this section for further discussion of the role of delegated negotiations.
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Stage 1. Two-step negotiations:
First step. For eachMi Rj pair, Nature randomly selects which side gets to make
a take-it-or-leave it o¤er: M ji is selected with probability ij, and R
i
j is selected
with complementary probability 1   ij; the selection is only observed by the two
agents, M ji and R
i
j, and selections are made independently across pairs.
Second step. For each Mi   Rj pair, the selected agent, M ji or Rij, o¤ers a tari¤
tij (qij) to its counterpart, who accepts or rejects it; all o¤ers are simultaneous and
secret, and all acceptance decisions are also simultaneous and secret.
Stage 2. Each Rj observes the tari¤s negotiated by its agents, or the lack thereof; re-
tailers then simultaneously set retail prices for the brand(s) that they carry.
We look for the sequential equilibria of this game  , which requires beliefs to be
consistent.29 This implies that a deviation by one player conveys no information on
other playerssimultaneous moves.30 Hence, in stage 1, the receiver of a deviant o¤er
does not revise its beliefs about the tari¤s negotiated by the other agents; and in stage
2, a retailer that faces a deviant contract believes that the other retailers still face the
equilibrium tari¤s, and will therefore stick to the equilibrium retail prices.
Let ij 2 ij  fM ji ; Rijg denote the agent selected for making the o¤er in the
negotiation between Mi and Rj, j  (ij)i2I 2 j  i2Iij denote the prole of
selected agents in the negotiations between Rj and its suppliers, and   (j)j2J 2  

j2Jj denote the prole of selected agents in all negotiations. Formally, a (sequential)
equilibrium of game   is a vector of price responses, (p^Rj (tj))j2J , together with a vector of
equilibrium tari¤s, (^t)2 (where t^ = (^t
j
j )j2J ), a vector of equilibrium prices, (p^
)2
(where p^ = (p^jj )j2J ), and beliefs b  f(bMji ; bRij)(i;j)2IJ ; (bRj)j2J g, such that:
31
(i) In stage 2, for every j 2 J :
 Rj expects its rivals to face the equilibrium tari¤s and charge the equilibrium prices;
 for any vector of tari¤s tj negotiated by Rjs agents in stage 1, the price response
p^Rj (tj) maximizes Rjs expected prot, given the other retailersequilibrium prices;
 for every j 2 j, p^jj = p^Rj (^tjj ).
(ii) In stage 1, for every i 2 I, every j 2 J and every selected agent ij 2 ij, letting
~ij 2 ij n fijg denote the non-selected agent:
29See Kreps and Wilson (1982).
30Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) refer to this principle as no-signaling-what-you-dont-know.
31Sequential equilibria have been dened for nite action spaces. We adapt here the denition by
focusing on equilibrium tari¤s and unilateral deviations from these tari¤s.
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 ij and ~ij (regardless of the tari¤ tij o¤ered by ij) believe that all other agents stick
to their equilibrium behavior; they thus expect that Rj will charge p^Rj (tij; t^
 i;j
 i;j )
whereas its rivals will stick to the equilibrium prices, p^ j j = (p^
k
k )k2Jnfjg;
 ~ij accepts any tari¤ tij that does not decrease the expected prot of its rm;
 ij o¤ers a tari¤ that maximizes the expected prot of its rm.32
A key feature of this game is that, as rms can share prot (e.g., through lump-sum
transfers), their agents always seek to maximize their joint prot, regardless of which side
makes the o¤er. That is, the tari¤ tij negotiated by M
j
i and R
i
j induces Rj to maximize
Mi and Rjs joint prot, as in a bargaining equilibrium. Of course, which side makes the
o¤er a¤ects how the prot is shared: the o¤ering side appropriates the bilateral gains
from trade, leaving the receiving side indi¤erent between accepting or rejecting the o¤er.
The probability ij therefore plays the same role asMis bargaining power in its bilateral
relationship with Rj. Building on this, we show below that any bargaining equilibrium can
be replicated as an equilibrium of game  ; the converse moreover holds for any equilibrium
of game   with regulartari¤s and price responses, dened as follows:
Denition 3 (regular price responses and tari¤s) In game  :
(i) the price responses (p^Rj )j2J are said to be regular if they are invariant to lump-
sum changes in tari¤s: for any j 2 J , any tari¤s tj and any vector of xed fees
f = (fij)i2I 2 Rn, p^Rj (tj + fj) = p^Rj (tj); and
(ii) the tari¤s t are said to be regular if they depend on which side makes the o¤er
only through a lump-sum transfer: for any (i; j) 2 I  J , tM
j
i
ij (qij)   t
Rij
ij (qij) does
not depend on qij.
Price responses are trivially regular when best-responses are unique; when instead a
retailer is indi¤erent between several optimal prices, imposing regularity amounts to mak-
ing the actual price response independent of lump-sum changes in the retailers expected
prot function. Tari¤s are regular when which side makes the o¤er does not a¤ect rms
bargaining positions with other partners.33 Together, these two requirements imply that
bilateral bargaining power has no impact either on retail prices: p^ = p^ for any  2 .
The next Proposition establishes an equivalence between the above bargaining equi-
libria and the sequential equilibria of game   that have regular price responses and tari¤s:
32Without loss of generality, attention can be restricted to acceptable tari¤s, as the null tari¤ t;,
equal to 0 for qij > 0 and to +1 for qij > 0, is acceptable and mimics rejection.
33In equilibrium, each channel is typically indi¤erent between many cost-based tari¤s (e.g., convex vs.
concave), but the adopted shape drives the outcome of rmsother negotiations; see Section 3.3.
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Proposition 3 (micro-foundation)
(i) For any bargaining equilibrium B, there exists a sequential equilibrium of game  ,
with regular price responses and tari¤s, that yields the same retail outcome and
gives all rms the same expected prots as B.
(ii) Conversely, for any sequential equilibrium E of game   with regular price responses
and tari¤s, there exists a bargaining equilibrium yielding the same retail outcome
and giving all rms the same expected prots as E.
Proof. See Online appendix B.
Any bargaining equilibrium f(pRj (tj))j2J ; te;peg can thus be replicated as a sequential
equilibrium of game   with regular price responses and tari¤s. The proof is constructive
and relies on contingent tari¤s, t^M
j
i
ij = t
e
ij + F
Ri
ij and t^
Rij
ij = t
e
ij   FMiij , where the fees FMiij
and FRjij leave the receiving agent indi¤erent between accepting or rejecting the o¤er. The
construction also relies on price responses that coincide with (pRj (tj))j2J when prots
are single-peaked, and may otherwise slightly di¤er to ensure their regularity.
Conversely, any sequential equilibrium of game   with regular price responses (p^Rj (tj))j2J
and regular tari¤s (^t)2 (implying that the equilibrium prices satisfy p^ = p^ for any
 2 ) can be replicated as a bargaining equilibrium. There again, the proof is construc-
tive and relies on the same price responses and on the expected tari¤s teij = Eij [t^
ij
ij ].
Remark: on the role of delegated negotiations. To assess the role of delegation, consider
the direct negotiationsgame  D, derived from   by assuming that each rm assigns
the same agent for all bilateral negotiations. The receiver of an unexpected o¤er may
then wonder about what the deviating rm is o¤ering to the others  the consistency
requirement imposed on sequential equilibria has little bite in game  D. As already noted,
the literature often focuses on passive beliefs,34 which is in line with the bargaining
equilibrium approach and the spirit of the delegated negotiations game  : each channel
takes as given the other equilibrium contracts when negotiating its own tari¤. Indeed,
any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with passive beliefs (PBEPBhereafter) of game  D
constitutes a sequential equilibrium of game  . Unfortunately, the converse does not hold:
the a sequential equilibria of game   constitute the only candidate PBEPBs of game  D
but, with downstream Bertrand competition, these candidate PBEPBs may not survive
multilateral deviations, where a rm deviates on its o¤ers to multiple partners; as a
result, PBEPBs may fail to exist in game  D.35 In other words, delegating negotiations
34See the papers mentioned in footnote 26 and Collard-Wexler et al. (2019) for a recent example.
35For the case of an upstream monopoly, the contract equilibrium characterized by OBrien and Sha¤er
(1992) constitutes the only candidate PBEPB. Rey and Vergé (2004) show however that it does not
survive multilateral deviations when downstream rms are insu¢ ciently di¤erentiated. By contrast, for
downstream Cournot competition, existence of a PBEPB has been established by Hart and Tirole (1990)
for an upstream monopoly, and extended by Nocke and Rey (2018) for an upstream duopoly. McAfee
and Schwartz (1995) note however that existence problems arise again when negotiated tari¤s become
publicly observable before downstream decisions are made.
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to distinct agents does not a¤ect the set of candidate PBEPB outcomes surviving single-
channel deviations, but ensures existence by preventing multi-channel deviations.
Remark: deterministic outcomes. In game  , the retail outcome is deterministic but,
for each channel, the equilibrium tari¤ depends on which side makes the o¤er. It is
however straightforward to extend the game so as to ensure that the equilibrium tari¤s,
too, are deterministic. To see this, consider the modied game  ^, in which the following
preliminary stage is added:
Stage 0. For each Mi   Rj pair, M ji o¤ers a tari¤ tij (qij) to Rij, who then accepts or
rejects it;36 all o¤ers are simultaneous and secret, and all acceptance decisions are
also simultaneous and secret. If the o¤er is accepted, the game directly proceeds to
stage 2, otherwise it proceeds to stage 1.
Stage 1 now constitutes an outside option for stage 0. Consider a bargaining equi-
librium B = f(pRj (tj))j2J ; te;peg and the associated equilibrium of game   identied
by Proposition 3, E = f(p^Rj (tj))j2J ; (^t)2; (p^)2;bg; by construction, they satisfy
teij = Eij [t^
ij
ij ] (for (i; j) 2 I  J ) and yield the same retail prices (p^ = pe for any
 2 ) and the same expected prots, feMigi2I and feRjgj2J . Suppose now that, in
the modied game  ^, all players adopt the same strategies and beliefs as in E for stages
1 and 2, and consider the negotiation for channel Mi   Rj in stage 0. As subsequent
negotiations (in case of rejection at stage 0) are bilaterally e¢ cient, and Rij can secure
eRj by proceeding to stage 1, it is optimal for M
j
i to o¤er the expected tari¤ t
e
ij and
for Rij to accept it. Hence, o¤ering and accepting the tari¤s t
e = E [^t
] in stage 0, to-
gether with the strategies prescribed by E in the following stages, constitutes a sequential
equilibrium of the modied game  ^. It follows that there is an equivalence between the
bargaining equilibria, the equilibria of game   with regular tari¤s and price responses,
and the deterministic equilibria of the modied game  ^.
Remark: linear tari¤s. When tari¤s are restricted to be linear, bilateral negotiations
are no longer e¢ cient and Nash bargaining amounts to maximizing
 
Giji
ij
(1 Gijj )1 ij ,
where Gijl denotes the gains from trade for rm l = i; j when negotiating the tari¤
tij. We show in Online Appendix C that a bargaining equilibrium can still be repli-
cated as an equilibrium of the modied game  ^ for appropriate bargaining parameters
 =
 
ij

(i;j)2IJ (i.e., if the pair Mi Rj reaches stage 1, M
j
i gets to make a take-it-or-
leave-it o¤er with probability ij) the parameters  however depend on more variables
than the weights .
36Which agent (M ji or R
i
j) is selected to make the o¤er in this stage does not a¤ect the analysis.
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5 Vertical restraints and agency model
To illustrate the exibility of our approach, we rst consider the impact of vertical re-
straints, namely resale price maintenance (hereafter, RPM) and price parity agreements
(hereafter, PPAs). These provisions are commonly observed in practice and both have
triggered heated policy debates.37 We then discuss how our results are a¤ected when
switching to the agency business model (in which the supplier remains the owner of
goods and/or services and chooses the nal prices), which is often adopted by online
retail platforms. We only provide here a quick summary of the analysis and of the main
results. The complete analysis is presented in Online appendix D.
5.1 Resale price maintenance
To allow for RPM, we suppose here that each Mi   Rj pair can contract not only on a
(non-linear) tari¤ tij (qij), but also if it wishes to do so on the retail price pij. The
timing of wholesale negotiations and retail pricing decisions remains as before, with the
caveat that in case of RPM, Rj sets the price pij that has been agreed upon.
Allowing for RPM does not destabilize the above cost-based tari¤ equilibria. Indeed,
if the other channels sign cost-based tari¤s, then a cost-based tari¤ tij induces Rj to
maximize its joint prot with Mj, and there is no need for contracting on pij.38
However, RPM can sustain many other outcomes, even with simple two-part tari¤s.
As the wholesale price wij is no longer needed to drivethe retail price pij (which can now
be agreed upon through RPM),Mi and Rj can now set wij in any arbitrary way, adjusting
the xed fee Fij so as to share the prot as desired. However, wij a¤ectsMis negotiation
with the other retailers, as well as Rjs negotiation with the other manufacturers. For
instance, when negotiating with Mh, Rj takes into account the impact of the price phj
on its downstream margin on brand i, pij   wij. Likewise, when negotiating with Rk,
Mi takes into account the impact of the price pik on its upstream margin on Rjs sales,
wij   ci. As there are n  m instruments (the wholesale prices) for n  m targets (the
retail prices), it follows that, generically, any retail prices can be sustained in equilibrium.
Proposition 4 (RPM) With RPM, any price vector p can generically be sustained.
Proof. See Proposition D.1 in Online appendix D.1.
We have focused so far on full RPM,where a retailer must charge the exact price
negotiated with the manufacturer; our framework can also shed some light on the role
of minimum RPM (i.e., price oors) and maximum RPM (i.e., price caps). For instance,
37PPAs have gained importance with the development of online platforms.
38Using RPM however reduces Rjs prot, as Rj can no longer adjust pij if another negotiation breaks
down: this reduces Rjs disagreement payo¤ and, therefore, its equilibrium payo¤.
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restricting attention to symmetric equilibria, any price above the competitive price p
can be sustained with minimum RPM (resp., maximum RPM) when there is more (resp.,
less) substitution among manufacturersbrands than among retailersstores.
Proposition 5 (min vs max RPM) Restricting attention to symmetric equilibria, any
price p > p can generically be sustained with minimum RPM (resp., maximum RPM)
when there is more (resp., less) substitution among manufacturers than among retailers.
Proof. See Proposition D.2 in Online appendix D.1.
To see the intuition, consider rst retail pricing decisions. Absent RPM, when set-
ting their prices retailers account for their downstream margins but ignore their partners
upstream margins. Hence, if upstream margins are positive, double marginalization prob-
lems arise: pij exceeds the level maximizing the joint prot of Mi and Rj, which calls for
a price cap. Conversely, if upstream margins are negative, price oors are needed.
The next step is to determine the sign of upstream margins. With cost-based tari¤s,
eachMi Rj pair maximizes the prot generated by Rjs sales, which leads to a compet-
itive outcome. When instead upstream margins are not zero, Mi and Rj moreover take
into account the margins charged by Mi to Rjs rivals, but ignores the margins on Rjs
sales of the other brands. It follows that, to sustain supra-competitive prices, negative
upstream margins are required when there is more substitution upstream; price oors are
then needed to counter retailersexcessive incentives to lower prices. When instead there
is more substitution downstream, positive upstream margins are required, and price caps
are then needed to counter retailersexcessive incentives to raise prices.39
5.2 Price parity agreements
We now turn to PPAs, which require the retailer to price the manufacturers brand at the
same level as (or no less/more than) competing brands. These provisions have triggered
debates about their potential anti-competitive e¤ects. For instance, in April 2010, the
UK O¢ ce of Fair Trading (OFT) considered that bilateral agreements linking the retail
price of a tobacco brand to the prices of competing brands (at the same stores) was
anti-competitive and had the same adverse e¤ects as RPM.40
To shed some light on this debate, we now consider a variant of our setting in which,
in the second stage, retailers must charge the same price on all brands. We nd that
PPAs have little impact on the equilibrium outcome:
39Price oors thus have no e¤ect in this case; by contrast, Allain and Chambolle (2011) nd that
industry-wide price oors are always anticompetitive.
40See Decision CA98/01/2010 of the O¢ ce of Fair Trading, Case CE/2596-03: Tobacco, 15 April 2010.
This decision was later quashed by the Competition Appeals Tribunal (see the CAT Judgement [2011]
CAT 41, 12 December 2011), who however did not discuss the possible anticompetitive e¤ects of PPAs.
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Proposition 6 (price parity agreements) Under PPAs, in the class of bargaining
equilibria based on di¤erentiable tari¤s and positive quantities:
(i) equilibrium tari¤s are all cost-based; and,
(ii) if p is symmetric across brands, then prices remain equal to p.
Proof. See Proposition D.3 in Online appendix D.2.
The insight of Proposition 2 thus carries over when retailers must set uniform prices
across brands requiring a smooth retail behavior moreover boils down to tari¤s being
di¤erentiable and price responses being interior. PPAs thus have no impact on equilib-
rium tari¤s, which remain cost-based. If in addition the equilibrium prices are already
symmetric absent PPAs, then PPAs have no impact on retail prices either.
5.3 Agency model
We have focussed so far on the resalebusiness model usually adopted by brick-and-
mortarretailers: distributors buy goods or services from suppliers, and resell them to
consumers. Online platforms often adopt instead an agencybusiness model: suppliers
sell directly to consumers, and platforms obtain commissions based on sales.
This amounts to turning the framework upside-down. Manufacturers are now down-
stream and control retail prices and remunerate their upstream partners (i.e., the retail-
ers/platforms) with (non-linear) commissions. The timing thus becomes:
Stage 1: Each pair negotiates a (possibly non-linear) commission schedule based on the
volume of sales achieved by the manufacturer on the retailers platform.
Stage 2: Manufacturers simultaneously set the retail prices for their products, for each
platform that carries them.
It follows that, as long as manufacturers adopt a smooth pricing behavior, marginal
commissions must reect (upstream rms) distribution costs; the equilibrium outcome is
therefore that of competition between multi-storerms. Whether this is more compet-
itive than the previous multi-brand retail oligopoly depends on whether manufacturers
or retailers are closer substitutes (see Online appendix D.3).
Price parity agreements (now requiring manufacturers to set the same prices on all
platforms) have again no impact on the equilibrium outcome beyond imposing symmetry.
That is, equilibrium tari¤s remain cost-based and, when rms are symmetric at both
stages of the vertical chains (and the equilibrium prices are symmetric in the absence
of PPAs), then price parity agreements do not a¤ect the equilibrium retail prices either.
These insights are in sharp contrast with the recent literature on price parity agreements.
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However, so far this literature has focused on either linear commissions41 or constant
revenue-sharing rules,42 which generate contractual ine¢ ciencies; instead, we allow here
for general non-linear commissions and thus for e¢ cient bilateral contracting.43
6 Endogenous network
Tari¤s being cost-based, intrabrand competition dissipates prots when retailers are close
substitutes; rms would then benet from limiting the number of distribution channels.
Yet, the above bargaining approach predicts that all channels are always active. To see
why, suppose that rms negotiate cost-based two-part tari¤s. In every bilateral negotia-
tion, and regardless of which other channels are active, the manufacturer is then willing
to supply for any non-negative fee, and the retailer is willing to add the manufacturers
brand to its portfolio if the fee is su¢ ciently low; they thus activate their channel.
To endogenize the channel network, the framework must therefore allowmanufacturers
and/or retailers to select explicitly their trading partners.44 Prompted by the observation
that many insurers limit the set of hospitals to which they o¤er access, Ho and Lee
(2019) and Ghili (2018) allow insurers, in case of disagreement with a selected hospital,
to replace it with an alternative hospital from outside the network. The outcome remains
the same as Nash-in-Nash when networks are complete, but insurers can obtain more
favorable terms by opting for selective networks, as hospitals must then compete to join
the networks.45 Lee and Fong (2013) adopt another, innite horizon framework in which,
at the beginning of every period, rms decide which new links to activate and/or to break
(and incur a cost per added/withdrawn link); Nash-in-Nash bargaining then takes place
within the resulting network.
We explore here an alternative approach, which consists in introducing a preliminary
stage in which the distribution network is endogenously determined through a simultane-
ous veto-game. This approach is similar in spirit to that of Lee and Fong (2013), but
in a static setting. It turns out to remain reasonably tractable and yet predicts the emer-
gence of selective distribution networks when retailers are close substitutes, as intuition
suggests.
Formally we assume that, in a preliminary stage, manufacturers and retailers choose
which channels to activate, each rm having veto power. That is, each retailer announces
which manufacturer(s) it wishes to deal with (if any), and likewise each manufacturer
41See Boik and Corts (2016) and Johansen and Vergé (2017).
42See Johnson (2017) and Foros et al. (2017).
43Allowing for direct sales by suppliers would amount to adding a platform (the direct saleschannel)
o¤ering intermediation services at cost, and would not a¤ect the above insights.
44For an earlier analysis of buyer-seller network formation without downstream competition, see, e.g.,
Kranton and Minehart (2001).
45For instance, if hospitals are close substitutes, then dealing with a single hospital enables insurers to
appropriate most of the prot, regardless of their bilateral bargaining power.
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announces which retailer(s) it wishes to deal with (if any); these announcements are
simultaneous and publicly observable. A channel then becomes active if and only if both
partners wish to deal with each other. This preliminary stage determines the channel
network, which gives rise a bargaining equilibrium dened along the same lines as before.
It is well-known that veto games are subject to coordination problems that may generate a
multiplicity of equilibria in particular, there always exists a trivial equilibrium in which
no channel becomes active. To avoid these coordination issues, we focus on Coalition-
Proof Nash Equilibria (hereafter, CPNE).46
As the number of potential networks grows geometrically with the number of rms,
in this section we focus on the simplest relevant case with two symmetric manufac-
turers, labelled MA and MB for convenience, and two symmetric retailers, R1 and R2.
Manufacturersand retailersunit costs are respectively denoted by cA = cB = c and
1 = 2 = , and, for any price vector p  (pA1; pB1; pA2; pB2), any i 6= h 2 fA;Bg and
any j 6= k 2 f1; 2g, the demand for brand i at store j is given by:
Dij (p)  D (pij; phj; pik; phk) ;
where the function D (:) is continuously di¤erentiable. Bargaining sharing rules, too, are
symmetric: ij =  for every i 2 I and every j 2 J .
6.1 Bargaining equilibria
We provide in Online appendix E.1 a complete characterization of the bargaining equi-
libria for each distribution network, and summarize here their main features. As in the
baseline model, tari¤s are cost-based and there exists a unique equilibrium in two-part tar-
i¤s. When all rms activate at most one channel, the equilibrium outcome is also unique.
Otherwise, there may exist multiple equilibrium outcomes, which di¤er in the division of
prots. To ensure that rmscontinuation payo¤s are properly dened, throughout this
section we focus on the equilibria based on two-part tari¤s,47 which are as follows.
Bilateral monopoly: a single channel is active, say i j. Mi andRj obtain mM  m
and mR  (1  )m, respectively, where m denotes the monopoly prot obtained
generated by the channel.
 Exclusive dealing: two unconnected channels are active, say i   j and h   k. Man-
ufacturersand retailersprots are EDM  ED and EDR  (1  ) ED, where ED
denotes the per-channel prot in a duopoly where the two productsare di¤erentiated
both upstream and downstream.
46See Bernheim et al. (1987). It follows that the analysis does not rely on a strong form of commitment,
as no coalition of rms has an incentive to renegotiate the agreements.
47The analysis is thus valid when only two-part tari¤s are feasible, or when rms favor two-part tari¤s
when they are indi¤erent between those and other non-linear tari¤s.
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 Upstream foreclosure: a single manufacturer deals with both retailers. Manufac-
turers and retailers prots are respectively UFM  2UF and UFR  (1  ) UF ,
where UF denotes the per-channel prot in a duopoly where the two products are dif-
ferentiated only downstream.
Downstream foreclosure: a single retailer deals with both manufacturers. The manu-
facturersand the retailers prots are DFM  
 
2DF   m and DFR  2 (1  )DF +
2
 
m   DF , where DF denotes the per-channel prot when a downstreammonopolist
sells both brands.
 Single exclusion: a single channel, say h  k, is excluded. All rms are thus directly
or indirectly connected, as retailers have a common manufacturer (namely, Mi), and one
of them (Rj) also deals with the other manufacturer (Mk). We denote respectively by
SEMm and 
SE
Rm the prots obtained by the multi-partner manufacturer and retailer (Mi
and Rj) and by SEMs and 
SE
Rs the prots obtained by the single-partner manufacturer
and retailer (Mh and Rk).
 Interlocking relationships: all channels are active; rmsprots are then:
M = 2 (2
   ^) and R = 2 [(1  )  +  (^   )] ;
where  denotes the equilibrium per-channel prot, whereas ^ denotes the prot that
a retailer could achieve by dropping one brand.48
Two observations readily follow from manufacturers being imperfect substitutes:
 Bilateral monopoly versus downstream foreclosure: in both networks there is a single
retailer, carrying only one brand in the rst case, and both brands in the second case;
brand di¤erentiation thus yields: 2DF > m > DF > 0.
 Upstream foreclosure versus exclusive dealing: in both networks there are two mono-
brand retailers, carrying the same brand in the rst case, and di¤erent brands in the
second case; brand di¤erentiation thus yields: ED > UF > 0.
6.2 Equilibrium network
We now study the CPNE of the network formation game. For expositional purposes, we
restrict attention to cases where manufacturers do have bargaining power (i.e.,  > 0).49
We rst note that at least two channels are active. Otherwise, a pair of vertically re-
lated inactive rms could generate a prot by activating their channel, and this deviating
coalition would obviously be self-enforcing, as both rms would benet from it. Fur-
thermore, upstream foreclosure cannot arise: the excluded supplier (say, Mh) and either
48Using symmetry,  and ^ correspond to the prots j and 
ij
j dened in Proposition 1.
49When  = 0, coalition-proofness has little bite, as manufacturers obtain no prot anyway. However,
a unique equilibrium is selected as  tends to 0.
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retailer (say, Rj) would gain from activating their channel (possibly in addition to the
channel i  j): Mh would benet from avoiding exclusion (EDM ;SEMs > 0), and Rj would
benet from dealing with a di¤erent supplier than Rk (maxfEDR ;SERmg  EDR > UFR ).
Intuitively, it is worth distributing a brand through both retailers only if they are
substantially di¤erentiated; otherwise, intrabrand competition dissipates prots without
adding much demand. The following Proposition conrms this intuition by considering
the two polar cases where retailers are either perfect substitutes or local monopolies:50
Proposition 7 (endogenous network)
(i) When retailers do not compete against each other, the unique CPNE yields inter-
locking relationships.
(ii) When instead retailers are perfect substitutes:
 if ED > 2DF   m, the unique CPNE yields exclusive dealing;
 if ED < 2DF   m, the unique CPNE yields downstream foreclosure.
Proof. See Online appendix E.2.
Interestingly, rmsrelative bargaining power has no impact on the equilibrium net-
work. When retailers are local monopolies, opening an additional channel always bene-
ts both partners. When instead retailers are perfect substitutes, the network choice is
driven by manufacturers, who want to deal with a single retailer; the relevant comparison
is therefore between downstream foreclosure and exclusive dealing. As manufacturers
obtain a share  of their contributions to their retailers prot, the outcome follows from
a comparison between these contributions i.e., the channel prot ED under exclusive
dealing, and the additional prot from expanding the brand portfolio, 2DF   m, under
downstream foreclosure.
To provide further insights, we study below the following linear demand specication,
in which costs are normalized to zero (c =  = 0) and, for i 6= h 2 fA;Bg and j 6= k 2
f1; 2g, the (inverse) demand for brand i at store j is given by, for some ;  2 ]0; 1[:
P (qij; qhj; qik; qhk) = 1  qij   qhj   qik   qhk:
The parameter  (resp., ) reects the degree of substitution between manufacturers
(resp., retailers).51 The next proposition conrms the previous insights:
50While we have so far ruled out these extreme cases for expositional purposes, it is straightforward
to extend the previous analysis, as long as manufacturers remain imperfect substitutes.
51To limit the number of parameters, the price sensitivity across both manufacturers and retailers is
supposed to be the product of those across manufacturers () and across retailers (). Similar insights
obtain when making this assumption for the demand D rather than the inverse demand P , or when
normalizing instead the demand so as to ensure that P (q; q; q; q) remains constant as  and  evolve.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium distribution network
Proposition 8 (endogenous network - linear demand) For the above linear demand
specication, there exists  () 2]0; 1[, which is a decreasing function of , such that:
 if  <  (), then the unique CPNE yields interlocking relationships;
 if instead    (), then the unique CPNE yields exclusive dealing.
Proof. See Online appendix E.3.
These insights are illustrated by Figure 1. There is again a unique CPNE, which
does not depend on rmsrelative bargaining powers (): interlocking relationships arise
when retailers are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated, otherwise rms prefer avoiding intrabrand
competition. For this linear demand example, we have that ED > 2DF   m; man-
ufacturers thus favor exclusive dealing over downstream foreclosure (EDM > 
DF
M ), and
retailers concur (to avoid exclusion).52
52This analysis thus provides a micro-foundation for exclusive dealing network structure, which has
been the focus of many studies see, e.g., Bonanno and Vickers (1988), Horn and Wolinski (1988), and
Milliou and Petrakis (2007).
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7 Mergers
We now consider the e¤ect of horizontal (upstream or downstream) and vertical mergers.
Whereas the literature on horizontal mergers often focuses on price e¤ects,53 our approach
provides a natural framework for studying the impact on distribution networks as well. As
we will see, taking this dimension into consideration can yield very di¤erent conclusions.54
For the sake of exposition, we stick to the above successive duopoly setting and main-
tain the focus on equilibria based on two-part tari¤s. We provide a complete analysis in
Online Appendix F and only highlight here the main ndings.
7.1 Downstream merger
A merger between R1 and R2 creates a multi-location retail monopolist, R. For simplic-
ity, we assume that manufacturers cannot discriminate according to the channel through
which their products are sold (e.g., brick-and-mortar versus online sales); hence, R nego-
tiates with each Mi a single two-part tari¤, ti(qi) = Fi +wiqi. Equilibrium tari¤s remain
cost-based55 but eliminating downstream competition raises prices to the monopoly level.
Beyond this classic horizontal e¤ect, a downstream merger may also a¤ect the distri-
bution network: pre-merger, exclusivity can arise to avoid downstream competition; by
creating a retail monopoly, the merger eliminates this motivation and makes interlocking
relationships more likely. Indeed, for the linear demand specication, the unique CPNE
always involves interlocking relationships. The merger may therefore benet consumers
by expanding product variety. This is for instance the case when retailers are good
enough substitutes so that exclusive dealing arises pre-merger, and brand di¤erentiation
is so large that prices are then close to the monopoly level. The following proposition
conrms this intuition for the linear demand specication:
Proposition 9 (downstream merger)
(i) A downstream merger yields monopolistic retail prices for any given distribution
network but makes interlocking relationships more likely. Hence, it reduces consumer
surplus and total welfare when interlocking relationships already arise pre-merger,
but otherwise expands the distribution network and can then increase consumer
surplus and total welfare  all the more so if, pre-merger, the two channels are
substantially di¤erentiated, so that prices are already close to monopoly level.
53Regarding horizontal mergers in vertically related markets see, e.g., von Ungern-Stenberg (1996) and
Dobson and Waterson (1997) for downstream mergers and Horn and Wolinsky (1988) and Ziss (1995) for
upstream mergers. More recently, Milliou and Sandonis (2018) consider the impact on product portfolio.
54There is a substantial literature on vertical integration and foreclosure; see, e.g., Salinger (1988),
Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990), Hart and Tirole (1990) and, more recently, Nocke and Rey (2018). We
extend the insights of the last two papers to multiple upstream rms and price competition downstream.
55This is in line with Bernheim and Whinston (1985, 1986, 1998).
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(ii) For the linear demand specication considered above, the merger thus reduces con-
sumer surplus and total welfare whenever  <  (); when instead    (), there
exist ^S () and ^W (), which are decreasing functions of  satisfying ^S (1) =
^W (1) = 0, such that the merger reduces consumer surplus (resp., total welfare) if
 < ^S () (resp.,  < ^W ()) and increases it if  > ^S () (resp.  > ^W ()).
Proof. See Online appendix F.1.
Pre-merger, the condition    () ensures that exclusive dealing arises and the
conditions  < ^s () (for s = S;W ) ensure that brand di¤erentiation induces high
prices; as a result, the network-expansion e¤ect of the merger more than compensates
the price increase to the monopoly level: taking into consideration this network e¤ect
thus reverses the standard conclusion based on prices.
7.2 Upstream merger
A merger between MA and MB creates a multi-brand upstream monopolist, M . For
simplicity, we assume thatM then bundles the two brands and thus negotiates with each
Rj a unique xed fee Fj, besides the wholesale prices wAj and wBj.56 Equilibrium tari¤s
still remain cost-based; hence, for any given distribution network, the merger a¤ects
neither wholesale nor retail prices, but only the division of prot.
The merger may however alter the equilibrium network, and a¤ect consumers in this
way. For example, when retailers are close substitutes, competing manufacturers would
rather distribute their products through di¤erent retailers, so as to improve their bargain-
ing position;M may instead decide to sell both brands through the same retailer, so as to
avoid downstream competition and increase industry prot. Likewise, where competing
manufacturers would opt for interlocking relationships, M may restrict the distribution
of one brand to improve the protability of its other brand. We have:
Proposition 10 (upstream merger)
(i) An upstream merger does not a¤ect retail prices for in any given distribution net-
work but may generate (complete or partial) vertical foreclosure, in which case it
reduces consumer surplus and total welfare.
(ii) For the above linear demand specication, there is still a unique CPNE post-merger,
and the merger either has no impact on the network (and, thus, on consumers and
total welfare), or alters it in a way that reduces both consumer surplus and total
56The bargaining equilibrium is then similar to a game of delegated negotiations, in which M has two
agents, each negotiating a bundled tari¤ with a retailer. Likewise, in the previous case of an downstream
merger, the bargaining equilibrium is similar to a game in which R has two agents, each negotiating a
single tari¤ with a manufacturer.
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welfare; specically, there exist ~ () and  (), which are decreasing functions of 
satisfying 0 < ~ () <  () <  () < 1 for  > 0, such that:
 if    (), then the merger alters the network from exclusive dealing to
downstream foreclosure;
 if instead ~ () <  <  (), then the merger alters the network from inter-
locking relationships to exclusive dealing;
 otherwise, the merger has no impact on the network.
Proof. See Online appendix F.2.
Hence, despite the absence of direct price e¤ects, taking into consideration the e¤ect
of an upstream merger on the distribution network can give rise to competition concerns:
an horizontal merger between suppliers may trigger vertical foreclosure, as the merged
entity may stop supplying some products to some retailers.
7.3 Vertical merger
A merger between Mi and Rj creates a vertically integrated rm, I, that interacts with
the independent Mh and Rk. Mhs tari¤s remain cost-based but, as Rk now competes
with Is downstream subsidiary, either I stop supplying Rk, or it increases its wholesale
price (wik > c).57 In addition, in the latter case, Is downstream subsidiary now competes
less aggressively (despite facing cost-based tari¤s), as it takes into account the upstream
margin earned on Rks sales. As a result, for any given network in which Rk carries Mis
brand, the merger raises retail prices, which reduces consumer surplus and total welfare.
The merger may also alter the distribution network. Where an independent Mi can
limit intrabrand competition only through exclusivity, I can now achieve this by raising
wik; hence, the merger may induce Rk to carry both brands rather thanMhs brand only.
However, I also internalizes the impact of carrying Mhs brand on the protability of its
own brand, which makes interlocking relationships less likely. Indeed, we have:
Proposition 11 (vertical merger) For the above linear demand specication:
(i) When  <  () (interlocking relationships pre-merger), a vertical merger raises
the wholesale price charged to the independent retailer, and either does not a¤ect
the network or induces the integrated rm to drop the rival brand; it thus increases
retail prices and reduces both consumer surplus and total welfare.
(ii) When instead    () (exclusive dealing pre-merger), there exists IR (; ) and
ED (; ) > max

 () ; IR (; )
	
such that:
57In the formal analysis, for the sake of exposition we assume that the wholesale price wik is observed
by the downstream subsidiary Rj , and thus becomes public. However, even if wik were not observed
by Rj , I would still have an incentive to raise it so as to limit the competition faced by Rj (see, e.g.,
Hart and Tirole 1990).
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 If  > ED (; ), then the merger has no network or price e¤ect; it thus has
no impact on consumer surplus and total welfare.
 If instead   IR (; ), then the merger fully expands the distribution net-
work, which increases consumer surplus and total welfare.
Otherwise, the merged rm supplies the rival retailer, but charges a positive
margin; as a result, the merger reduces consumer surplus (it also reduces total
welfare if retailers are close enough substitutes).
Proof. See Online appendix F.3.
The simulations performed for the case of a linear demand show that the parameter
regions in which a vertical merger is either neutral or pro-competitive are rather small
(see, e.g., Figure 4 in Online appendix F.3), suggesting that the upward price pressure
that it creates is likely to dominate any network expansion benet.
8 Observable contracts
While our assumption of secret contracting is natural for many industries, it is worth
noting that the same framework, as well as its micro-foundation, can be used as well
when wholesale tari¤s are common knowledge among downstream rms. To see this,
modify the previous two-stage game by replacing its stage 2 with:
Stage 2 (observable contracts): Retailers, having observed all wholesale tari¤s, si-
multaneously set retail prices for the brand(s) that they carry.
A bargaining equilibrium of this modied game can then dened as follows. In
stage 2, retail prices constitute a Nash equilibrium given the negotiated tari¤s. In stage
1, each Mi  Rj pair negotiates a tari¤ tij (qij) that: (i) maximizes the joint prot of Mi
and Rj, given the other equilibrium contracts and the resulting retail price equilibrium;
and (ii) gives a share ij of the additional prot generated by a successful negotiation to
Mi (and thus a share 1  ij to Ri). Formally:
Denition 4 (observable contracts) A bargaining equilibrium with observable con-
tracts is a vector of price responses pR(t) = (pRj (t))j2J , together with a vector of equilib-
rium tari¤s te = (tej )j2J and a vector of equilibrium prices p
e = (pej )j2J , such that:
 In stage 2, the price responses pR(t):
 constitute a Nash equilibrium, for any t negotiated in stage 1:
8j 2 J ;pRj (t) 2 arg max
pj
X
i2I
"  
pij   j

Dij
 
pj;p
R
 j (t)

 tij
 
Dij
 
pj;p
R
 j (t)
 # ;
 satisfy pe = pR (te).
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 In stage 1, for every (i; j) 2 I  J , the equilibrium tari¤ teij:
maximizes the joint prot of Mi and Rj, given Rjs other equilibrium tari¤s,
te i;j, and the retail price responses, p
R (t); that is, tij = teij maximizes: 
pRij
 
tij; t
e
 i;j; t
e
 j
  ci   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 gives Mi and Rj shares ij and 1   ij respectively, of the additional prot
generated by their relationship.
These bargaining equilibria can be generated by the game of delegated negotiations
 O, derived from game   by replacing its stage 2 with the above Stage 2 (observable
contracts). As tari¤s are publicly observed at the beginning of stage 2, each continuation
game constitutes a proper subgame, and it is thus natural to look for the subgame perfect
equilibria (SPEs hereafter) of game  O. Ensuring the existence of Nash equilibria for any
set of wholesale tari¤s is however problematic for example, su¢ ciently concave tari¤s
would generate convex prot functions and discontinuous price responses. A solution
consists in focusing on two-part tari¤s, which allow for bilateral e¢ ciency without raising
convexity issues: the existence of continuation equilibria is then guaranteed if, in the
downstream market where m multiproduct rms compete against each other, there exists
a Nash equilibrium for any prole of constant unit costs.
In what follows, we therefore focus on two-part tari¤s of the form tij (qij) = Fij+wijqij,
which we denote by tij = fwij; Fijg. For the sake of exposition, we further assume that,
in case of multiple equilibria, the selection of the continuation equilibrium depends on
unit costs (and thus on wholesale prices), and not on xed costs (franchise fees); that is,
the price responses can be expressed as pR (w), where w = (wj)j2J denotes the vector
of wholesale prices. With this restriction, the next proposition establishes a perfect
correspondence between the bargaining equilibria and the SPEs of game  O:
Proposition 12 (micro-foundation: observable two-part tari¤s)
(i) For any bargaining equilibrium of the form B = fpR (w) ; te = fwe;Feg;peg, there
exist (F)2 such that E = f(p^Rj (tj))j2J ; (^t = fwe;Fg)2; (p^ = pe)2g
constitutes a SPE of game  O, giving all rms the same expected prots as B.
(ii) Conversely, for any SPE of game  O of the form E = fp^R(w); (^t = fw^; F^g)2; p^g,
B = f(p^Rj (tj))j2J ; te = fw^;Fe = E[F^]g; p^g constitutes a bargaining equilibrium,
giving all rms the same expected prots as E.
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Proof. See Online appendix G.1.
The intuition is the same as for secret contracts. Consider the bilateral negotiation
betweenMi and Rj, say, in game  O. Given the retail price response pR
 
wij;w
e
 i;j;w
e
 j

,
the selected agent chooses the wholesale price wij that maximizes the joint prot of the
two rms. Hence, which side makes the o¤er has no impact on the wholesale prices, which
coincide with bargaining equilibrium ones. Which side makes the o¤er however a¤ects the
xed fees, as the selected agent appropriates the bilateral gains from trade; as a result,
expected xed fees coincide with those negotiated in a bargaining equilibrium.
Intuitively, the equilibrium wholesale prices are now above cost. Indeed, starting
from cost-based tari¤s, a slight increase in wij, say, generates only a second-order loss
of e¢ ciency in the bilateral relationship between Mi and Rj (as wij = ci would then
maximize the joint prot of Mi and Rj), but generates a rst-order strategic benet, by
inducing the other retailers to raise their prices (assuming, as is often the case, that retail
prices are strategic complements). This, in turn, implies that retail prices and industry
prot are higher under public contracting than under secret contracting. Yet, we would
expect the outcome to be somewhat competitive.
To explore this further, consider a market structure in which: (i) costs are symmetric
(ci = c and j = ); (ii) demand is symmetric and such that a uniform increase in all
the prices of a retailer decreases its demand; (iii) total industry prot is concave in prices
and maximal for symmetric monopoly prices (pMij = p
M); (iv) all products are (imperfect)
substitutes and retail prices are strategic complements; and: (v) symmetric wholesale
prices wij = w generate a symmetric retail price equilibrium pij = pR (w), where pR (w)
increases with w and is such that pR
 
wM

= pM for some wM > c. Suppose further that:
Assumption AO(observable contracts) Starting from a symmetric outcome where
all wholesale prices are equal to w, increasing wij, for some i 2 I and j 2 J :
(i) decreases the total quantity sold by Mi;
(ii) increases the total quantity sold by any other Mh, for h 6= i, as well as the total
quantity sold by any other Rk, for k 6= j.
Under Assumption A, secret contracting in two-part tari¤s yields a unique equilibrium,
where wholesale prices are at cost: wij = c; Assumption AO ensures that retail prices are
thus also symmetric: pij = p
. The next proposition conrms the intuition that public
contracting generates in that case higher prices and prots:
Proposition 13 (public contracting raises prices and prots) Under Assumptions
A and AO, any bargaining equilibrium with symmetric observable two-part tari¤s tOij =
wO; FO
	
generates positive upstream margins (i.e., wO > c) and symmetric retail prices
pij = p
O that lie between the competitive and monopoly levels: p < pO < pM .
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Proof. See Online appendix G.2.
Remark: on the role of delegated negotiations. Proposition 12 shows that bargaining
equilibria can be again interpreted as (here, subgame perfect) equilibria of a delegated
negotiations game. Assuming that rms delegate the bilateral negotiations with their
partners to distinct agents again ensures existence. This is achieved not only by limiting
the scope for multilateral negotiations, as for secret contracting, but also by limiting the
scope for multilateral responsesto a deviation, which would otherwise arise with public
contracting. For example, in the direct negotiation game considered by Rey and Vergé
(2010), in which manufacturers have all the bargaining power in the bilateral negotiations,
a small reduction in one wholesale price charged by Mi to Rj, say, may induce any of
Rjs rivals to reject the o¤er made by any of Mis rivals. As a result, even for a simple
successive linear duopoly model such as the one considered in Proposition 13, multilateral
deviations and responses prevent the existence of a SPE in most of the parameter range.
Assuming delegated negotiations also a¤ect pricing incentives, however. For example,
when negotiating with Rj, M
j
i takes as given the xed fee that M
k
i is negotiating with
Rk. By contrast, in the case of direct negotiations, Mi would take into account the fact
that a reduction in wij, which is likely to induce Rj to price more aggressively and reduces
Rks prot, would induce a reduction in the xed fee that could be charged to Rk. Ignoring
this e¤ect is thus likely to induce manufacturers to price more aggressively.
Remark: deterministic outcomes and linear tari¤s. As for game  , the retail equilib-
rium outcome of game  O is deterministic but the negotiated tari¤s depend on which side
makes the o¤er. It is however straightforward to extend again the game so as to ensure
that the equilibrium tari¤s, too, are deterministic. Consider the extended game  ^O, in
which in a preliminary stage 0, one side can make an o¤er; the game proceeds as in  O if
the o¤er is rejected, otherwise it proceeds directly to the retail pricing stage. The same
reasoning as for secret tari¤s (with the caveat that any change in the tari¤s accepted at
stage 0 or 1 is now observed by all retailers before stage 2) applies; as a result, there
is an equivalence between the bargaining equilibria, the equilibria of game  O, and the
deterministic equilibria of the modied game  ^O.
The same reasoning carries over to the case of observable linear tari¤s: as before, any
bargaining equilibrium with observable linear tari¤s can be replicated as an equilibrium
of the extended game  ^O for appropriate bargaining parameters .
9 Conclusion
In the rst part of this paper, we develop a framework for the analysis of multilateral
vertical relations. The key features are (secret, bilateral) upstream negotiations, followed
by downstream price competition. The setting allows for any number of rms, any
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degree of product di¤erentiation, and any cost or demand asymmetry, at each stage of
the vertical chain; it also allows for any bargaining power within each vertical channel,
and places no restriction on the tari¤s that can be negotiated. To x ideas, we cast
the exposition in a manufacturer retailer setting, but the framework can be applied as
well to other contexts: media content and TV channels, hospitals and health insurance
providers, manufacturers and part suppliers, and so forth.
An appealing feature of this framework lies in its tractability. We show that equilib-
rium tari¤s are cost-based, whenever they induce a smooth downstream behavior (i.e., a
small change in the quantity sold for one brand by a retailer triggers only small changes
in the quantities sold for the other brands by that same retailer). The equilibrium down-
stream outcome thus replicates that of a multiproduct oligopoly. The division of the
prots however depends on the shape of the equilibrium tari¤s: downstream rms get a
higher (resp., lower) share of the industry prot when tari¤s are convex (resp., concave).
We provide a micro-foundation that relies on a non-cooperative game of delegated
negotiations. The bargaining equilibria correspond to the sequential equilibria of this
game, and correspond to the candidate perfect equilibria with passive beliefs of a game
of direct negotiations, as characterized by single-sided deviations; focussing on delegated
negotiations ensures existence by discarding the possibility of multi-sided deviations.
To illustrate the versatility of this framework, we consider several extensions. We rst
consider resale price maintenance (RPM) provisions, where the retail price of a product is
contractually set by its manufacturer. We show that even purely vertical, bilateral RPM
agreements drastically a¤ect competition; in particular, they can sustain industry-wide
monopoly prices, thus eliminating inter-brand as well as intrabrand competitive pressures.
We also nd that both maximum and minimum RPM can be used to raise prices above
their competitive levels, an insight at odds with the current legal treatment of RPM,
which treats minimum RPM substantially more harshly than maximum RPM.
We then turn to price parity agreements that restrict a retailers pricing policy across
competing brands. While antitrust agencies have sometimes viewed these price parity
agreements as a restriction of competition, similar to minimum RPM, in our setting
these contractual clauses are instead rather ine¤ective they do not substantially a¤ect
the equilibrium outcome, beyond imposing symmetry.
We also use our framework to study the agency business model widely adopted by
online retailers and intermediation platforms. This amounts to turning the initial resale
setting upside-down: manufacturers are now downstream and set nal price, whereas
retailers (or intermediation platforms) are upstream. The above insight carries over:
as long as rms can negotiate non-linear commissions, these must be cost-based. The
equilibrium outcome then replicates that of direct competition between multi-platform
rms. Likewise, price parity agreements (linking prices across distribution platforms) do
not substantially a¤ect the equilibrium outcome, beyond imposing symmetry.
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In the second part of this paper, we endogenize the channel network by introducing a
preliminary stage in which rms choose which channels to activate. To obtain a complete
characterization, we restrict attention to successive symmetric duopolies. In the polar case
where downstream rms are local monopolies, the unique (coalition-proof) equilibrium
has all channels being active. When downstream rms are instead perfect substitutes,
the unique equilibrium involves either exclusive dealing (each upstream rm dealing with
a di¤erent downstream rm) or downstream foreclosure (both upstream rms dealing
with a common downstream rm). When demand is linear, there is always a unique
(coalition-proof) equilibrium, with all channels being active if retailers are su¢ ciently
di¤erentiated, and exclusive dealing otherwise.
Finally, we use our extended framework to study the impact of mergers on the net-
work as well as on prices. Interestingly, this may lead to rather di¤erent conclusions
than when focusing on price e¤ects. In particular, a downstream merger may expand
the distribution network and benets consumers and society, despite the elimination of
downstream competition. Conversely, an upstream merger can trigger vertical foreclosure
and be anti-competitive despite the absence of direct price e¤ects.
That upstream contract terms are private and not observable by rival suppliers or
customers appears plausible in many markets. The implication that tari¤s are then cost-
based is moreover in line with the empirical analysis of Nilsen et al. (2016), who nd
that an upstream merger between Norwegian egg producers did not have any impact on
consumer prices, but only on the division of prots between producers and retailers. Yet,
other markets may be more transparent. It can therefore be useful to consider the case of
observable contracts. This appears di¢ cult in the absence of any restriction on admissible
tari¤s, but we show how to apply the above framework to the case of observable two-part
tari¤s. The case of secret or observable linear contracts is also considered as well. Which
assumption about the informational context or the relevant type of tari¤s provides the
best t could be empirically tested.
It would also be interesting to compare the predictions of our network formation
framework (which is static and uses coalition-proofness as an equilibrium selection device)
with those of alternative approaches, such as the dynamic approach developed by Lee
and Fong (2013) (using Markov-perfection as an equilibrium selection device). Finally,
the exibility and tractability of the approach studied in this paper makes it a good
instrument to study rmsdecisions over other dimensions, such as product portfolio or
investment in production capacity or innovation.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Let
ij  ij(p), j  j(p) = max
pj
j(pj;p

 j) and 
ij
j  max
p i;j
j((1;p i;j);p j)
denote the equilibrium prots achieved by rm j on brand i and in total, and in case of
a negotiation break-down. We rst establish the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Under Assumption A, in equilibrium:
0 < ij  j   ijj < ij:
Proof. We rst establish the rst inequality; using j = maxpj j
 
pj;p

 j

, we have:
ij = max
pj
j
 
pj;p

 j
 max
p i;j
j
 
(1;p i;j) ;p j

:
That the last expression is positive then follows from the fact that: (i) in the determi-
nation of ijj , Rj is constrained to set qij = 0; and (ii) from Assumption A, maximizing
j
 
pj;p

 j

with respect to pj leads to Dij (p) > 0.
To establish the second inequality, note that:
ijj = max
p i;j
X
h2Infig
hj
 
(1;p i;j) ;p j


X
h2Infig
hj
  1;p i;j ;p j
>
X
h2Infig
hj (p
)
= j   ij;
where the strict inequality stems from Assumption A.
We now prove Proposition 1. To establish existence, x a candidate equilibrium in
which each Mi   Rj pair, for i 2 I and j 2 J , signs the cost-based two-part tari¤
tij (qij) = F

ij + ciqij, where:
F ij = ij
 
j   ijj

;
and retail prices are equal to p. Consider the negotiation betweenMi andRj. Given their
other equilibrium tari¤s, (tik)k2Jnfjg and
 
thj

h2Infig, and the other retailersequilibrium
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prices, p j, they seek to maximize their joint prot, equal to: 
pj   ci   j

Dij
 
pj;p

 j

+
X
k2Jnfjg
F ik
+
X
h2Infig
 
phj   ch   j

Dhj
 
pj;p

 j
  F hj :
Assumption A ensures that this joint prot is maximal for pj = p
r
j
 
p j

. Furthermore,
given Rjs other equilibrium tari¤s, t i;j, adopting a tari¤ tij leads Rj to maximize its
own prot, equal to:  
pij   j

Dij
 
pj;p

 j
  tij  Dij  pj;p j
+
X
h2Infig
 
phj   ci   j

Dhj
 
pj;p

 j
  F hj :
A cost-based two-part tari¤ in the form tij (qij) = Fij + ciqij is then optimal, as it makes
Rjs variable prot equal to the joint variable prot of Mi and Rj.
To complete the proof of existence, it su¢ ces to show that the xed fees satisfy the
Nash bargaining assumption. Let Mi denote the impact of a successful negotiation on
Mis prot and Rj denote the impact on Rjs prot. Under Nash bargaining, Mi must
obtain a fraction ij of the bilateral joint surplus generated by the negotiation, Mi+Rj :
Mi = ij
 
Mi + Rj

: (4)
In the candidate equilibrium, manufacturers derive their prots from xed fees, whereas
retailers are residual claimants; hence, Mi and Rj respectively obtain:
Mi =
X
k2J
F ik and 

Rj
= j  
X
h2I
F hj:
If the negotiation between Mi and Rj were to break down, Mi would simply collect the
other retailersxed fees and Rj would sell the other brands, adjusting its prices so as to
maximize its own prot. They would therefore respectively obtain:
ijMi =
X
k2Jnfjg
F ik and 
ij
Rj
= ijj  
X
h2Infig
F hj:
Hence, Mi = F

ij and Rj = 
i
j   F ij; the Nash bargaining rule (4) thus yields:
F ij = ij
i
j:
The candidate equilibrium thus indeed constitutes an equilibrium. Conversely, when-
ever the equilibrium contracts are cost-based tari¤s:
 Given its rivalsequilibrium prices, pe j, Rjs prot (gross of xed fees) coincides
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with j
 
pj;p
e
 j

, and thus its equilibrium prices must satisfy pej 2 prj
 
pe j

; As-
sumption A therefore ensures that retail prices are equal to pe = p.
 The Nash bargaining rule then uniquely pins down the equilibrium xed fees.
We now turn to the last part of the Proposition. Manufacturers obtain:
Mi =
X
j2J
ij
i
j;
From Lemma 1, their prot is thus positive as long as ij > 0 (as ij > 0), but they
obtain less than a share ij of the equilibrium channel prot (as ij < 

ij). It follows that
retailers get more than a share 1 ij of the channel prots they generate. In particular,
they obtain a positive prot regardless of their bargaining power (namely, even when
ij = 1):
Rj = 

j  
X
i2I
F ij = 

j  
X
i2I
ij
i
j  j  
X
i2I
ij > 

j  
X
i2I
ij = 0;
where the strict inequality derives from Lemma 1.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Part (i). Consider the negotiation between Mi and Rj, given the equilibrium tari¤s
negotiated for the other brands, te i;j, and the other retailersequilibrium prices, p
e
 j.
Choosing the tari¤ tij that maximizes the joint prot of Mi and Rj amounts to choosing
the quantity qij sold by Rj at the retail competition stage, taking into account that Rj will
price so as to maximize its own prot. The equilibrium quantity qeij therefore maximizes:
r^ijj (qij)  ciqij  
X
h2Infig
tehj
 
q^ijhj (qij)

+
X
k2Jnfjg

teik
 
q^ijik (qij)
  ciq^ijik (qij) ;
where q^ijhk(qij)  Dhk(p^ijj (qij);pe j) and r^ijj (qij) 
P
h2I [(p^
ij
hj (qij)   j)q^ijhj(qij)]. As qeij 2
Int (Qij), it thus satises the following rst-order condition:
(r^ijj )
0  qeij  ci   X
h2Infig
(tehj)
0(qehj) (q^ijhj)0(qeij) +
X
k2Jnfjg
[(teik)
0(qeik)  ci](q^ijik)0(qeij) = 0: (5)
However, Rj chooses qij so as to maximize its own prot, equal to:
r^ijj (qij)  teij(qij) 
X
h2Infig
tehj(q^
ij
hj(qij)):
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The equilibrium quantity qeij must therefore also satisfy Rjs rst-order condition:
(r^ijj )
0(qeij) = (t
e
ij)
0(qeij) +
X
h2Infig
(tehj)
0(qehj) (q^ijhj)0(qeij): (6)
Combining (5) and (6) yields:
ueij  
X
k2Jnfjg
ijjku
e
ik = 0; (7)
where ijjk   (q^ijik)0(qeij) denotes the equilibrium diversion ratio of brand is sales from Rj
to Rk, and ueik  (teik)0(qeik)  ci denote Mis equilibrium margin on the sales through Rk.
That is, these margins satisfy:
i 
264 u
e
i1
...
ueim
375 = 0;
where the mm matrix i is such that
i (j; k) =
(
1 if k = j;
 ijjk if k 6= j:
This matrix is diagonal dominant, as
i (j; j) = 1 >Pk2Jnfjg ijjk = Pk2Jnfjg i (j; k);
it it is therefore non-singular, implying that Mis equilibrium tari¤s must be cost-based:
the only solution is
ueij = 0 () (teij)0(qeij) = ci
for every j 2 J .
Part (ii). When all tari¤s are cost-based and induce smooth retail behaviors, the equi-
librium prices satisfy the rst-order conditions of each retailers prot maximization pro-
gram, that is, for i 2 I and j 2 J :
0 = Dij(p
e) +
X
h2I
[phj   (tehj)0(qehj)  j]
@Dhj
@pij
(pe)
= Dij(p
e) +
X
h2I
(phj   ch   j)
@Dhj
@pij
(pe)
=
@j
@pij
(pe):
These conditions thus coincide with those characterizing p and Assumption A then
ensures that retail prices are pe = p.
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A Division of prots
Proposition 2 shows that, as long as tari¤s induce all retailers to adopt a smooth retail
behavior, equilibrium prices and quantities, and thus total industry prot, are the same
as in a multiproduct oligopoly. Together with Proposition 1, it shows further that the
division of this prot is also uniquely dened when two-part tari¤s are used. However,
other tari¤s can sustain di¤erent prot allocations. To see this, our next proposition
considers quadratic tari¤s of the form:
tij (qij) = Fij () + ciqij + 
 
qij   qij
2
;
where qij = Dij (p
) and Fij () remains to be determined. For the sake of exposition, we
assume that these tari¤s generate a smooth retail response, even if a negotiation breaks
down; that is:
Assumption A. For  not too negative and any j 2 J :
(i) Maximizing
j
 
pj;p

 j
 X
i2I


Dij
 
pj;p

 j
  qij2
with respect to pj yields a unique price response, which is uniquely characterized
by rst-order conditions.
(ii) For any i 2 I:
(a) Maximizing
j
 
(1;p i;j) ;p j
  X
h2Infig


Dhj
 
(1;p i;j) ;p j
  qhj2
with respect to p i;j yields a unique price reaction, denoted p
ij
 i;j (), which is
a continuous function of ;
(b) This price reaction is such that Dhj
  1;pij i;j (0) ;p j 6= qhj for some h 2
I n fig and Dik
  1;pij i;j (0) ;p j 6= qik for some k 2 J n fjg.
Assumptions A(i) and A(ii:a) are satised, for instance, when the revenue function
(letting pj (qj) denote the vector of inverse residual demands, satisfying
 
Dij
 
pj;p
e
 j

i2I =
qj)
rj (qj) 
X
i2I

pij (qj)  j

qij
1
is strictly concave. Assumption A(ii:b) simply asserts that breaking down a negotiation
between a manufacturer and a retailer a¤ects the manufacturers sales in at least one
other retailers stores, as well as the retailers sales of at least one other brand. We have:
Proposition A.1 (division of prot) There exists  > 0 such that:
(i) for any  satisfying jj < , there exists an equilibrium in which each pair Mi Rj
signs a cost-based tari¤ of the form tij (qij), for some Fij (), and all retail prices are
equal to p; and,
(ii) within this class of equilibria, each Mi obtains a prot Mi (), which is such that
Mi () > 

Mi
(resp., Mi () < 

Mi
) for  > 0 (resp.,  < 0).
Proof. Consider a candidate equilibrium where retail prices are equal to p and each
Mi  Rj pair signs a contract:
tij (qij) = Fij () + ciqij + 
 
qij   qij
2
;
for an appropriately chosen Fij ().
We rst check that p constitutes a retail price equilibrium when these contracts are
in place. In response to p j, Rj chooses its prices pj so as to maximize:
j
 
pj;p

 j
  j  pj;p j X
i2I


Dij
 
pj;p

 j
  qij2 :
It follows that pj = p
r
j
 
p j

, which maximizes j
 
pj;p

 j

and leads to Dij (p) = qij,
satises the rst-order conditions, that is, for every h 2 I:
@j
@phj

pj=pj
=
@j
@phj
(p)  2
X
i2I
 
qij   qij
 @Dij
@phj
(p) =
@j
@phj
(p) = 0:
Assumption A(i) then ensures that pj = pj constitutes Rjs unique price response to
the tari¤s tj .
In the negotiation betweenMi andRj, given their other equilibrium tari¤s, (tik)k2Jnfjg
and
 
thj

h2Infig, and the other retailersequilibrium prices, p

 j, the two rms seek to
maximize their joint prot, which is now equal to: 
pj   ci   j

Dij
 
pj;p

 j

+
X
k2Jnfjg
n
Fik () + 

Dik
 
pj;p

 j
  qik2o
+
X
h2Infig
h 
phj   ch   j

Dhj
 
pj;p

 j
  nFhj () +  Dhj  pj;p j  qhj2oi :
By construction, pj = p
r
j
 
p j

satises the associated rst-order conditions for  = 0.
As the additional terms in  are of the form 2(Dhk(pj;p j)   qhk), charging pj = pj
(which leads to Dhk (p) = qhk for every (h; k) 2 I  J ), still satises these rst-order
2
conditions for  6= 0, . Furthermore, for  = 0, the joint prot is uniquely maximal for
pj = p

j . It follows that it remains maximal at p

j for jj low enough.
Likewise, from Lemma 1 (see Appendix A), Mi and Rj have an incentive to deal with
each other when jj is low enough. The tari¤s tj then sustain an equilibrium in which
retail prices are set to p and each channel i   j generates a prot ij, to be shared
according to the Nash bargaining rule.
Let us now evaluate the impact of  on the division of prot. In equilibrium, eachMi
derives all of its prot through the xed fees:
Mi () =
X
j2J
Fij () ;
whereas each Rj obtains Rj () = 

j  
X
i2I
Fij (). If the negotiation with Mi were to
break down, Rj would adjust its prices p i;j so as to maximize:
j
 
(1;p i;j) ;p j
  X
h2Infig


Dhj
 
(1;p i;j) ;p j
  qhj2 :
From Assumption A(ii:a), this yields a unique price response, pij i;j (), which is a con-
tinuous function of . Letting:
ijj ()  j
  1;pij i;j () ;p j  X
h2Infig


Dhj
  1;pij i;j () ;p j  qhj2
denote the associated value, and qijik ()  Dik
  1;pij i;j () ;p j denote Mis sales
through every other retailer Rk, Mis and Rjs disagreement payo¤s are respectively
equal to:
ijMi () =
X
k2Jnfjg
n
Fik () + 

qijik ()  qik
2o
and ijRj () = 
ij
j () 
X
h2Infig
Fhj () :
Hence, the impact of a successful negotiation on prots are respectively given by:
Mi = Fij   
X
k2Jnfjg

qijik ()  qik
2
and Rj = 

j   Fij   ijj () ;
and the Nash bargaining rule (4) yields:
Fij () = ij

j   ijj ()

+ (1  ij)
X
k2Jnfjg

qijik ()  qik
2
:
Therefore:
Mi () =
X
j2J
8<:ij j   ijj ()+ (1  ij) X
k2Jnfjg

qijik ()  qik
29=; ;
3
and Assumption A(ii:a) ensures that this expression is a continuously di¤erentiable func-
tion of . Furthermore, using the envelope theorem yields:
dijj
d
(0) =  
X
h2Infig

qijhj(0)  qhj
2
:
We thus have:
0Mi (0) =
X
j2J
8<:ij X
h2Infig

qijhj(0)  qhj
2
+ (1  ij)
X
k2Jnfjg

qijik (0)  qik
29=; > 0;
where the strict inequality follows from Assumption A(ii:b): for ij > 0, q
ij
hj(0) 6= qhj for
some h 6= j, and for ij = 0, qijik (0) 6= qik for some k 6= j.
It follows that 0Mi () > 0 for  close to 0; hence, in that range, Mi () > 

Mi
=
Mi (0) (resp., Mi () < 

Mi
) for  > 0 (resp.,  < 0).
Hence, while there is a unique retail equilibrium outcome, replicating that of a mul-
tiproduct oligopoly, manufacturers and retailers can share the resulting prot in vari-
ous ways. With the above quadratic tari¤s, manufacturers obtain a bigger share when
marginal wholesale prices increase with the quantity being traded, as this degrades the
retailersoutside option in case a negotiation breaks down. To see why, start with the
equilibrium two-part tari¤s tij (qij) = F

ij + ciqij used in Proposition 1, and introduce
a convex term, 
 
qij   qij
2
with  > 0, for some i 2 I and j 2 J . Modifying the
tari¤ in this way does not a¤ect the amount paid by Rj if it sticks to the equilibrium
quantity qij, but increases the amount that Rj would have to pay if it were to modify its
prices and/or stop carrying another brand. It follows that introducing this convex term
weakens Rjs bargaining position in its negotiations with the other suppliers. Conversely,
manufacturers obtain a smaller share when the tari¤s are concave (i.e., when  < 0).
B Micro-foundation: Proof of Proposition 3
Part (i). Fix a bargaining equilibrium B =
n 
pRj (tj)

j2J ; t
e;pe
o
and, for every i 2 I
and every j 2 J :
 let
eMi 
X
k2J
[tik (Dik (p
e))  ciDik (pe)] ;
eRj 
X
h2I
 
pehj   j

Dhj (p
e)  thj (Dhj (pe))

;
respectively denote the equilibrium prots of Mi and Rj;
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 let
pij i;j 2 arg max
p i;j=(phj)
h2Infig
X
h2Infig
"  
phj   j

Dhj
 
(1;p i;j) ;pe j

 tehj
 
Dhj
 
(1;p i;j) ;pe j
 #
denote Rjs price response if the negotiation with Mi breaks down, and
ijMi 
X
k2Jnfjg

teik
 
Dik
  1;pij i;j ;pe j  ciDik   1;pij i;j ;pe j ;
ijRj 
X
h2Infig
 
pijhj   j

Dhj
  1;pij i;j ;pe j  tehj  Dhj   1;pij i;j ;pe j ;
respectively denote the resulting prots for Mi and Rj; and
 for every ij 2 ij, let
F^
ij
ij 
(
eRj   ijRj if ij = M ji ,
   eMi   ijMi if ij = Rij,
reect the benet of the bilateral relationship for ijs rm.
These fees balance each other in expectation:
Lemma B.1 (bargaining fees) For every i 2 I and every j 2 J :
Eij
h
F^
ij
ij
i
= 0:
Proof. We have:
Eij
h
F^
ij
ij
i
= ijF^
Mji
ij + (1  ij) F^
Rij
ij
= ij

eRj   ijRj

  (1  ij)
 
eMi   ijMi

= 0;
where the last equality follows from Nash bargaining (equation (4)).
Let
 
p^

2 denote the price vector such that p^
 = pe for every  2  and, for
every j 2 J , let t^jj =

t^
ij
ij

i2I
denote the tari¤s t^ijij = t
e
ij + F^
ij
ij and p^
R
j (tj) denote the
following candidate price response:
 p^Rj (^tjj ) = pej for every j 2 j;
 for every i 2 I and every  i;j = (hj)h2Infig, p^Rj (ti;j; t^ i;j i;j ) = pRj (tij; te i;j) (where
t^
 i;j
 i;j = (t^
hj
hj )h2Infig and t
e
 i;j = (t
e
hj)h2Infig) whenever tij =2 ft^M
j
i
ij ; t^
Rij
ij g;
 if there is no agreement between Rj and fMigi2I , where I  I and I 6= ?, then
(with the convention that tij () = 0 and p^Rij (tj) = +1 for i 2 I, and expressingRjs
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tari¤s as tj = (0;tj), where tj = (thj)h2InI , and its price vector as pj = (1; pj),
where pj = (phj)h2InI):
 
p^Rhj (0;tj)

h2InI 2 arg max
pj=(phj)
h2InI
X
h2InI
"  
phj   j

Dhj
 
(1; pj) ;pe j

 thj
 
Dhj
 
(1; pj) ;pe j
 # ;
with the restriction that, in case of multiple optima:
 the selected best-response is una¤ected by lump-sum changes in tari¤s; that
is, for any fj = (fhj)h2InI 2 R
jInIj
+ :
p^Rhj (0;tj + fj) = p^
R
hj (0;tj) for every h 2 I n I;
 in the particular case where there is no agreement with a single Mi, and all
other tari¤s correspond to the bargaining equilibrium tari¤s (that is, t i;j =
te i;j), the selected best-response corresponds to the prices that would arise in
the bargaining equilibrium:
p^R i;j
 
0; te i;j

= pij i;j;
 in all other cases, p^Rj (tj) = pRj (tj).
The price response p^Rj () coincides with the price response of the bargaining equilib-
rium, pRj (), whenever Rjs prot has a unique maximum. In case of multiple maxima,
p^Rj (tj) di¤ers from p
R
j (tj) only if p
R
j () were to pick di¤erent maxima when altering the
tari¤s tj by some constants. We now show that ((p^Rj (tj))j2J ; (^t
)2; (p^)2), together
with consistent beliefs, constitutes an equilibrium of game  .
We rst note that this candidate equilibrium gives all rms the same expected prots
as the bargaining equilibrium B: the price responses to the equilibrium tari¤s are designed
to generate the same retail prices as in B (regardless of which side gets to make the o¤ers),
and the expected equilibrium tari¤s (where the expectation refers to which side makes the
o¤ers) coincide with the bargaining equilibrium tari¤s. It can further be noted that the
tari¤s t^ijij are such that t^
Mji
ij gives Rj its disagreement prot in the bargaining equilibrium
B, ijRj , and conversely t^
Rij
ij gives Mi its disagreement prot in the bargaining equilibrium
B, ijMi .
We now study stage 2, and consider a given retailer Rj, for some j 2 J . With
consistent beliefs, following any deviation on tj (including the absence of an agreement),
Rj expects the other retailers agents to have negotiated the equilibrium tari¤s, and
thus it expects its rivals to charge the equilibrium prices, which are the same as in the
bargaining equilibrium B: p^ j j = pe j for every  j 2  j. Therefore:
 Following disagreement with one or several manufacturers, p^Rj () constitutes an appro-
priate price response, as it maximizes Rjs expected prot, given its beliefs that all other
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retailers charge pe j.
 If instead Rj agreed on a tari¤ tij with everyMi, for i 2 I, then by construction pRj (tj)
constitutes an appropriate price response to tj = (tij)i2I . Furthermore, if tj =

tij; t^
 i;j
 i;j

for some i 2 I and some  i;j  (hj)h2Infig, then pRj
 
tij; t
e
 i;j

also constitutes an appro-
priate price response to tj, as the tari¤s t^
 i;j
 i;j coincide with the bargaining equilibrium
tari¤s te i;j up to some constants. The same applies to the particular case where tij = t^
ij
ij
for some ij 2 ij, in which case tj = (t^ijij ; t^ i;j i;j ) = (^t;jj ) and pej = pRj (tej ), which
maximizes Rjs prot when it faces tej , also maximizes Rjs prot when it faces t^
;j
j , as
the tari¤s t^;jj coincide with the tari¤s t
e
j up to some constants.
It follows that p^Rj () indeed constitutes an appropriate price response for Rj.
We now turn to stage 1, and study the bilateral negotiation between Mi and Rj,
for some i 2 I and j 2 J . In the bargaining equilibrium B, the tari¤ teij maximizes
their joint prot, given the other retailers prices, the tari¤s tei; j = (t
e
ik)k2Jnfjg and
te i;j = (t
e
hj)h2Infig negotiated with the other partners, and Rjs price response p
R
j ();
that is, tij = teij maximizes:
RMi Rj (tij) 

pRij
 
tij; t
e
 i;j
  ci   jDij  pRj  tij; te i;j ;pe j
+
X
k2Jnfjg
"
teik
 
Dik
 
pRj
 
tij; t
e
 i;j

;pe j

 ciDik
 
pRj
 
tij; t
e
 i;j

;pe j
 #
+
X
h2Infig
( 
pRhj
 
tij; t
e
 i;j
  jDhj  pRj  tij; te i;j ;pe j
 tehj
 
Dhj
 
pRj
 
tij; t
e
 i;j

;pe j
 ) :
In the above candidate equilibrium of game  , the agents M ji and R
i
j expect all other
agents to negotiate the equilibrium tari¤s and the other retailers to charge the equilibrium
prices. Hence, when signing a tari¤ tij they expect Rj to charge p^Rj

tij; t^
 i;j
 i;j

for any
realization  i;j = (hj)h2Infig 2  i;j = h2Infighj. Therefore, they expect the joint
prot of their two rms to be given by:
^RMi Rj (tij)  Ei; j ; i;j
h
~RMi Rj (tij;i; j; i;j)
i
;
where i; j  (ik)k2Jnfjg and:
~RMi Rj (tij;i; j; i;j) 
h
p^Rij

tij; t^
 i;j
 i;j

  ci   j
i
Dij

p^Rj

tij; t^
 i;j
 i;j

;pe j

+
X
k2Jnfjg
24 t^ikik Dik p^Rj tij; t^ i;j i;j  ;pe j
 ciDik

p^Rj

tij; t^
 i;j
 i;j

;pe j
 35 (8)
+
X
h2Infig
8<:
h
p^Rhj

tij; t^
 i;j
 i;j

  j
i
Dhj

p^Rj

tij; t^
 i;j
 i;j

;pe j

 t^hjhj

Dhj

p^Rj

tij; t^
 i;j
 i;j

;pe j
 9=;
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If feasible, it would be optimal for the selected agent, ij, to o¤er a tari¤ that maximizes
the expected joint prot ^RMi Rj (tij), and leaves the other agent indi¤erent between
accepting or rejecting the o¤er. To conclude the argument, we now show that the tari¤
t^
ij
ij achieves precisely this.
 For any ij 2 ij, the tari¤ t^ijij maximizes the expected joint prot of Mi and Rj.
Picking tij =2 ft^ijij gij2ij would yield (using p^Rj (tij; t^ i;j i;j ) = pRj (tij; te i;j)):
~RMi Rj (tij;i; j; i;j) 

pRij
 
tij; t
e
 i;j
  ci   jDij  pRj  tij; te i;j ;pe j
+
X
k2Jnfjg
"
t^ikik
 
Dik
 
pRj
 
tij; t
e
 i;j

;pe j

 ciDik
 
pRj
 
tij; t
e
 i;j

;pe j
 #
+
X
h2Infig
( 
pRhj
 
tij; t
e
 i;j
  jDhj  pRj  tij; te i;j ;pe j
 t^hjhj
 
Dhj
 
pRj
 
tij; t
e
 i;j

;pe j
 ) :
From Lemma B.1, we have:
Ehk
h
t^hkhk (qhk)
i
= tehk (qhk) + Ehk
h
F^ hkhk
i
= tehk (qhk) : (9)
Therefore:
^RMi Rj (tij) =

pRij
 
tij; t
e
 i;j
  ci   jDij  pRj  tij; te i;j ;pe j
+
X
k2Jnfjg
"
teik
 
Dik
 
pRj
 
tij; t
e
 i;j

;pe j

 ciDik
 
pRj
 
tij; t
e
 i;j

;pe j
 #
+
X
h2Infig
( 
pRhj
 
tij; t
e
 i;j
  jDhj  pRj  tij; te i;j ;pe j
 tehj
 
Dhj
 
pRj
 
tij; t
e
 i;j

;pe j
 )
= RMi Rj (tij) : (10)
Picking instead tij = t^
ij
ij , for any ij 2 ij, yields (using p^Rj

t^
ij
ij ; t^
 i;j
 i;j

= pej ):
~RMi Rj

t^
ij
ij ;i; j; i;j

  peij   ci   jDij (pe)
+
X
k2Jnfjg
h
t^ikik (Dik (p
e))  ciDik (pe)
i
+
X
h2Infig
h 
pehj   j

Dhj (p
e)  t^hjhj (Dhj (pe))
i
;
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and thus, using (9):
^RMi Rj

t^
ij
ij

=
 
peij   ci   j

Dij (p
e) +
X
k2Jnfjg
[teik (Dik (p
e))  ciDik (pe)]
+
X
h2Infig
 
pehj   j

Dhj (p
e)  tehj (Dhj (pe))

= RMi Rj
 
teij

: (11)
As RMi Rj (tij) is maximal for tij = t
e
ij, it follows from (10) and (11) that ^
R
Mi Rj (tij)
is indeed maximal for tij = t^
ij
ij , for any ij 2 ij.
 The agent Rij is indi¤erent between accepting or rejecting the tari¤ t^M
j
i
ij . If the agents
M ji and R
i
j do not reach an agreement, Rjs expected prot is given by (with the con-
vention that tj = (0; t i;j)):
^ijRj  E i;j
24 X
h2Infig
8<:
h
p^Rhj

0; t
 i;j
 i;j

  j
i
Dhj

1; p^R i;j

0; t
 i;j
 i;j

;pe j

 thjhj

Dhj

1; p^R i;j

0; t
 i;j
 i;j

;pe j
 9=;
35 :
The price response pR i;j (0; ) is invariant to lump-sum changes in tari¤s, and the tari¤s
t
Mji
 i;j and t
Rij
 i;j only di¤er from t
e
 i;j by some xed fees. We thus have:
p^R i;j

0; t
 i;j
 i;j

= p^R i;j
 
0; te i;j

= pij i;j:
Hence, Rjs expected disagreement prot can be expressed as:
^ijRj =
X
h2Infig
(  
pijhj   j

Dhj
 1;pij i;j;pe j
 Ehj
h
t
hj
hj
 
Dhj
 1;pij i;j;pe ji
)
=
X
h2Infig
"  
pijhj   j

Dhj
 1;pij i;j;pe j
 tehj
 
Dhj
 1;pij i;j;pe j
#
= ijRj ;
where the second equality stems from (9), and the last one from the denition of pij i;j.
But as already noted, accepting the tari¤ t^M
j
i
ij gives Rj precisely this prot, 
ij
Rj
.
 The agent M ji is indi¤erent between accepting or rejecting the tari¤ t^
Rij
ij . In the absence
of an agreement, Mis expected prot is given by:
^ijMi  Ei; j ; i;j
24 X
k2Jnfjg
8<: t
ik
ik

Dik

1; p^R i;j

0; t
 i;j
 i;j

;pe j

 ciDik

1; p^R i;j

0; t
 i;j
 i;j

;pe j
 9=;
35 :
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Using again p^R i;j

0; t
 i;j
 i;j

= p^R i;j
 
0; te i;j

= pij i;j, this expected prot can be expressed
as:
^ijMi =
X
k2Jnfjg
n
Eik
h
tikik
 
Dik
 1;pij i;j;pe ji  ciDik  1;pij i;j;pe jo
=
X
k2Jnfjg

teik
 
Dik
 1;pij i;j;pe j  ciDik  1;pij i;j;pe j
= ijMi ;
which, as already noted, is precisely the prot that M ji obtains when accepting the tari¤
t^
Rij
ij .
Part (ii). Fix an equilibrium of game  , E =
n 
p^Rj (tj)

j2J ;
 
t^

2 ;
 
p^

2 ;b
o
,
such that price responses and tari¤s are regular, and so p^ = p^ for any  2 , and the
beliefs b are consistent. Consider now the tari¤s te =
 
teij

(i;j)2IJ where, for every i 2 I
and every j 2 J :
teij (qij) = Eij
h
t^
ij
ij (qij)
i
= ij t^
Mji
ij (qij) + (1  ij) t^
Rij
ij (qij) : (12)
We now show that
n 
p^Rj (tj)

j2J ; t
e;pe = p^
o
constitutes a bargaining equilibrium.
We start again with stage 2, and consider a givenRj, for some j 2 J . As pe = p^ = p^,
Rj expects the other retailers to charge the same prices as in the equilibrium E . Hence,
p^Rj (tj) constitutes an appropriate price response to any tari¤s tj negotiated by Rjs
agents in stage 1:
p^Rj (tj) 2 arg max
pj
E j
24X
i2I
8<:
 
pij   j

Dij

pj; p^
 j
 j

 tij

Dij

pj; p^
 j
 j
 9=;
35
= arg max
pj
(X
i2I
 
pij   j

Dij (pj; p^)  tij (Dij (pj; p^))
)
:
The regularity of the equilibrium tari¤s implies that, for any h 2 I, t^M
j
h
hj () and t^
Rhj
hj ()
coincide, up to a constant; it follows from the denition of the tari¤ tehj that it also di¤ers
from t^
Mjh
hj () or t^
Rhj
hj () only by a constant. The regularity of price responses then ensures
that, along the equilibrium path, prices are indeed equal to pej :
p^Rj
 
tej

= p^Rj

t^
j
j

= p^
j
j = p
e
j :
We now turn to stage 1, and study the bilateral negotiation between Mi and Rj, for
some i 2 I and j 2 J . In the equilibrium E , the tari¤ o¤ered by the selected agent,
ij, maximizes the expected prot of its rm, among those that are acceptable by the
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other agent. As prots can easily be shared through lump-sum fees (which do not a¤ect
retailerspricing decisions, as price responses are regular), it follows that the tari¤ t^ijij
maximizes the expected joint prot of Mi and Rj, given the other retailersprices and
the tari¤s negotiated with the other partners; that is, tij = t^
ij
ij maximizes:
^RMi Rj (tij)  Ei; j ; i;j
h
~RMi Rj (tij;i; j; i;j)
i
;
where ~RMi Rj (tij;i; j; i;j) is given by (8). As the price responses are regular and, as
noted above, the tari¤s only di¤er by some constants, we have:
p^Rij

tij; t^
 i;j
 i;j

= p^Rij
 
tij; t
e
 i;j

:
The expression of ^RMi Rj (tij) can therefore be simplied to:
^RMi Rj (tij) =

p^Rij
 
tij; t
e
 i;j
  ci   jDij  p^Rj  tij; te i;j ;pe j
+
X
k2Jnfjg
(
Eik
h
t^ikik
 
Dik
 
p^Rj
 
tij; t
e
 i;j

;pe j
i
 ciDik
 
p^Rj
 
tij; t
e
 i;j

;pe j
 )
+
X
h2Infig
( 
p^Rhj
 
tij; t
e
 i;j
  jDhj  p^Rj  tij; te i;j ;pe j
 Ehj
h
t^
hj
hj
 
Dhj
 
p^Rj
 
tij; t
e
 i;j

;pe j
i )
Using tehk () = Ehk
h
t^hkhk ()
i
for any h 2 I and k 2 J , we then have:
^RMi Rj (tij) =

p^Rij
 
tij; t
e
 i;j
  ci   jDij  p^Rj  tij; te i;j ;pe j
+
X
k2Jnfjg
"
teik
 
Dik
 
p^Rj
 
tij; t
e
 i;j

;pe j

 ciDik
 
p^Rj
 
tij; t
e
 i;j

;pe j
 #
+
X
h2Infig
( 
p^Rhj
 
tij; t
e
 i;j
  jDhj  p^Rj  tij; te i;j ;pe j
 tehj
 
Dhj
 
p^Rj
 
tij; t
e
 i;j

;pe j
 ) ;
where the right-hand side corresponds to RMi Rj (tij), the joint prot of Mi and Rj in
their bilateral negotiation of the bargaining game, taking as given Rjs other equilibrium
tari¤s, te i;j, as well as rivalsequilibrium prices, p
e
 j, and Rjs price response, p
R
j (tj).
As by construction tij = t^
ij
ij maximizes ^
R
Mi Rj (tij), it thus also maximizes 
R
Mi Rj (tij).
Furthermore, as Rjs price response is regular and tehk di¤ers from t^
hk
hk only by some
constant, it follows that tij = teij, too, maximizes 
R
Mi Rj (tij) = ^
R
Mi Rj (tij). Finally, it
is straightforward to check that teij gives Mi and Rj shares ij and 1  ij, respectively,
of the additional prot generated by their relationship, and that the resulting expected
prots are the same as in the equilibrium E .
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C Micro-foundation for linear tari¤s
Consider a bargaining equilibrium for some vector of bargaining weights = (ij)(i;j)2IJ 2
[0; 1]nm, and let we () and pe () denote the equilibrium wholesale and retail prices,
eMi () and 
e
Rj
() respectively denote Mis and Rjs prots, and 
j
Mi
()  eMi ()
and iRj ()  eRj () respectively denote their disagreements payo¤s i.e., the prots
that they would obtain if the other equilibrium tari¤s remained unchanged but they de-
cided not to deal with each other. As the outcomes of the bilateral negotiations are given
by the Nash bargaining rule, we have:
weij () = arg max
wij

RMi
 
wij;w
e
 fijg ()
  jMi hRRj  wij;we fijg ()  iRji1 
where RMi
 
wj;w
e
 j ()

and RMi
 
wj;w
e
 j ()

denote Mis and Rjs prots in the con-
tinuation equilibrium where Rj faces wholesale prices wj and expects all other retailers to
face wholesale prices we j () and charge retail prices p
e
 j (); the resulting equilibrium
prots, eMi () and 
e
Rj
(), lie on the Pareto frontier generated by varying wij.
We now show that this bargaining equilibrium can be replicated as an equilibrium
of the game  ^ for some vector of bargaining parameters =
 
ij

(i;j)2IJ 2 [0; 1]
nm
(i.e., if the pair Mi  Rj reaches stage 1, M ji gets to make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er with
probability ij). For the sake of exposition, we assume here that, in stage 0, the agent
of the upstream rm is always selected to make an o¤er to its counterpart. The analysis
is qualitatively the same if the downstream agent were instead selected, although the
specic choice of the bargaining parameters  would be a¤ected.
Specically, we construct an equilibrium in which the wholesale tari¤s o¤ered at stage
0 are equal to we () and these tari¤s are accepted by retailersagents at that stage. If
this is indeed the case, all rms obtain the same prots as in the bargaining equilibrium
with weights . Fix i 2 I and j 2 J , and consider what happens if Rij rejects M ji s o¤er
but all other tari¤s are accepted at stage 0. With probability ij,M
j
i gets to make a (nal)
counter-o¤er and thus leaves Rij a prot just equal to the disagreement payo¤ 
e
Rj
().
With probability 1   ij, Rij gets to make the nal o¤er and it thus achieves at least
eRj (): it can secure this prot by o¤ering a wholesale price wij = w
e
ij (), whichM
j
i is
willing to accept (as it is the outcome of the Nash bargaining rule, which never harms the
negotiating parties). Therefore, Rijs outside option in game  ^ () is of the form ^j
 
ij

,
which is non-decreasing in ij and such that ^j (0) = 
e
Rj
()  eRj ()  ^j (1).
There thus exists ij such that ^j
 
ij

= eRj (). This value of ij induces M
j
i , in
stage 0, to choose a wholesale price wij that lies on the Pareto frontier and gives Rj
at least eRj (); this leads M
j
i to choose wij = w
e
ij (), and prots thus correspond to
the equilibrium prots of the bargaining equilibrium. As a consequence, any bargaining
equilibrium outcome can be replicated as the equilibrium outcome of some game  ^ ().
The reverse statement also holds for the equilibria of the game  ^ () that are Pareto
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e¢ cient and such that, in stage 0, each downstream agent (i) is indi¤erent between
accepting the initial o¤er or waiting for the stochastic game  , and (ii) accepts the o¤er.
Let w^e () and p^e () denote the equilibrium wholesale and retail prices, ^eMi () and
^eRj () respectively denoteMis and Rjs prots, and ^
j
Mi
()  ^eMi () and ^
i
Rj
() 
^eRj () respectively denote their disagreements payo¤s i.e., the prots that they would
obtain if the other equilibrium tari¤s remained unchanged but they decided not to deal
with each other (at all). These prots also constitute the prots that M ji and R
i
j can
respectively secure even if they are not selected to make the nal o¤er at stage 1. Finally,
denote by iRj () the maximal prot that Rj can achieve if it has to guarantee to
Mi a prot at least equal to ^eMi . Remember that, in equilibrium, Rj is indi¤erent
between accepting and rejecting the initial o¤er made by M ji at stage 0, implying that
its equilibrium prot ^eRj () satises:
^eRj () = ij^
i
Rj
() +
 
1  ij

iRj () :
Consider now a bargaining equilibrium, and suppose that the equilibrium wholesale prices
are whk = w^ehk () for every hk 6= ij, and focus on the bargaining between Mi and Rj
for di¤erent values of the bargaining parameter ij. For ij = 0, the outcome is the
same as if Rij were to make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er, and Rjs prot is therefore equal to
iRj (). When ij = 1, the bargaining solution is the same as ifM
j
i were to make a take-
it-or-leave-it o¤er and Rjs prot is therefore equal to ^
i
Rj
(). As the bargaining weight
ij continuously increases from 0 to 1, Rjs prot decreases from iRj () to ^
i
Rj
();
hence, there exists a value for ij for which the bargaining solution yields a prot equal
to ^iRj () to Rj. As the outcome moreover lies on the Pareto frontier, it must be the
case that Mj obtains exactly ^eMi (), and that wij = w^
e
ij (). Therefore, for any Pareto
e¢ cient equilibrium of the game  ^ () such each retailer is indi¤erent between accepting
the initial o¤er or waiting for the stochastic game   but accepts at the initial stage, there
exists a vector of bargaining weights  for which the bargaining equilibrium would yield
exactly the same outcome.
D Vertical restraints and agency model
D.1 Resale price maintenance
We suppose here that manufacturers and retailers can adopt RPM provisions; that is,
each Mi  Rj pair can contract not only on a (non-linear) tari¤ tij (qij), but also if the
two rms wish to do so on the retail price pij. The timing of wholesale negotiations
and retail pricing decisions remains as before, with the caveat that in case of an RPM
agreement betweenMi and Rj, the retailer simply sets the agreed retail price pij in stage
2.
We rst note that allowing rms to adopt RPM provisions does not destabilize the
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cost-based tari¤ equilibria identied above. Specically, when the other channels sign
cost-based tari¤s, a cost-based tari¤ precisely induces the retail price that maximizes
the joint prot of the manufacturer and the retailer,1 and therefore they do not need to
contract on the retail price. Retailers, however, get a lower share of the industry prot
when RPM is used in equilibrium. This is because they can no longer adjust the prices
they charge for the rival brands if their negotiations with a manufacturer were to fail. For
instance, when dealing withMi, Rjs disagreement payo¤and therefore, the equilibrium
payo¤ is lower when Rj has a RPM contract with other manufacturers.
RPM can, however, be used to sustain many other outcomes. To see this, suppose
that bilateral prots are well-behaved when rms rely on two-part tari¤s of the form
tij (qij) = Fij + wijqij. Namely:
Assumption B. For any i 2 I and j 2 J , any wholesale prices (whk)(h;k)6=(i;j)2IJ and
any prices (phk)(h;k)6=(i;j)2IJ , the gross joint prot of Mi and Rj, given by: 
pij   ci   j

Dij (p) +
X
k2Jnfjg
(wik   ci)Dik (p) +
X
h2Infig
 
phj   whj   j

Dhj (p) ;
is strictly quasi-concave2 in pij and maximal for a nite price level.
Let  (p) denote the nmnm matrix such that the term in row l (i; j)  (i  1)m+
j and column l (h; k), for i; h 2 I and j; k 2 J , is given by:
l(i;j);l(h;k) (p) =
8><>:
@Dhj
@pij
(p) if h 6= i and k = j,
 @Dik
@pij
(p) if h = i and k 6= j,
0 otherwise.
We have:
Proposition D.1 (RPM) When RPM is allowed:
(i) there exists an equilibrium based on cost-based two-part tari¤s and RPM, which
replicates the multiproduct oligopoly prices and quantities, but gives retailers a lower share
of prot than in the absence of RPM; and,
(ii) any price vector p such that j (p)j 6= 0 can be sustained in equilibrium.
Proof. Part (i). Assuming that all other channels, h   k (i.e., for every (h; k) 6= (i; j))
sign cost-based two-part tari¤s thk(q) = F

hk+chqhk and agree, through RPM, to set retail
1For instance, in the equilibrium based on two-part tari¤s characterized in Proposition 1, the equi-
librium contract tij (qij) = F

ij + ciqij induces Rj to maximize the joint prot of the pair Mi  Rj .
2If the demand for the channel i   j drops to zero when the price pij is high enough, then the
strict quasi-concavity should hold in the price range where Dij () > 0. A similar comment applies to
Assumptions C and D.
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prices phk = phk, the joint prot of Mi and Rj is given by:
Mi Rj =
 
pij   ci   j

Dij
  
pij;p

 i;j

;p j

+
X
k2Jnfjg
F ik
+
X
h2Infig
 
phj   ch   j

Dhj
  
pij;p

 i;j

;p j
  F hj :
As the variable part of this prot coincides with j
 
pj;p

 j

, Assumption A ensures
that it is maximized for pij = pij. Therefore, Mi and Rj can maximize their joint prot
by agreeing to charge pij. Furthermore, as this joint prot does not depend on their own
tari¤ (in particular, the tari¤ tij no longer a¤ects Rjs prices, which are here set through
RPM), they can also sign a cost-based two-part tari¤.
As rms negotiate cost-based two-part tari¤s, Mi = F

ij for every i 2 I; hence, from
Nash bargaining, for every i 2 I and every j 2 J the xed fee F ij is given by:
F ij = Mi = ij
 
Mi + Rj

= ij
 
j   ijj

, where ijj = j
  1;p i;j ;p j :
As retailers cannot adjust their prices in case of disagreement, the additional prot gen-
erated by a successful negotiation is (weakly) larger than in the absence of RPM:
j   ijj = j   j
  1;p i;j ;p j
 j  max
p i;j
j
 
(1;p i;j) ;p j

= j   ijj > 0;
where the strict inequality stems from Lemma 1 (see Appendix A).
There thus exists an equilibrium where rms negotiate cost-based two-part tari¤s and
RPM is used (and retail prices are equal to p). Mis and Rjs equilibrium prots are
then given by:
Mi =
X
j2J
ij
 
j   ijj

and Rj = 

j  
X
i2I
ij
 
j   ijj

:
It follows that, as long as ij > 0, manufacturers obtain a positive prot, which is
moreover (weakly) greater than what they would obtain in the absence of RPM (namely,
Mi =
P
j2J ij
 
j   ijj

). However, they still obtain less than a share ij of the
equilibrium channel prot:
j   ijj < ij:
To see this, it su¢ ces to note that, from Assumption A(ii):
ijj =
X
h2Infig
hj
  1;p i;j ;p j > X
h2Infig
hj (p
) = j   ij:
It follows that retailers still get more than a share 1   ij of the prots they generate,
and thus obtain a positive prot.
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Part (ii). Fix a price vector p satisfying j (p)j 6= 0 and consider a candidate equilibrium
in which each pair Mi   Rj agrees on setting the retail price to pij, and on a two-part
tari¤ based on some wholesale price wij. Note that the condition j (p)j 6= 0 implies that
all quantities are positive. Indeed, if we had Dij (p) = 0 for some (i; j) 2 I  J , then
an increase in pij could not a¤ect the demand for any other channel (that is, we would
have @Dhj=@pij (p) = @Dik=@pij (p) = 0 for any h 6= i and any k 6= j); hence, the row
l (i; j)  (i  1)m+ j would only have zeros, implying j (p)j = 0.
Given the agreements signed by the other channels, Mi and Rj are willing to reach an
agreement, as they can replicate the no-agreement outcome by agreeing on a prohibitively
high price for their channel (together with a tari¤ satisfying tij (0) = 0). Furthermore, if
Mi and Rj were to deviate to some tij and to a di¤erent retail price pij 6= pij, their joint
prot (gross of xed fees) would be given by:
Mi Rj (pij) =
 
pij   ci   j

Dij ((pij;p i;j) ;p j)
+
X
k2Jnfjg
(wik   ci)Dik ((pij;p i;j) ;p j)
+
X
h2Infig
 
phj   whj   j

Dhj ((pij;p i;j) ;p j) ;
which depends only on the deviating retail price pij, and not on the deviating wholesale
tari¤ tij (qij). Hence, Mi and Rj have no incentive to deviate from the specied whole-
sale tari¤. Furthermore, under Assumption B, this joint prot has a unique maximum,
characterized by the rst-order condition. Hence,Mi and Rj have no incentive to deviate
from the specied retail price, pij, whenever 0Mi Rj (pij) = 0, that is:
Dij (p) +
 
pij   ci   j
 @Dij
@pij
(p)
+
X
k2Jnfjg
(wik   ci) @Dik
@pij
(p) +
X
h2Infig
 
phj   whj   j
 @Dhj
@pij
(p) = 0;
which can be rewritten as:X
h2Infig
(whj   ch) @Dhj
@pij
(p) 
X
k2Jnfjg
(wik   ci) @Dik
@pij
(p) = ij (p) ;
where:
ij (p)  Dij (p) +
X
h2I
 
phj   ch   j
 @Dhj
@pij
(p) :
It follows that, if j (p)j 6= 0, there exists a unique vector of wholesale prices, w (p)
satisfying the above equations for every i 2 I and every j 2 J .
Finally, the equilibrium xed fees Fij (p) (for every i 2 I and every j 2 J ) can be
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uniquely identied using Fij (p) = Mi (p) and the Nash bargaining rule:
Fij (p) = ij

Rj (p) + Mi (p)

= ij
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
X
h2I

phj   ci   j

Dhj (p)
+
X
k2Jnfjg
[wik (p)  ci] [Dik (p) Dhk ((1;p i;j) ;p j)]
+
X
h2I

phj   whj (p)  j

[Dhj (p) Dhk ((1;p i;j) ;p j)]
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
:
Conversely, starting from an equilibrium in which each channel i   j agrees on a
wholesale unit price equal to wij (p) (associated with the corresponding xed fee Fij (p))
and a retail price equal to pij, no manufacturer-retailer pair has an incentive to deviate
to another wholesale and/or retail price.
Proposition D.1 shows that with RPM, many prices can arise in equilibrium. In
particular, whenever
  pM 6= 0, RPM enables the rms to sustain monopoly prices.
The proof is constructive, and consists of exhibiting two-part tari¤s which, together with
RPM, sustain the targeted prices.
The intuition is simple. By construction, the joint prot of Mi and Rj does not
depend on the internalwholesale price wij. As it is no longer needed to drive the
retail price pij (which can now be directly agreed upon through RPM), this internal
wholesale price wij can thus be xed in any arbitrary way, adjusting the xed fee Fij
so as to share the prot as desired. However, this internal price a¤ects Mis negotiation
with every other retailer Rk, as well as Rjs negotiation with every other manufacturer
Mh, and can thus be set so as to sustain the targeted retail prices. As there are nm
instruments(the wholesale prices) for nm targets(the retail prices), it follows that,
generically, an equilibrium can be constructed around any prole of retail prices.
More precisely, in the absence of RPM and with cost-based tari¤s, Rj takes into
consideration the full margin on its sales; it thus chooses pij so as to maximize:
j (p) =
X
h2I
 
phj   ch   j

Dhj (p) :
Let:
ij (p) 
@j (p)
@pij
= Dij (p) +
X
h2I
 
phj   ch   j
 @Dhj
@pij
(p) (13)
denote the impact of a marginal increase in pij on the above prot. In the absence of
RPM, Assumption A implies that equilibrium retail prices p are such that ij (p
) = 0
for every i 2 I and every j 2 J .
With RPM, pij is instead chosen by Mi and Rj, who, for given vectors of wholesale
prices wi; j = (wik)k2Jnfjg and w i;j = (whj)h2Infig, now ignore the upstream margin on
Rjs sales of any rival brand h, whj  ch, but do account for the upstream margin onMis
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sales through any rival store k, wik   ci. Hence, under Assumption B, and for any given
retail price prole p, to ensure that Mi and Rj stick to pij it su¢ ces to pick wi; j and
w i;j so as to satisfy their rst-order condition. This amounts to satisfy:X
h2Infig
(whj   ch) @Dhj
@pij
(p) 
X
k2Jnfjg
(wik   ci) @Dik
@pij
(p) = ij (p) : (14)
That is, the di¤erential impact of a marginal increase of pij on the upstream margins of
the channelsMi Rk, for k 2 J nfjg, andMh Rj, for h 2 I nfig, should o¤-set ij (p).
The condition j (p)j 6= 0 ensures the existence of a wholesale price vector w satisfying
the above equations for every i 2 I and every j 2 J , in which case these wholesale
prices are moreover uniquely dened. Fixed fees are then uniquely determined through
the bargaining sharing rule.
So far we have considered full RPM,where a retailer is required to charge the exact
price negotiated with the manufacturer. The analysis can also shed some light on the role
of minimum RPM (i.e., price oors) and maximum RPM (i.e., price caps). For the sake of
exposition, we focus here on symmetric manufacturers and retailers,3 and on symmetric
equilibria, where wij = w and pij = p for every i 2 I and every j 2 J . The condition
j(p)j 6= 0 then amounts to M (p) 6= R (p), where:
M (p) 
X
h2Infig
@Dhj
@pij
(p; :::; p) and R (p) 
X
k2Jnfjg
@Dik
@pij
(p; :::; p)
denote the impact of a change in the price of brand i in store j on, respectively, the sales
of the others brands at store j (interbrand price sensitivity of demand) and on the sales
of brand i in the other stores (intrabrand price sensitivity of demand).4 Thus, whenever
M (p) 6= R (p), there exists an equilibrium based on two-part tari¤s and RPM, in which
all retail prices are equal to p and all wholesale prices are equal to w = w (p), where
(using (14)):
w (p)  c+  (p)
M (p)  R (p) ; (15)
where  (p) = ij (p; :::; p) denotes, as before, the marginal impact given by (13), of
an increase in one retailers price on the prot generated by that retailer when it faces
cost-based tari¤s.
To ensure that price caps or price oors induce the expected outcomes, we introduce
the following regularity conditions:
Assumption C. For any p > p such that M(p) 6= R(p):
3Symmetry among manufacturers means ci = c and Dij (p) = Dhj
 
Mih (p)

for any j 2 J and any
i; h 2 I, where Mih (p) is derived from p by swapping the prices of brands i and h in each retailers stores.
Likewise, symmetry among retailers means j =  and Dij (p) = Dik

Rjk (p)

for any i 2 I and any
j; k 2 J , where Rjk (p) is derived from p by swapping Rjs and Rks prices for each brand.
4The symmetry assumptions ensure that these parameters are also symmetric.
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(i) for any j 2 J , Rjs gross prot
P
i2I (pij   w (p)  )Dij (pj; p; :::; p) is strictly
quasi-concave in pj = (pij)i2I ; and,
(ii) the function  (p) satises 0 (p) < 0.
Finally, to rule out large deviations in the bilateral negotiations, we introduce another
technical assumption. For any p > p and w 6= c, for any i 2 I and any j 2 J , let denote
by p^ijj (pij;w; p) =
 
p^ijhj (pij;w; p)

h2Infig the prices that Rj would like to charge on the
other brands, conditional on charging pij for brand i and on facing price caps (if w > c)
or price oors (if w < c) set to p on the other brands; that is:
 if w > c,
p^ijj (pij;w; p)  arg max
p i;j
X
h2I
(phj   w   )Dhj ((pij;p i;j) ; p; :::; p)
s.t. phj  p for any h 2 I n fig ;
 if w < c,
p^ijj (pij;w; p)  arg max
p i;j
X
h2I
(phj   w   )Dhj ((pij;p i;j) ; p; :::; p)
s.t. phj  p for any h 2 I n fig :
:
We can now state our last assumption, namely, that the joint prot of Mi and Rj re-
mains well-behaved when Rj faces price caps or price oors for the other brands (whether
or not these constraints are binding). Specically:
Assumption D. For any i 2 I and j 2 J , any wholesale price w and any retail price p,
the gross joint prot of Mi and Rj, given by:
(pij   c  )Dij
  
pij; p^
ij
j (pij;w; p)

; p; :::; p

+
X
k2Jnfjg
(w   c)Dik
  
pij; p^
ij
j (pij;w; p)

; p; :::; p

+
X
h2Infig
 
p^ijhj (pij;w; p)  w   

Dhj
  
pij; p^
ij
j (pij;w; p)

; p; :::; p

;
is strictly quasi-concave in pij and maximal for a nite price level.
We then have:
Proposition D.2 (min vs. max RPM) Restricting attention to symmetric equilibria,
any price p > p can be sustained with minimum RPM (resp., maximum RPM) when
there is more (resp., less) substitution among manufacturersbrands than among retailers
stores, that is, when M (p) > R (p) (resp., M (p) < R (p)).
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Proof. The proof consists in showing that the equilibria characterized in the proof of
Proposition D.1 for the case of xed RPM can also be sustained with price caps or price
oors. We rst study in which direction the retailers would like to adjust their prices,
were they free to do so, starting from the two-part tari¤ cum RPM equilibrium identied
by Proposition D.1, in which retail prices are set to p and all wholesale prices are set
to w (p). This determines whether price oors or price caps are needed to sustain this
equilibrium. Second, we show that following a small deviation in one of its prices, a
retailer nds it optimal to stick to the equilibrium price p for the other brands. This
validates the rst order conditions characterized in the proof of Proposition D.1, and
thus the relationship between p and w (p). The strict quasi-concavity of the bilateral
joint prot then concludes the argument.
Consider a situation in which all retail prices are set to p and all wholesale prices are
set to w (p), characterized by (15).5 Starting from this situation, by adjusting the price
pij, Rj could obtain a prot, gross of xed fees, equal to:
[pij   w (p)  ]Dij (pij; p; :::; p) +
X
h2Infig
[p  w (p)  ]Dhj (pij; p; :::; p) :
Thus, the impact of a marginal increase in one retailers price on that retailers prot is
given by (using (15)):
D (p; :::; p)  [p  w (p)  ] [ (p)  M (p)] =  (p) + [ w (p)  c] [ (p)  M (p)]
= [ w (p)  c] [ (p)  R (p)] ;
where:
 (p)   @Dij
@pij
(p; :::; p) > 0
denotes the own-price sensitivity of demand. As retailers are di¤erentiated, and thus
imperfect substitutes, R(p) < (p) (that is, when the price of a particular brand increases
in one store, and thus consumers buy less of that brand in that store, consumers only
partially report the lost demand for the brand to di¤erent stores). Furthermore, under
Assumption C(i) Rjs prot is strictly quasi-concave in its prices (pj); hence, retailers
have an incentive to lower their prices if w (p) < c, and to raise them if w (p) > c. In
other words, price oors are needed to sustain p if w (p) < c, and price caps are instead
needed to sustain p if w (p) > c.
The price constraints (price caps or price oors) are by construction binding whenever
w (p) 6= c. By continuity, this remains true when, say, Mi and Rj adopt a price pij that
slightly departs from the symmetric price p. Hence, in the event of such a (marginal)
deviation, the constraints imposed by the other manufacturers continue to be binding,
and Rj thus continues to charge prices equal to p for the other brands. It follows that,
5The equilibrium xed fee F (p) is also uniquely dened and determined by the surplus-sharing rule.
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as in the case of xed RPM, (15) ensures that such a marginal deviation is not protable
for Mi and Rj. That is, (15) still constitutes the relevant rst-order condition when
xed RPM is replaced with minimum RPM (when w (p) < c) or maximum RPM (when
w (p) > c). The strict quasi-concavity assumption E ensures that global deviations in pij
are not protable either.
To understand the underlying intuition, consider rst the retail pricing decisions. If
retailers were free to set their prices, they would do so taking into consideration their
downstream margins but ignoring their partnersupstream margins. Hence, if upstream
margins are positive, classic double marginalization problems arise: the price of any brand
at any store would be higher than what would maximize the joint prot of the manu-
facturer and the retailer, and price caps are therefore needed. Conversely, if upstream
margins are negative, retailers would be tempted to adopt too low prices, and price oors
are thus needed.
The next step is to determine whether positive or negative upstream margins are
needed to sustain supra-competitive retail prices. If tari¤s were cost-based, each nego-
tiating pair would aim at maximizing the prot generated by the retailers sales (on all
brands); but then, each pair would have an incentive to undercut the othersprices.6
When relying instead on a wholesale price w 6= c, each pair moreover takes into
account the impact of their joint decision on the manufacturers margins earned on the
sales of its brand at the other stores, which, in a symmetric situation, is given by
(w   c)
X
k2Jnfjg
@Dik
@pij
(p; :::; p) = (w   c)R (p) ;
but however ignores the impact of their decision on the upstream margins earned on the
retailers sales of the other brands, which is given by
(w   c)
X
h2Infig
@Dhj
@pij
(p; :::; p) = (w   c)M (p) :
Therefore, in order to sustain the equilibrium price (i.e., discourage undercutting it), the
net balance of these two e¤ects should be positive, which amounts to
(w   c) [R (p)  M (p)] :
It follows that in order to raise prices above p, negative upstream margins are required
when M (p) > R (p), in which case price oors are needed to counter retailersexcessive
incentives to lower prices; when instead M (p) < R (p), positive upstream margins are
required, and price caps are then needed to counter retailersexcessive incentives to raise
prices.7
6To see this formally, consider a situation where all retail prices are equal to p > p. By construction,
 (p) = 0, and thus, from Assumption C(ii),  (p) < 0 for p > p.
7Price oors thus have no e¤ect in this case; by contrast, Allain and Chambolle (2011) nd that
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Remark: Price caps and price oors. Moving from full RPM to price oors or price
caps may also a¤ect the division of prot, as Rjs disagreement payo¤s may be a¤ected. If
the negotiation betweenMi andRj were to fail, Rj would be tempted to react by optimally
revising the retail prices p i;j it charges the other brands. Such adjustment is impossible
under full RPM, but may become feasible under a price oor or price ceiling. When such
a change is indeed feasible, Rjs disagreement payo¤s and thus the equilibrium division
of prot are a¤ected.
D.2 Price parity agreements
We now turn to the role of price parity agreements (PPAs). A PPA is a contractual
provision requiring the retailer to price the manufacturers brand at the same level as
competing brands. Variants of such PPAs may be slightly less restrictive and simply
prevent the retailer from charging less for competing brands, or more for competing
brands.
These provisions have recently triggered debates about their potential anti-competitive
e¤ects. In April 2010, the UK O¢ ce of Fair Trading (OFT) imposed £ 225 million nes
against tobacco manufacturers and retailers over retail pricing strategies. The OFT con-
sidered that manufacturers and retailers had entered into bilateral agreements linking the
retail price of a tobacco brand to the prices of competing brands (at the same stores).
Those retail price parity agreements were deemed to be anti-competitive by the OFT,
who judged that they had the same adverse e¤ects as RPM.8
We now show that in our framework, a PPA is not a substitute for RPM. To see
this, we adapt the previous two-stage game of wholesale negotiations and retail pricing
decisions as follows:
 in the rst stage, each Mi  Rj pair can also adopt a PPA (in addition to agreeing
on a tari¤ tij (qij)); and,
 in the second stage, a retailer that has accepted a PPA must set the same retail
price for all the brands it carries.
Obviously, imposing uniform prices across brands can a¤ect retailerspricing behavior
when they would otherwise wish to charge asymmetric prices. In particular, the condi-
tional price responsesintroduced in Section 3.2 are now pijj (qij) = (p
ij
j (qij) ; :::; p
ij
j (qij))
satisfying:
Dij
 
pijj (qij) ;p
e
 j

= qij;
where pe =
 
peij

(i;j)2IJ is the vector of equilibrium prices.
industry-wide price oors are always anticompetitive.
8See Decision CA98/01/2010 of the O¢ ce of Fair Trading, Case CE/2596-03: Tobacco, 15 April 2010.
This decision was later quashed by the Competition Appeals Tribunal (see the CAT Judgement [2011]
CAT 41, 12 December 2011), who however did not discuss the possible anticompetitive e¤ects of PPAs.
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Assumption E. For every i 2 I and every j 2 J , whenever it is positive, the demand
function Dij (p) satises:
(i)
P
h2I @Dij (p) =@phj < 0;
(ii)
P
h2I @Dij (p) =@phk > 0 for any k 2 J n fjg; and,
(iii) In addition,
P
h2I
P
k2J @Dik (p) =@phj < 0.
Assumption E is rather innocuous and simply relies on products being di¤erentiated.
Part (i) requires that Rjs sales of Mis brand decrease when Rj uniformly increases the
price of all brands, whereas part (ii) assumes that the same sales increase when a rival
retailer uniformly increases its prices. Finally, part (iii) ensures that when Rj uniformly
increases all of its prices, the total sales ofMis brand through all retailers decreases (i.e.,
the direct e¤ects on the sales through Rj dominates).
The following proposition shows that rms cannot strategically use PPAs to depart
from cost-based tari¤s, and thus cannot a¤ect the equilibrium outcome beyond imposing
symmetry:
Proposition D.3 (price parity agreements) In the class of equilibria based on di¤er-
entiable tari¤s and price parity agreements where all equilibrium quantities are positive:
(i) equilibrium tari¤s are all cost-based, that is, marginal wholesale prices reect mar-
ginal costs of production; and,
(ii) if rms are symmetric at both stages of the vertical chain,9 then all prices are the
same as if in the absence of any price parity agreement.
Proof. Part (i). Consider a candidate equilibrium where the equilibrium tari¤s are teij
for every i 2 I and every j 2 J , and all equilibrium quantities are positive and the
equilibrium retail prices are given by the price vector pe such that, for every j 2 J ,
peij = p
e
j for all i 2 I.
If such an equilibrium exists, the price pej must maximize Rjs prot when it faces the
tari¤s tej and anticipates rival retail prices p
e
 j:
pej 2 arg max
pj
(X
h2I
 
pj   j

Dhj
 
pj;p
e
 j
  tehj  Dhj  pj;pe j
)
:
Alternatively, one can write Rjs maximizing program as choosing a quantity qij for
Mis brand. Under the price parity requirement, choosing a quantity qij amounts to
choosing the price pijj (qij) such that, for p
ij
j (qij) =
 
pijj (qij) ; : : : ; p
ij
j (qij)

:
Dij
 
pijj (qij) ;p
e
 j

= qij: (16)
Assumption E ensures that such a price pijj (qij) exists and is continuously di¤eren-
tiable as long as qij  qmax
 
pe j
  Dij  (0; : : : ; 0) ;pe j. Therefore, when it faces the
9See Footnote 3 for a precise expression of this symmetry assumption.
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tari¤s tj =
 
tij; t
e
 i;j

and anticipates that its rivals set their equilibrium prices, pe j, Rj
chooses the quantity qij that maximizes:
rijj (qij)  tij (qij) 
X
h2Infig
tehj
 
qijhj (qij)

where qijhk (qij) denotes Rks sales of the Mhs brand, for h 6= i 2 I and k 2 J , and is
given by:
qijhk (qij)  Dhk
 
pijj (qij) ;p
e
 j

(17)
and rijj (qij) denotes Rjs retail revenues (net of the retailing costs)
rijj (qij) 

pijj (qij)  j

qij +
X
h2Infig

pijj (qij)  j

qijhj (qij) :
To maximize their joint prot, subject to the PPA, Mi and Rj should adopt a tari¤
tij inducing the quantity qij that maximizes:
rijj (qij)  ciqij  
X
h2Infig
tehj
 
qijhj (qij)

+
X
k2Jnfjg

teik
 
qijik (qij)
  ciqik (qij) :
Therefore, to induce the quantity qeij > 0 that maximizes their joint prot, Mi and
Rj need to agree on an equilibrium tari¤ teij that satises (using q
ij
ik
 
qeij

= qeik): 
teij
0  
qeij
  ci + X
k2Jnfjg

(teik)
0 (qeik)  ci
  
qijik
0  
qeij

= 0:
For any i 2 I, the equilibrium upstream margins ueij =
 
teij
0  
qeij
   ci, for j 2 J ,
thus satisfy:

i 
264 u
e
i1
...
ueim
375 = 0; (18)
where 
i
denotes the mm matrix such that the term in row j 2 J and column k 2 J
is given by:

i
(j; k) =
(
1 if k = j,
 ijik otherwise.
; where 
ij
ik =  
 
qijik
0  
qeij

Conversely, to induce Rj to sell a given quantity qij, it su¢ ces to adopt a continuously
di¤erentiable tari¤ tij () that is su¢ ciently convex and qij is characterized by the rst-
order condition.
We now conclude the proof by showing that, under Assumption E, the matrix 
i
is
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invertible. Di¤erentiating (17) (for h = i), yields:

ij
ik =  
"X
h2I
@Dik
@phj
(pe)
#  
pijj
0  
qeij

: (19)
Di¤erentiating (16), we get:
 
pijj
0
(qij) =
1P
h2I
@Dij
@phj
 
pijj (qij) ;p
e
 j
 < 0: (20)
Using (20), equation (19) can be rewritten as:

ij
ik =  
P
h2I
@Dik
@phj
(pe)P
h2I
@Dij
@phj
(pe)
> 0;
where the inequality stems from Assumption E. Indeed, parts (i) and (ii) of that assump-
tion respectively imply that
P
h2I
@Dij
@phj
(pe) < 0 and
P
h2I
@Dik
@phj
(pe) > 0. It follows that
the matrix 
i
is diagonally dominant, as for every j 2 J we have:
i (j; j)  X
k2Jnfjg
i (j; k) = 1  X
k2Jnfjg
P
h2I
@Dik
@phj
(pe)
 Ph2I @Dij@phj (pe)
=
 Ph2I @Dij@phj (pe) Pk2JnfjgPh2I @Dik@phj (pe)
 Ph2I @Dij@phj (pe)
=
 Ph2I h@Dij@phj (pe) +Pk2Jnfjg @Dik@phj (pe)i
 Ph2I @Dij@phj (pe)
=  
P
h2I
hP
k2J
@Dik
@phj
(pe)
i
 Ph2I @Dij@phj (pe)
> 0;
where the inequality stems from Assumption E (parts (i) and (iii)). It follows that the
matrix 
i
is invertible, and thus (18) yields
 
teij
0  
qej

= ci for every i 2 I and every
j 2 J .
Part (ii). Given the equilibrium tari¤s te, the equilibrium prices must be such that for
any j 2 J , pej maximizes Rj prot, that is:
pej 2 arg max
pj
(X
h2I
 
pj   j

Dhj
 
pj;p
e
 j
  tehj  Dhj  pj;pe j
)
:
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This maximization program also writes as:
pej 2 arg max
pj
(
j
 
pj;p
e
 j

+
X
i2I

teij
 
Dij
 
pj;p
e
 j
  ciDij  pj;pe j
)
:
Given that we focus here on interior symmetric equilibria, the equilibrium retail price
pej must satisfy the rst-order condition:
X
i2I

@j
@pij
(pe) +
h 
teij
0  
qeij
  cii @Dij
@pij
(pe)

= 0 ()
X
i2I
@j
@pij
(pe) = 0: (21)
By denition the prices p satisfy this last condition, as @j (p) =@pij = 0 for every
i 2 I. Moreover, when rms are symmetric at both stages of the vertical chain, the
equilibrium price vector p is symmetric, in the sense that for every j 2 J , pij = pj .
Therefore, p is a solution to the set of rst-order conditions given by equation (21) for
every j 2 J .
Finally, using symmetry, equation (21) simplies to @j (pe) =@pij = 0. Under As-
sumption A, this system of rst-order conditions has a unique solution, which ensures
that we must have pe = p.
The adoption of PPAs thus does not a¤ect the previous analysis. Pricing at marginal
cost again makes a retailer the residual claimant for the prot it can generate together
with a given manufacturer even if this prot is limited due to the imposition of uniform
prices and thus induces the retailer to maximize this joint prot (possibly subject to
the uniform price restriction). It follows that in equilibrium, all contracts are cost-based.
Remark: smooth tari¤s. Proposition D.3 is more general than Proposition 2 as it
applies to all equilibria based on di¤erentiable tari¤s, regardless of whether or not they
would induce a smooth retail behavior in the absence of PPAs. The reason is that by
imposing uniform prices across brands, PPAs de facto ensure that retail behavior will
be smooth. In particular, the equivalent of the assumption
i 6= 0 (namely, i 6=
0, replacing the impact of qij on the adjusted demands q^
ij
ik (qij), obtained with Rjs
conditional price response, with the mechanical impact that a change in the quantity qij
will have on the other quantities qijik (qij) of brand i sold by the other retailers Rk, given
that Rj has to charge the same price p
ij
j (qij) for all brands) always holds when retailers
are subject to PPAs.
Remark: price caps and price oors. The above analysis focuses on purePPAs,
which require retailers to charge the same price for all brands; any manufacturer can
thus unilaterally impose this price uniformity. As mentioned above, in practice a variant
consists of preventing retailers from charging prices that exceed those of rival brands.
Obviously, the outcome is the same as with pure PPAs when all manufacturers adopt
this variant, as retailers are then de facto constrained to charge the same price for all
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brands. While this paper does not formally study the case where a limited number of
manufacturers adopt this variant, it should be clear that the proof of Proposition D.3
readily extends to this case. A similar comment applies when retailers are instead required
to charge no less than for rival brands, or when a limited number of retailers are subject
to a PPA or one of its variants.
D.3 Agency model
We have been focussing so far on the resalebusiness model, where the distributor buys
the goods and/or services from the suppliers, and then resells them to consumers (hence,
absent RPM, it is the distributor who sets consumer prices). If such a model is standard
for brick-and-mortarretailers, online retail platforms often adopt instead an agency
business model in which the supplier remains the owner of its goods and/or services, and
chooses the prices at which it o¤ers them on the platforms; each distributor then obtains
commissions on the sales made through its platform.
To study this agency business model within our framework, in this section we adapt
the timing of negotiations and pricing decisions as follows:
1. Each Mi   Rj pair negotiates a (possibly non-linear) commission schedule ~tij (qij),
based on the volume of sales qij achieved by Mi through Rjs platform. As before,
these bilateral negotiations are simultaneous and secret; and,
2. Each Mi sets the retail prices for its product on each platform that carries it; in
this section we will refer to Mis prices as ~pi = (~pij)j2J .
The bargaining equilibria of this game are dened accordingly. In the second stage
(retail pricing decisions), each manufacturer chooses its prices assuming that its rivals
set the equilibrium retail prices, ~pe i =
 
~pehj

h2Infig;j2J . In the rst stage, each Mi   Rj
pair negotiates a schedule ~tij (qij) that: (i) maximizes its joint prot, given the other
equilibrium contracts and the resulting retail pricing behavior; and (ii) gives a share ij 2
[0; 1] of the additional prot generated by a successful negotiation to the manufacturer
(and thus a share 1  ij to the retailer).
Formally, a bargaining equilibrium is a vector of price responses
 
~pRi
 
~ti

i2I , together
with a vector of equilibrium commission schedules ~te =
 
~teij

(i;j)2IJ and a vector of
equilibrium prices ~pe = (~pei )i2I such that:
 In the second stage:
 for every i 2 I and any vector of schedules ~ti =
 
~tij

j2J negotiated by Mi in
the rst stage, Mis pricing strategy is given by:
~pRi
 
~ti
 2 arg max
~pi
(X
j2J

(~pij   ci)Dij
 
~pi; ~p
e
 i
  ~tij  Dij  ~pi; ~pe i
)
;
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 the equilibrium prices and commission schedules satisfy ~pei = ~p
R
i
 
~tei

.
 In the rst stage, each schedule ~teij:
maximizes the joint prot ofMi and Rj, taking as givenMis other equilibrium
schedules, ~tei; j, rivalsequilibrium prices, ~p
e
 i, andMis pricing strategy in the
second stage, ~pRi
 
~ti

:
~teij 2 arg max
~tij
( 
~pRij
 
~tij;~t
e
i; j
  ci   jDij  ~pRi  ~tij;~tei; j ; ~pe i
+
P
h2Infig
"
~tehj
 
Dhj
 
~pRi
 
~tij;~t
e
i; j

; ~pe i

 jDhj
 
~pRi
 
~tij;~t
e
i; j

; ~pe i
 #
+
P
k2Jnfjg
"  
~pRik
 
~tij;~t
e
i; j
  ciDik  ~pRi  ~tij;~tei; j ; ~pe i
 ~teik
 
Dik
 
~pRi
 
~tij;~t
e
i; j

; ~pe i
 #) ;
 gives Mi and Rj shares ij and 1   ij, respectively, of the additional prot
generated by their relationship.
It is straightforward to see that this denition of a bargaining equilibrium amounts
to turning the previous framework upside-down: manufacturers are now downstream
(they control retail prices), whereas retailers/platforms are upstream. As before, how-
ever, commissions are non-linear payment schedules paid by downstream rms (here, the
manufacturers) to their upstream partners (the retailers).
We thus simply need to adapt our initial assumptions to conclude that as long as
commissions induce a smooth retail pricing behavior by manufacturers, equilibrium com-
missions are cost-based and the outcome is similar to that of a multi-store oligopoly in
which n rms directly compete against each other at m retail locations. Formally, the
modied assumption is:
Assumption Ã: multi-store oligopoly. There is a unique price vector ~p satisfying
~pi 2 ~pri (~p i)  arg max~pi
nP
j2J
 
~pij   ci   j

Dij (~p)
o
for every i 2 I; it is char-
acterized by rst-order conditions and such that ~pi = ~p
r
i
 
~p i

for every j 2 J , and
Dij (~p
) > 0 for every i 2 I and every j 2 J .
Under Assumption Ã, and in the class of contracts inducing the manufacturers to
adopt a smooth pricing behavior, all commission schedules must be cost-based, in the
sense that marginal commission rates must reect marginal costs of distribution; hence,
the equilibrium outcome replicates that of direct competition between multi-store rms
(that is, ~pe = ~p). Moreover in this framework, price parity agreements (i.e., agreements
between manufacturers and retailers requiring that manufacturers set the same prices on
all platforms) have no impact on the equilibrium outcome beyond imposing symmetry.
More precisely, equilibrium tari¤s are once again cost-based in the sense that marginal
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commissions reect marginal costs of distribution (i.e., the intermediariescosts). In addi-
tion, when rms are symmetric at both stages of the vertical chains (and the equilibrium
prices are symmetric in the absence of PPAs), then price parity agreements do not a¤ect
the equilibrium retail prices either.
The result that Price Parity Agreements (PPAs) have no impact on prices in the
agency model contrasts with the recent literature on these agreements. However, so far
this literature has focused on either linear commissions10 or constant revenue-sharing
rules,11 which generate contractual ine¢ ciencies; instead, we allow for general non-linear
commissions and thus for e¢ cient bilateral contracting. Foros et al. (2017) also consider
constant revenue-sharing rules but study the platformschoice between setting nal prices
(traditional wholesale model) or delegating these pricing decisions to suppliers (agency
model). They show that a coordination failure may arise, whereby the agency model
may fail to be adopted (even though it would increase all rmsprots); PPAs can then
be used to facilitate the adoption of the agency model, thus leading to higher prices for
consumers.
E Endogenous network
E.1 Bargaining equilibria
In this subsection, we study the bargaining equilibria for the distribution networks consid-
ered in Section 6.1. For the sake of exposition, we assume that demand satises standard
regularity assumption ensuring that two-part tari¤s induce retailers to adopt a smooth
retail behavior. Using similar arguments as in Propositions 1 and 2, we show that there
exists a unique equilibrium in two-part tari¤s, in which these tari¤s are cost-based, and
characterize the equilibrium prots.
E.1.1 Bilateral monopoly
Suppose rst that a single channel is active, say i  j. In this case, rms maximize their
joint prot by negotiating a cost-based tari¤ and generate in this way a prot
m  max
p
(p  c  )D (p;1;1;1) :
As both rms would obtain zero prot in case of a negotiation break-down, Mis and
Rjs equilibrium prots are respectively equal to:
Mi = 
m
M  m and Rj = mR  (1  ) m:
10See Boik and Corts (2016) and Johansen and Vergé (2017).
11See Johnson (2017).
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These equilibrium prots can, for instance, be sustained with the following two-part
tari¤:
tij (q) = 
m + cq:
E.1.2 Exclusive dealing
Suppose now that two unconnected channels are active, say i   j and h   k. Given the
equilibrium retail price pehk set by Rk and the tari¤ tij that it faces, Rj chooses the price
pRij (tij) that maximizes its retail prot, that is:
pRij (tij)  arg max
p
[(p  )D (p;1;1; pehk)  tij (D (p;1;1; pehk))] :
The joint prot of Mi and Rj, equal to 
pRij (tij)  c  

D
 
pRij (tij) ;1;1; pehk

;
is thus maximized when the tari¤ tij is cost-based. Therefore, in any equilibrium, each
tari¤ is cost-based and each channel generates a prot
ED   pED   c  D  pED;1;1; pED ;
where the price pED is such that:
pED = arg max
p
(p  c  )D  p;1;1; pED :
As both rms would again obtain zero prot in case of a negotiation break-down,Mis
and Rjs equilibrium prots are respectively equal to:
Mi = 
ED
M  ED and Rj = EDR  (1  ) ED:
These equilibrium prots can be sustained with the following two-part tari¤s:
tij (q) = thk (q) = 
ED + cq:
E.1.3 Upstream foreclosure
In the case where a single manufacturer, say Mi, deals with both retailers, OBrien and
Sha¤er (1992) have shown that equilibrium tari¤s are cost-based (see Proposition 3, p.
305). In equilibrium, each channel thus generates a prot
UF   pUF   c  D  pUF ;1; pUF ;1 ;
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where the price pUF is such that:
pUF = arg max
p
(p  c  )D  p;1; pUF ;1 :
If the negotiation with Rj were to break down, Rj would be excluded and obtain
zero prot. In equilibrium, it thus obtains a share 1    of the bilateral gains from
trade. As retailers are the residual claimants for the prot generated by their channel
(the manufacturer obtaining its prots through the xed fees), these bilateral gains from
trade coincide with the prot generated by the channel.12 It follows that the manufacturer
and the two retailersequilibrium prots are respectively equal to:
Mi = 
UF
M  2UF and R1 = R2 = UFR  (1  ) UF :
These equilibrium prots can be sustained with the following two-part tari¤s:
ti1 (q) = ti2 (q) = 
UF + cq:
E.1.4 Downstream foreclosure
In the case where a single retailer, say Rj, deals with both manufacturers, Bernheim
and Whinston (1985, 1998) have shown that equilibrium tari¤s are then cost-based. In
equilibrium, each channel thus generates a prot
DF  max
p
(p  c  )D (p; p;1;1) :
If the negotiation withMi were to break down,Mi would be excluded and obtain zero
prot. In equilibrium, it thus obtains a share  of the bilateral gains from trade, which
are here equal to 2DF   m, as Mi and Rj jointly earn 2DF   Fhj when reaching an
agreement, and m   Fhj otherwise. In equilibrium, manufacturersprots are therefore
given by:
MA = MB = 
DF
M  
 
2DF   m
whereas the retailers prot is equal to:
Rj = 
DF
R  2 (1  ) DF + 2
 
m   DF  :
These equilibrium prots can be sustained with the following two-part tari¤s:
tAj (q) = tBj (q) = 
 
2DF   m+ cq:
12That is, the bilateral joint prot of Mi and Rj is given by UF +Fk if they reach an agreement, and
by Fk otherwise; hence, the bilateral gains from trade are equal to UF .
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E.1.5 Single exclusion
Suppose nally that a single channel, say h   k, remains inactive. All rms are thus
directly or indirectly connected, as Mi deals with both retailers, and Rj deals with both
manufacturers.
It is straightforward to check that the same reasoning as in the baseline model (with
the convention here that phk = +1 and thk () = qhk = 0) implies that the equilibrium
upstream margin uSEhj satises (noting that qhk = 0 implies 
hj
jk = 0):
uSEhj = 0;
whereas the equilibrium margins uSEij and u
SE
ik satisfy:
uSEij   ijjkuSEik = 0;
uSEik   ikkjuSEij = 0:
The condition 3 then implies ijjk
ik
kj 6= 1, which in turn yields uSEij = uSEik = 0.
We now turn to the equilibrium retail prices. For the sake of exposition, we use the
subscripts J , M and R to refer respectively to the joint channel of the two multi-channel
rms (here, i   j), the other channel of the multi-channel manufacturer (here, i   k),
and the other channel of the multi-channel retailer (here, h  j). Given that equilibrium
tari¤s are cost-based, the equilibrium retail prices pSEJ and p
SE
R must satisfy:
 
pSEJ ; p
SE
R

= arg max
(pJ ;pR)
(
(pJ   c  )D
 
pJ ; pR; p
SE
M ;1

+ (pR   c  )D
 
pR; pJ ;1; pSEM
 ) ;
whereas the equilibrium price pSEM satises:
pSEM = arg max
pM
(pM   c  )D
 
pM ;1; pSEJ ; pSER

:
In what follows, we assume that these prices are unique. We denote by
SEm 
 
pSEJ   c  

D
 
pSEJ ; p
SE
R ; p
SE
M ;1

+
 
pSER   c  

D
 
pSER ; p
SE
J ;1; pSEM

the prot generated by the multi-channel retailer (Rj), and by
SEs 
 
pSEM   c  

D
 
pSEM ;1; pSEJ ; pSER

the prot generated by the single-channel retailer (Rk). Finally, let
^J  max
p
(p  c  )D  p;1; pSEM ;1 and ^R = max
p
(p  c  )D  p;1;1; pSEM 
denote the prot that the multi-channel retailer (Rj) could generate by focusing instead,
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respectively, on the joint channel (Mi  Rj), and on the other channel (Mh  Rj).
We now focus on two-part tari¤s and derive the individual equilibrium prots. We
respectively denote Mis and Mhs prots by Mi = 
SE
Mm and Mh = 
SE
Ms, where the
subscripts Mm and Ms respectively refer to the multi-channel and single-channel man-
ufacturers. With a similar convention, we respectively denote Rjs and Rks prots by
Rj = 
SE
Rm and Rk = 
SE
Rs . As rms negotiate cost-based two-part tari¤s, from Nash
bargaining (equation (35) the xed fees are of the form F = , where  is the extra
joint prot generated by a successful negotiation. We thus have:
Fij = 
 
SEm   ^R

> 0; Fhj = 
 
SEm   ^J

> 0 and Fik = SEs > 0:
Manufacturersprots are therefore respectively given by
Mi = 
SE
Mm  
 
SEm + 
SE
s   ^R

and Mh = 
SE
Ms  
 
SEm   ^J

;
and retailersprots are respectively given by
Rj = 
SE
Rm  (1  )SEm + 
 
^J + ^R   SEm

and Rk = 
SE
Rs  (1  ) SEs :
E.2 Proof of Proposition 7
We consider the two polar cases in turn.
E.2.1 No retail competition
Consider rst the case where retailers are active in independent geographic markets. Each
geographic market can then be analyzed separately and, building on the analysis already
presented in the text, in any CPNE both brands must be carried in each market. Finally,
it is straightforward to check that this indeed constitutes a CPNE.
Consider the geographic market of Rj, say. In the candidate CPNE, Rj carries both
brands, each channel generates M , and rmsprots are respectively given by A =
B = 
 
2M   m (> 0) and Rj = 2 (1  )M + 2  m   M (> 0). Obviously, in
the preliminary stage manufacturers have no incentive to deviate (either unilaterally, or
as a coalition), as they can only change the distribution network by exiting the market.
Likewise, the retailer has no incentive to reduce the number of brands it carries as:
2 (1  ) M + 2  m   M > (1  ) 2M > (1  )m;
where the rst inequality stems from brand di¤erentiation and the second from the fact
that the retailer generates more prot when it carries both brands. Moreover, a deviation
involving the grand coalition(i.e., Rj together with both manufacturers) would either
have no e¤ect (if all rms remain active) or require the exit of one rm, which the
rm would reject. Finally, suppose that Rj deviates with one manufacturer. To make
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the deviation protable for the manufacturer, it must exclude the other brand. In the
continuation bargaining game, the remaining active channel generates m and Rj obtains
(1  ) m < Rj , making the deviation unprotable for Rj. It follows that interlocking
relationships (i.e. here, both brands being carried in each retailers territory) indeed
constitutes a CPNE.
E.2.2 Perfect retail substitutes
Consider now the case where retailers are perfect substitutes.
We rst note that each brand will be carried by a single retailer. To see this, consider a
candidate equilibrium in whichMi, say, deals with both retailers. As tari¤s are cost-based,
retailers face the same marginal cost, and intrabrand competition leads them to simply
pass on this cost to consumers. As a result, retailers derive zero prot from the sales of
Mis product, and thus Mi obtains zero prot as well. But then, Mi would protably
deviate by refusing to deal with one retailer: the other retailer would then generate a
prot from selling Mis product, and Mi would obtain a share of that prot.
As both brands must be sold (from the reasoning at the beginning of Section 6.2), it
follows that the only candidate CPNE networks are exclusive dealingand downstream
foreclosure.
In the case of exclusive dealing, each rm has a single trading partner, and thus
its outside option in case of disagreement yields zero prot. The channel prot ED
is thus simply shared in proportion (; 1  ). Each manufacturer obtains EDM 
ED and each retailer obtains EDR  (1  ) ED. In case of downstream foreclo-
sure, each manufacturer again has a single trading partner, but now one retailer car-
ries both brands.13 As a result, in case of disagreement with one manufacturer, the
retailer would still obtain a share of the bilateral monopoly prot m. As a result,
manufacturers now obtain DFM  
 
2DF   m, whereas the selected retailer obtains
DFR  2 (1  ) DF + 2
 
m   DF .
Note that when starting from a candidate CPNE involving either exclusive dealing or
downstream foreclosure:
 deviations by a coalition activating more than two channels are irrelevant: at least
one manufacturer (who has to be part of the deviating coalition) would be dealing
with both retailers, and this manufacturer would have an incentive to (unilaterally)
deviate from the coalition so as to deal instead with a single retailer;
 all active rms obtain a positive prot, and thus none of them has an incentive
to deviate by simply refusing to deal; in the same vein, in case of downstream
foreclosure, the active retailer has no incentive to close down any channel: with only
one active channel (that is, under bilateral monopoly) the retailer would only obtain
13As retailers are perfect substitutes here, the active retailer generates the industry-wide monopoly
prot (that is, 2DF = M ).
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mR = (1  ) m, whereas with both active channels (downstream foreclosure) the
retailer obtains:
DFR = 2 (1  )DF + 2
 
m   DF  > (1  ) 2DF > (1  ) m = mR ;
where the last inequality stems from the fact that the retailer generates more prot
when it carries both brands.
We now consider the other potential deviations for each of the two candidate equilib-
rium networks.
 Exclusive dealing. Consider a candidate CPNE in which, say,Mi deals with Rj whereas
Mh deals with Rk. In the light of the above remarks, deviations leading to fewer, or to
more active channels are irrelevant. Likewise, a coalition deviating to upstream foreclosure
is irrelevant (as intrabrand competition would then dissipate all prots). Therefore, the
only relevant deviation is for a coalition to move to downstream foreclosure. Suppose, for
instance, that Mi and Rk agree to open their channel (in addition to the h  k channel)
and foreclose Rj (that is, Mi and Rk now deal with each other, whereas Mi stops dealing
with Rj but Rk keeps dealing with Mh):
 this deviation is always protable for Rk, whose prot increases from EDR =
(1  ) ED to:
DFR = 2 (1  ) DF + 2
 
m   DF  > (1  ) 2DF > (1  ) ED = EDR ;
where the rst inequality stems from the fact that a channel prot is maximal when
all other channels are inactive (and thus m > DF ), whereas the second inequality
stems from the fact that industry-wide prot is larger when the two brands are
carried by the same retailer (so that 2DF > ED);
 by contrast, this deviation is protable for Mi if and only if:
DFM = 
 
2DF   m > EDM = ED:
It follows that exclusive dealing is a CPNE network if and only if ED  2DF   m.
 Downstream foreclosure. Consider now a candidate CPNE in which the two manufac-
turers deal with a single common retailer, say, Rj. Using the same reasoning as above,
the only relevant deviation is now for a coalition to move to exclusive dealing. Suppose,
for instance, that Mh stops dealing with Ri and forms a coalition with Rk to open their
channel (that is, Mh and Rk now deal with each other, whereas Rj keeps dealing with
Mi but no longer deals with Mh):
 this deviation is always protable for Rk, whose prot is now positive whereas it
would otherwise be excluded;
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 by contrast, this deviation is protable for Mh if and only if:
EDM = 
ED > DFM = 
 
2DF   m :
It follows that downstream foreclosure is a CPNE network if and only if ED 
2DF   m.
Summing-up, exclusive dealing constitutes the unique CPNE network if ED > 2DF 
m, whereas downstream foreclosure constitutes the unique CPNE network if instead
ED < 2DF m. In the limit case where ED = 2DF m, both network congurations
can arise in a CPNE.
E.3 Proof of Proposition 8
We already know that no rm can be fully excluded in equilibrium, which leaves us with
only three candidate networks for a CPNE: exclusive dealing, single exclusion (i.e., three
active channels) and interlocking relationships. We consider them in turn.
E.3.1 Exclusive dealing
Consider a candidate CPNE yielding exclusive dealing. Without loss of generality, we
can restrict attention to candidate strategies where rms are willing to deal with a single
partner, as this minimizes the number of alternative networks that a coalition could
achieve. Thus, consider a candidate equilibrium in which Mi and Rj, on the one hand,
and Mh and Rk, on the other hand, only want to deal with each other.
We rst note that these strategies constitute indeed a Nash-equilibrium of the net-
work formation game as, by unilaterally deviating, a rm can a¤ect the network only by
excluding itself from the market. Furthermore, given these equilibrium strategies, the
coalition of manufacturers, the coalition of retailers and the coalition consisting of Mi
and Rj (resp., Mh and Rk) cannot protably deviate: indeed, any deviation a¤ecting the
network could have been achieved through a unilateral deviation.
Finally, given these strategies, any network that can be achieved by a deviating coali-
tion of three rms can also be achieved by a two-rm coalition. Therefore, we only need
to consider deviations by the coalition consisting of Mi and Rk (by symmetry, the same
analysis applies to the coalition consisting of Mh and Rj) or by the grand coalition(all
four players).
 Deviations by the coalition Mi   Rk. When considering deviations by the coalition
consisting of Mi and Rk, looking for self-enforcing deviations amounts to looking for
Pareto-undominated Nash-equilibria of the two-player game betweenMi and Rk, keeping
xed the strategies of Mh and Rj i.e., taking as given that Mh only wants to deal with
Rk, and Rj only wants to deal with Mi.
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As noted above, Mi and Mh dealing exclusively with Rj and Rk respectively, consti-
tutes a Nash equilibrium of this two-player game. And as Mi and Rk obtain a positive
prot in this exclusive dealing network, we can restrict attention to alternative Nash
equilibria in which they both have at least one trading partner. Furthermore, we have:
(i) if Mi is willing to deal only with Rk, then Rks best-response is to deal with both
manufacturers (as downstream foreclosure gives Rk a greater prot than bilateral
monopoly);
(ii) if Mi is willing to deal with both retailers, then Rk prefers dealing exclusively with
Mh to dealing exclusively withMi (as competition is softer when the retailers carry
di¤erent brands);
(iii) if Rk is willing to deal with both suppliers, then Mi prefers dealing exclusively
with Rj to dealing exclusively with Rk, as the condition ED > 2DF   m implies
EDM > 
DF
M .
The rst two observations imply that there is no Nash equilibrium in which Rk deals
exclusively with Mi. The third one implies that there is no Nash equilibrium in which
Rk deals with both suppliers and Rj is excluded from the market. Therefore, besides
exclusive dealing (with channels i   j and h   k being active), the only other network
that may arise in a Nash-equilibrium of the two-player game is one where only channel
h  j remains inactive (i.e., single exclusion).
In addition, the above observations imply that, starting from a candidate Nash equi-
librium yielding a connected network (i.e., single exclusion), for each partner the only
relevant deviation consists of switching to exclusive dealing, by refusing to deal with its
other trading partner. Therefore, the connected network constitutes a Nash equilibrium
if and only if Mi and Rk both (weakly) prefer it to exclusive dealing, that is, if and only
if:
SEm + 
SE
s   ^R  ED and (1  ) SEm + 
 
^J + ^R   SEm
  (1  ) ED: (22)
For the linear demand specied above: (i) the rst condition in (22) amounts to
   (), where the threshold  () is the unique solution to ED = SEm + SEs   ^R,
and is such that  () 2 (0; 1) and it strictly decreases as  increases14; and (ii) when
this rst condition holds, then SEm > 
ED, and thus the second condition in (22) holds
strictly for any  2 [0; 1].
Therefore:
14The threshold  () is the unique solution in [0; 1] of: 
4 + 44
  
4  8+ 32   3+ 422  1  + 22+ 44 (1 + )
 4  2  + 22  6  11+ 62   3 = 0:
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 when  <  (), exclusive dealing and connected networks can both be supported
as a Nash-equilibrium of the two-player game, and the connected network in which
Mi is the multi-partner supplier is strictly preferred by both Mi and Rk;
 when  =  (), both types of networks can be supported as a Nash-equilibrium
of the two-player game, but Mi is indi¤erent between exclusive dealing and being
the multi-partner supplier in a connected network;
 nally, when  >  (), exclusive dealing is the unique network that can be sup-
ported as a Nash-equilibrium of the two-player game.
It follows from these observations that, when  <  (), starting from the candidate
Nash-equilibrium with exclusive dealing, there exists a self-enforcing protable deviation
for the coalition made of Mi and Rk. When instead    (), there is no self-enforcing
protable deviation for this coalition (as at least one rm namely, Mi would not
strictly benet from such a deviation).
 Deviations by the grand coalition. Consider now a deviation by the grand coalition. To
be protable, the grand coalition needs to increase the number of active channels: this
can be done by switching either to a connected network or to interlocking relationships.
However, switching to a connected network can already be achieved by the coalition
Mi  Rk and including more players in the coalition only makes the deviation less likely
to be self-enforcing. Moreover, whenever    () ; we have ED > 2 (2   ^) implying
that manufacturers cannot benet from such a deviation.
Summing-up, there exists a CPNE leading to exclusive dealing if and only if    ().
E.3.2 Interlocking relationships
Consider now a candidate CPNE leading to interlocking relationships (i.e., where all
channels are active). By construction, in such an equilibrium all rms must be willing
to deal with both of their trading partners. It follows that any deviating network that
could be achieved by a coalition made of the manufacturers and at least one retailer
(resp., the retailers and at least one manufacturer) could also be achieved by the coalition
of manufacturers (resp., retailers). Hence, there is no need to consider deviations by
coalitions of three or more rms, and we can instead restrict attention to unilateral
deviations and deviations by two-rm coalitions.
As exiting the market is not protable (as all rms are protable in the equilibrium
generated by interlocking relationships), to rule out unilateral deviations, it su¢ ces to
check that no rm prefers dealing with a single partner, which amounts to:
2 (2   ^)  SEm   ^J and 2 (1  ) + 2 (^   )  (1  ) SEs : (23)
For the linear demand specication:
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 2 > SEs , and thus the second condition in (23) holds strictly for any  2 [0; 1];
 the rst condition in (23) holds instead if and only if   (0).
Therefore, there exists a Nash-equilibrium leading to interlocking relationships if and
only if   (0). Next, we consider (self-enforcing) deviations by two-rm coalitions.
 Deviations by the coalition of manufacturers. Deviations by the coalition of manu-
facturers are self-enforcing if they constitute Pareto-undominated Nash-equilibria of the
two-player game betweenMA andMB, taking R1 and R2strategies as given. As retailers
are willing to deal with both suppliers, in this two-player game each manufacturer freely
determines which of its two distribution channels will be active.
Exiting the market is again never a best-response. Furthermore, from the above obser-
vation, in response toMh dealing with both retailers, Mi is also willing to deal with both
retailers when   (0), and strictly prefers doing so (rather than dealing exclusively
with one retailer) if  < (0). If instead Mh chooses to deal with one retailer only (say,
Rk):
 Mi prefers to deal exclusively withRj (so as to induce the exclusive dealing network)
to dealing exclusively with Rk (as this would lead to the foreclosure of Rj, which is
less protable for Mi, as ED > 2DF   m for the linear demand specication);
 And Mi strictly prefers dealing with both retailers rather than dealing exclusively
with Rj whenever SEm + 
SE
s   ^R > ED, that is, whenever  < ().
As  () is a decreasing function of , it follows from the above observations that,
when  < (), there exists a unique Nash-equilibrium of the above two-player manu-
facturer game, and this equilibrium induces interlocking relationships.
When instead    (), there also exists a Nash-equilibrium of the two-player game
leading to exclusive dealing. It can furthermore be checked that, for the linear demand
specication, manufacturers then prefer the outcome generated by exclusive dealing to
the outcome generated by interlocking relationships; that is,   () implies ED >
2 [2   ^]. Hence, even when interlocking relationships can be supported as a Nash-
equilibrium (which is the case when    (0)), there exists a self-enforcing deviation (to
exclusive dealing) for the coalition of manufacturers. In what follows, we thus focus on
the case  < ().
 Deviations by the coalition of retailers. Deviations by the coalition of retailers are
self-enforcing if they constitute Pareto-undominated equilibria of the two-player game
between R1 and R2, takingMA andMBs strategies as given. As manufacturers are willing
to deal with both distributors, in this two-player game each retailer freely determines
which of the two brands it will carry. Building on the previous observations, exiting the
market is never a best-response and, if a retailer chooses to carry both brands, then the
other retailer strictly prefers carrying both brands as well. In addition,  < () implies
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SERm > 
ED
R (that is, the second part of in (22) holds); hence, if a retailer chooses to
carry a single brand, the other retailer strictly prefers carrying both brands. Carrying
both brands thus constitutes a strictly dominant strategy for each retailer, implying
that, starting from the Nash-equilibrium with interlocking relationships, there is no self-
enforcing protable deviation by the coalition of retailers.
 Deviations by the coalition Mi   Rj. Finally, consider a coalition made of a supplier
(say, Mi) and a retailer (say, Rj). When  < ():
 when Mi (resp., Rj) deals with both retailers (resp., manufacturers), Rjs (resp.,
Mis) best-response is to deal with both manufacturers (resp., retailers);
 when Rj is willing to deal exclusively with Mi, Mis (unique) best-response is to
deal with both retailers.
Moreover, when Mi deals exclusively with Rk, Rj has two best-responses (dealing
with Mh exclusively, or accepting to deal with both manufacturers) that yield the same
connected network, where channel i  j remains inactive. Likewise, when Rj deals exclu-
sively with Mh, Mi has two best-responses (dealing with Rk exclusively, or accepting to
deal with both retailers) leading to the same network.
This implies that this two-player game has two Nash-equilibria, one leading to inter-
locking relationships and one leading to a connected network (with channel i j remaining
inactive). But in this last case, Mi and Rj would strictly prefer to activate channel i  j.
Hence, the equilibrium with single exclusion is strictly Pareto-dominated, implying that
there is no self-enforcing deviation for the coalition Mi  Rj.
Summing-up, there exists a CPNE with interlocking relationships if and only if  <
().
E.3.3 Single exclusion
We nally show that there never exists a CPNE with three active channels (i.e., single
exclusion). To see this, consider a candidate CPNE with only one channel, say h  k, is
inactive.
When  < (0), we have seen that both conditions in (23) strictly hold. It follows
that there exists a self-enforcing deviation for the coalition Mh   Rk, which consists of
activating the fourth channel (in addition to the other ones).
Furthermore, when  > (), we have seen that condition in (22) is violated. There-
fore, Mi would nd it protable to unilaterally deviate and deal exclusively with Rk.
As  () is a decreasing function of , the above analysis implies that there always
exists either a protable unilateral deviation (when  > ()), or a self-enforcing devi-
ation by a two-rm coalition (when  < (0)). Hence, there never exists a CPNE with
three active channels.
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F Mergers
We now apply our bargaining equilibrium approach to evaluate the e¤ect of mergers in
the above successive duopoly setting. To ensure that rmspayo¤s are properly dened,
we maintain the focus on equilibria based on two-part tari¤s.
F.1 Downstream merger
A merger between the two retailers creates a new entity, R, which is a multi-location
monopolist. As mentioned in the text, for the sake of exposition we assume that manufac-
turers can no longer discriminate according to the channel through which their products
are sold, and so R negotiates with each Mi a single two-part tari¤, ti(qi) = Fi + wiqi. A
bargaining equilibrium is then similar to a delegated negotiation game in which R uses
two di¤erent agents simultaneously negotiating with the two manufacturers.15
We rst study the bargaining equilibria for each distribution network, and show that
equilibrium tari¤s are still always cost-based. We then characterize the equilibrium xed
fees, and show that they are unique. Finally, we look for the CPNE of the network
formation game, which we compare with the pre-merger outcome.
Throughout this section, we assume that Rs monopolistic price response is uniquely
dened and that the resulting quantities are well-behaved. Specically, let (with the
convention that wij = pij =1 and Dij = 0 if brand i is not present at location j)
pm (w)  arg max
p
X
i2fA;Bg;j2f1;2g
 
pij   wij   j

Dij (p)
denote Rs price response to wholesale prices w, and qm (w) denote the corresponding
quantities (i.e., qmij (w) = Dij (p
m(w)) if brand i is present at location j, and qmij (w) = 0
otherwise). Likewise, let R (w), A (w) and B (w) denote the resulting prots (gross
of xed fees) for R, MA and MB respectively. We also maintain the following adaptation
of Assumption A (specically, the existence and uniqueness of a retail response) and
condition (3):
Assumption F1 (multi-brand multi-location monopoly) For any vector of whole-
sale prices w, there is a unique vector pm (w); furthermore, the retail quantity for each
(active) brand responds to its wholesale price:
for every i 2 fA;Bg ,
X
j2f1;2g
@qmij
@wij
(w) 6= 0:
15If manufacturers could charge di¤erent prices for each distribution channel, then the relevant dele-
gated negotiation game would have R using four di¤erent agents, one for each channel.
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F.1.1 Interlocking relationships
We start with interlocking relationships, where the retailer carries both brands at both
locations. In the last stage, R obtains a prot (gross of the xed fees FA and FB) given
by:
R (w)  max
p
8<: X
j2f1;2g
[(pij   wi   )Dik (p) + (phj   wh   )Dhj (p)]
9=;
:
Using the envelope theorem, we thus have:
@R
@whk
(w) =  qmhk (w) : (24)
Consider now the negotiation between R and Mi, for i 2 fA;Bg. Given the wholesale
price negotiated with the competing manufacturer, wIRh , R andMi choose wi1 = wi2 = wi
so as to maximize their joint prot, given by:
i + R
 
wi; w
IR
h ; wi; w
IR
h
  Fh = X
j2f1;2g
(wi   c) qmij
 
wi; w
IR
h ; wi; w
IR
h

+R
 
wi; w
IR
h ; wi; w
IR
h

+ Fk   Fh:
Using (24), the rst-order condition with respect to wi yields:
 
wIRi   c
 X
j2f1;2g
@qmij
@wi
 
wIR

= 0:
Assumption F1 then ensures that, in any equilibrium in two-part tari¤s, tari¤s are cost-
based, that is, wIRi = c for any i 2 fA;Bg.16
If the negotiation between Mi and R were to break down, Mi would be excluded
whereas R would keep selling Mhs product at both locations; the industry prot would
thus be 2^UF rather than 4M where:
^UF  max
p
(p  c  )D(p;1; p;1) and M  max
p
(p  c  )D(p; p; p; p):
As manufacturers obtain zero prot in case of a negotiation breakdown, in equilibrium
they obtain a share  of the bilateral gains from trade; as manufacturers obtain their
prots through the xed fees, and retailers are thus the residual claimants, these bilateral
gains coincide with the increase in industry prot; hence, the equilibrium prots are:
MA = MB = 
M
M  2
 
2M   ^UF  and R = MR  4 (1  ) M + 4  ^UF   M :
16More generally, under relatively mild assumptions, any post-merger bargaining equilibrium involves
cost-based tari¤s, but additional equilibria (based on non-linear tari¤s other than two-part tari¤s) can
sustain di¤erent prot-sharing between the monopolistic retailer and the manufacturers.
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F.1.2 Bilateral monopoly
If a single channel is active, say i j, the merger does not a¤ect the bargaining equilibrium.
Mis and Rs prots are thus respectively given by:
Mi = 
m
M  m and R = mR  (1  )m:
F.1.3 Downstream foreclosure
The merger does not a¤ect the bargaining outcome either when R carries both brands
but operates only one location. The equilibrium prots are then:
MA = MB = 
DF
M  
 
2DF   m and R = DFR  2 (1  ) DF+2  m   DF  :
F.1.4 Exclusive dealing
When two unconnected channels are active, say i  j and h  k, the situation is similar
to downstream foreclosure, except that the two active products are more di¤erentiated.
The equilibrium tari¤s are therefore cost-based, and the industry prot is equal to 2^ED,
where:
^ED  max
p
(p  c  )D(p;1;1; p);
and the equilibrium prots are:
Mi = Mh = 
ED
M  
 
2^ED   m and R = EDR  2 (1  ) ^ED + 2(m   ^ED):
F.1.5 Upstream foreclosure
When a single manufacturer, sayMi, negotiates with R a tari¤applying to both locations,
the situation is the same as under bilateral monopoly, except that (total) demand for
brand i is here equal to D^i(p) = 2D(p;1; p;1). The equilibrium tari¤s are therefore
cost-based, and the industry prot is equal to 2^UF , and the equilibrium prots are:
Mi = 
UF
M  2^UF and R = UFR  2 (1  ) ^UF :
F.1.6 Single exclusion
Finally, suppose that a single channel, say h   k, remains inactive (and so the active
channels are i   1, i   2 and h   j, for i 6= h 2 fA;Bg and j 6= k 2 f1; 2g). When
negotiating over wi, R and Mi seek to maximize their joint prot, given by:
i+R
 
wi; w
SE
h ; wi;1
 Fh = X
l2f1;2g
(wi   c) qmil
 
wi; w
SE
h ; wi;1

+R
 
wi; w
SE
h ; wi;1
 Fh:
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Using (24), the rst-order condition with respect to wi yields again:
 
wSEi   c
 X
l2f1;2g
@qmil
@wi
 
wSE

= 0:
Likewise, when negotiating over wh, Mh and R seek to:
h+R
 
wSEi ; wh; w
SE
i ;1
 Fi = (wh   c) qmhj  wSEi ; wh; wSEi ;1+R  wSEi ; wh; wSEi ;1 Fi;
which, using again (24), leads to the rst-order condition:
 
wSEh   c
 @qmhj
@wh
 
wSE

= 0:
Assumption F1 then ensures that both tari¤s are cost-based: wSEi = w
SE
h = c. The
resulting total prot is then
SE  R (c; c; c;1) :
As manufacturers obtain zero prot in case of a negotiation breakdown, in equilib-
rium they obtain a share  of the bilateral gains from trade, which coincide with their
contribution to industry prot; hence their equilibrium prots are given by:
Mi = 
SE
m  
 
SE   m , Mh = SEs    SE   2UF  ;
and R thus obtains:
R = 
SE
R  (1  )SE + 
 
2UF + m   SE :
F.1.7 Post-merger distribution network and impact on consumer surplus
 Equilibrium distribution network. As products are imperfect substitutes, we have:
4M > SE > 2^ED > 2 maxfDF ; ^UFg > 2 minfDF ; ^UFg > m:
Hence, a manufacturer is always strictly better o¤when R sells its brand at both locations
rather than at a single location. For manufacturers, it is thus a (weakly) dominant
strategy to activate both channels with R.
In addition, in our linear demand example, it can be checked that  interlocking rela-
tionshipsis always Rs preferred channel conguration. Combining these two observa-
tions, the unique coalition-proof distribution network involves interlocking relationships.
 Impact on prices and consumer surplus. Following a merger between the two retailers,
the equilibrium distribution network always involves interlocking relationships and prices
are at the industry-prot maximizing level. This implies that the merger harms consumers
whenever the pre-merger equilibrium distribution network already involves interlocking
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relationships. The merger may however benet consumers by expanding distribution
network. This is for instance the case when retailers are close substitutes, so that exclusive
dealing arises pre-merger, and brands do not compete (maximal di¤erentiation between
brands), as the two brands are then already sold at monopoly prices pre-merger; hence,
in that case consumers are not a¤ected by any price increase, but benet post-merger
from increased variety as they can nd both brands at both locations.
For the linear demand specication, interlocking relationships arise pre-merger when-
ever  <  (), in which case the merger harms consumers and society, as it raises
prices without any o¤-setting benet in variety. When instead    (), the merger
expands the distribution network, from exclusive dealing to interlocking relationships.
In that case, there exist two thresholds ^S () and ^W () (where ^S () and ^W () are
decreasing function of  such that ^S (1) = ^W (1) = 0 and ^S () < ^W () for  < 1)
17
such that, despite price increases, by expanding the distribution network the downstream
merger increases consumer surplus if and only if  < ^S (), and increases total welfare
if and only if  < ^W (). Hence, the downstream merger benets consumer if and only
if: (i) retailers are close enough substitutes, namely,  >  (), so that the pre-merger
distribution network involves exclusive dealing; and yet the combination of brand and
retail di¤erentiation yields prices that are so high that increasing them further to the
monopoly level does not o¤set the benet from expanding the network. These insights
are illustrated by Figure 2.
F.2 Upstream Merger
A merger between the two manufacturers creates a new entity,M , which is a multi-brand
monopolist dealing with competing distributors. For simplicity, we assume that M bun-
dles the two brands and thus negotiates with each Rj, in addition to the wholesale prices
wAj and wBj, a single xed fee Fj. A bargaining equilibrium is then similar to a game
with delegated negotiations whereM uses two di¤erent agents simultaneously negotiating
with the two retailers.18 This analysis is also similar to that of upstream foreclosure (i.e.,
one manufacturer dealing with two retailers) except that the manufacturer sells here two
di¤erentiated products.
17The threshold ^S () is the unique solution in [0; 1] to:
2 (1  )  2 (1 + )  322 + 33 = 0;
whereas the threshold ^W () is the unique solution in [0; 1] to:
6 (1  )  2  3 +   22+ (4  5)2 + 333 = 0:
18In the absence of bundling, the relevant delegated negotiation game would haveM using four di¤erent
agents, one for each distribution channel.
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Figure 2: Impact of a downstream merger
We rst study the bargaining equilibria for each possible distribution network, and
show that equilibrium tari¤s remain again cost-based. We then characterize the equilib-
rium xed fees, and show that they are unique. Finally, we solve for the CPNE of the
distribution network formation game, which we compare with the pre-merger outcome.
Throughout this section, we assume that the retail equilibrium outcome is uniquely
dened and well-behaved.Specically, for any j 2 f1; 2g, any wholesale prices wj =
(wAj; wBj) and any retail prices p = (pij)i2fA;Bg;j2f1;2g, let
~j (p; wj) 
X
i2fA;Bg
(pij   wij   )Dij (p)
denote Rjs retail prot (gross of xed fees), with the convention that wij = pij =1 and
Dij = 0 if Rj does not carry brand i; and, for any j 6= k 2 f1; 2g, any wholesale prices
wj = (wAj; wBj) and any rivals retail price pk = (pAk; pBk), let
~prj (pk;wj)  arg max
pj
~j (pj;pk; wj)
denote Rjs best-response to its rivalsprices p j. We also maintain the following adap-
tation of Assumption A and condition (3):
Assumption F2. For any vector of wholesale prices w and any vector of retail prices
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pk (with k 6= j 2 f1; 2g), the best-response function eprj (pk;wj) is uniquely characterized
by the rst-order conditions for any j 2 f1; 2g. In addition, the best-response functions
satisfy:
(i) eprj (pk; c; c) = prj (pk), dened in Section 2.3;
(ii) for any vector of wholesale prices wj and vector of retail prices pk, and for any
i 6= h 2 fA;Bg:
@~prij
@wij
(pk;wj) >
@~prhj
@wij
(pk;wj)  0:
F.2.1 Interlocking relationships
We start with interlocking relationships, where each retailer carries both brands. Consider
the negotiation between M and Rj, for j 2 f1; 2g. If they agree on wholesale prices
wj = (wAj; wBj), in the last stage Rj expects to obtain
~j
 
~prj
 
pIRk ;wj

;pIRk ; wj

= max
pj
~j
 
pj;p
IR
k ; wj

;
which, using the envelope theorem, satises:
@
@wij

~j
 
~prj
 
pIRk ;wj

;pIRk ; wj
	
=  Dij
 
~prj
 
pIRk ;wj

;pIRk

: (25)
Given the wholesale prices negotiated by M with Rk, wIRk =
 
wIRAk; w
IR
Bk

, M and Rj
choose wj = (wAj; wBj) so as to maximize their joint prot, given by:
wIRj = arg max
wj
8<:~j  ~prj  pIRk ;wj ;pIRk ; wj+ X
h2fA;Bg
(whj   c)Dhj
 
~prj
 
pIRk ;wj

;pIRk

+
X
h2fA;Bg
 
wIRhk   c

Dhk
 
~prj
 
pIRk ;wj

;pIRk
9=;
Using (25), the rst-order condition with respect to wij yields:
X
h2fA;Bg
 
wIRhj   c
 X
g2fA;Bg
@Dhj
@pgj
@~prgj
@wij
+
X
h2fA;Bg
 
wIRhk   c
 X
g2fA;Bg
@Dhk
@pgj
@~prgj
@wij
= 0:
Assumption F2 then ensures that wholesale prices are at cost: wIRij = c for every i 2
fA;Bg and j 2 f1; 2g.
If the negotiation between M and Rj were to break down, Rj would be excluded
whereas M would still obtain Fk from Rk; in equilibrium, Rj thus obtains a share 1  
of its contribution to the bilateral joint prot, which is equal to 2.19 It follows that the
19The joint bilateral prot of M and Rj is equal to 2 + Fk if they reach an agreement and to Fk
otherwise.
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equilibrium prots are:
M = eIRM  4 and R1 = R2 = eIRR  2 (1  ) :
F.2.2 Bilateral monopoly
If a single channel is active, say i j, the merger does not a¤ect the bargaining equilibrium.
Ms and Rjs prots are thus, respectively:
M = emM  m and Rj = emR  (1  )m:
F.2.3 Upstream foreclosure
When the manufacturer sells only one brand, say brand i, the merger does not a¤ect the
bargaining equilibrium. The manufacturer and the retailersprots are thus, respectively:
M = eUFM  2UF and R1 = R2 = eUFR  (1  )UF :
F.2.4 Downstream foreclosure
When M negotiates with a single retailer, say Rj, over both brands, the parties aim to
maximize their joint prot and this is again achieved by negotiating a cost-based tari¤,
i.e., weij = w
e
hj = c. Industry prot is then equal to 2
DF and this prot is divided
between M and Rj according to the (; 1  ) bargaining rule as prots would be equal
to 0 were the negotiation to fail. The individual prots are therefore:
M = eDFM  2DF and Rj = eDFR  2 (1  ) DF :
F.2.5 Exclusive dealing
When two unconnected channels are active, say i  j and h  k, the situation is similar
to upstream foreclosure, except that the two active products are now more di¤erentiated.
Equilibrium tari¤s are therefore cost-based and the industry prot is equal to 2ED.
Individual prots are then:
M = eEDM  2ED and R1 = R2 = eEDR  (1  ) ED:
F.2.6 Single exclusion
Finally, suppose that only one channel, say h   k, remains inactive. In the negotiation
between M and Rj, the parties take the wholesale price negotiated by M with Rk, wSEik ,
as given. They thus choose:
wSEj = arg max
wj
8<: ~j
 eprj  pSEik ;1; wj ; pSEik ;1; wj+  wSEik   cDik  eprj  pSEik ;1; wj ; pSEik ;1
+
P
g2fA;Bg
(wgj   c)Dgj
 eprj  pSEik ;1; wj ; pSEik ;1
9=;
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Applying the envelope theorem to Rjs retail pricing program yields:
@
@wij

~j
 eprj  pSEik ;1; wj ; pSEik ;1; wj	 =  Dij  eprj  pSEik ;1; wj ; pSEik ;1 :
Using this, the rst-order condition of the above joint prot maximization program with
respect to wl^j, for g^ = A;B, yields:
X
g2fA;Bg
 
wSEgj   c
 X
~g2fA;Bg
@Dgj
@p~gj
@~pr~gj
@wg^j
+
 
wSEik   c
 X
~g2fA;Bg
@Dik
@p~gj
@~pr~gj
@wg^j
= 0: (26)
Similarly, in the negotiation between M and Rk, the parties that the wholesale prices
negotiated by M with Rj, wSEj = (w
SE
ij ; w
SE
hj ), as given. They thus choose:
wSEik = arg max
wik
(
~k
 
~prik
 
pSEj ; wik

;1;pSEj ;wik

+ (wik   c)Dik
 
~prik
 
pSEj ; wik

;1;pSEj

+
P
g2fA;Bg
 
wSEgj   c

Dgj
 
~prik
 
pSEj ; wik

;1;pSEj
 )
Using the envelope theorem for Rks retail pricing program, the rst-order condition of
this joint prot maximization program yields:24 X
g2fA;Bg
 
wSEgj   c
 @Dgj
@pik
+
 
wSEik   c
 @Dik
@pik
35 @~prik
@wik
= 0: (27)
Conditions (26) and (27) are satised by wSEij = w
SE
hj = w
SE
ik = c. Assumption F2(ii),
combined with imperfect substitution between brands and retailers, ensures that this is
the only equilibrium.
Equilibrium tari¤s being cost-based, the equilibrium xed fee negotiated between M
and Rl, for any l 2 f1; 2g, is equal to Fl = Rl . It follows that
F SEj = 
SE
m and F
SE
k = 
SE
s :
Hence, M obtains a share  of the industry prot
M = eSEM    SEm + SEs 
and retailers obtain:
Rj =
eSERm  (1  ) SEm and Rk = eSERs  (1  ) SEs :
F.2.7 Post-merger distribution network and impact on consumer surplus
 Equilibrium distribution network. For all distribution networks, Ms prots are pro-
portional to  and retailersprots are always proportional to 1   ; this is because M
generates its prots exclusively through xed fees and a retailer is excluded if its negotia-
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tion withM fails. Hence, the decisions about activating or not a channel are independent
of .
Furthermore, imperfect substitutability implies that 2DF > m and ED > UF .
Therefore, bilateral monopoly and upstream foreclosure cannot arise in a CPNE: a coali-
tion formed by M and the active retailer would nd it protable to activate their second
channel in the rst case, and the grand coalition would rather switch to exclusive dealing
in the second. In addition, for any strategy chosen by its rival, a retailer always prefers
activating both channels (whenever possible) rather than a single one, and activating
any channel rather than being excluded. Therefore, in a CPNE the distribution network
must be Ms preferred one: otherwise, M could protably deviate, either by unilaterally
closing some of the channels, or by forming a coalition with one or both retailer(s) to
induce a switchto its preferred distribution network.
M always gets a share  of the industry prot; hence, bilateral monopoly and up-
stream foreclosure can never be its preferred distribution network, and we only need
to compare the industry prot with interlocking relationships (4), exclusive dealing 
2ED

, downstream foreclosure
 
2DF

and single exclusion
 
SEm + 
SE
s

. In our linear
setting, single exclusion always yields a lower prot than either interlocking relationships
(if  <  (0)) or downstream foreclosure (if  >  (0)). Comparing the remaining prots,
there exist two thresholds20 ~ () and  () that are decreasing functions of  such that
 () < ~ () <  () for  2 ]0; 1] ; ~ (0) =  (0) and  (0) = 1, such that the CPNE of
the network formation game involves:21
 interlocking relationships if and only if   ~ ();
 exclusive dealing if and only if ~ ()   <  ();
 downstream foreclosure if and only if    ().
 Impact on prices and consumer surplus and total welfare. Keeping the distribution
network constant, an upstream merger has no impact on wholesale and retail prices, and
thus does not a¤ect consumers or total welfare. However, the merger may well alter the
equilibrium distribution network and therefore have an impact on variety and prices, and
thus on consumer surplus and welfare.
 When    () (i.e., retailers are close substitutes), M prefers selling both brands
to a single common retailer (downstream foreclosure) rather than selling each one
20The threshold ~ () is the unique solution in [0; 1] to
4 (1  )  4  2    2 + 3  1 +   22 2    1 + 4  32   23 3 +   1 +   22 4 = 0;
whereas  () is the unique solution in [0; 1] to: 4  4 (1 + ) + 32   23 = 0:
21For  = ~ (), two CPNE co-exist: the manufacturers and the retailers are all indi¤erent between
interlocking relationships and exclusive dealing. But for  =  () ; if M is indi¤erent between exclusive
dealing and downstream foreclosure, the coalition formed by M and Rj can protably (in the sense of
Pareto-dominance) deviate to downstream foreclosure as this network is strictly preferred by Rj :
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Figure 3: Impact of an upstream merger
of them to a di¤erent retailer (exclusive dealing); in that case, the merger does not
really a¤ect variety (two channels are available pre- as well as post-merger, which
involve distinct brands and either the same retailer or two di¤erent retailers; because
of symmetry, keeping prices constant this would have no impact on consumers or
prots), but raises prices by avoiding downstream competition. Hence, it reduces
consumer surplus and total welfare.
 When  ()   < ~ (), M extends the distribution network and opts for inter-
locking relationships instead of exclusive dealing, which increases consumer surplus
and total welfare by both increasing variety and decreasing prices.
Hence, for the linear demand specication, the merger may either be consumer surplus
and welfare-neutral (network is una¤ected), consumer surplus and welfare increasing (for
a small set of parameter with intermediate degree of substitution between retailers), or
consumer surplus and welfare-decreasing (when retailers are good substitutes). These
insights are illustrated by Figure 3.
F.3 Vertical Merger
A vertical merger between one manufacturer, say Mi, and one retailer, say Rj, creates
a vertically integrated rm, I, dealing with an independent (i.e., non-integrated) manu-
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facturer, Mh, and an independent retailer, Rk. We focus in what follows on bargaining
equilibria based on two-part tari¤s to ensure that rmsprots continue to be properly
dened. Moreover, when considering the possible distribution networks, we assume that,
by default, the vertically integrated channel i   j is always active. We thus need to
consider eight possible distribution networks:
 Bilateral monopoly: only channel i  j is active (m).
 Exclusive dealing: only channels i  j and h  k are active (ED).
 Downstream foreclosure: only channels i  j and h  j are active (DF ).
 Upstream foreclosure: only channels i  j and i  k are active (UF ).
 Single exclusion: all channels but h  k are active (hk).
 Single exclusion: all channels but i  k are active (ik).
 Single exclusion: all channels but h  j are active (hj).
 Interlocking relationships: all channels are active (IR).
By construction, the integrated manufacturer supplies its downstream subsidiary at
cost: wij = c. We moreover show below that the independent manufacturer, Mh, always
o¤ers cost-based tari¤s to every available partner. Hence, at most one wholesale price,
wik, may vary. For the sake of exposition, in what follows we assume that the continuation
retail equilibrium has always a unique outcome and is well-behaved. Specically, for
any wholesale prices w = (wik; whj; whk), with the convention that wik =1 if the channel
i  k is inactive, and that
whl =
(
c if the channel h  l is active,
1 otherwise,
and for any retail prices p = (pj;pk), with the convention that pgl = 1 if the channel
g   l is inactive, for g 2 fA;Bg and l 2 f1; 2g, let
I (p; w) 
X
g2fA;Bg
(pgj   c  )Dgj (p) + (wik   c)Dik (p) ;
denote the vertically integrated rms prot (gross of xed fees), and
R (p; w)  (pik   wik   )Dik (p) + (phk   c  )Dhk (p)
denote the independent retailers prot (again gross of xed fees), with the convention
that the term corresponding to any given channel g  l is zero if that channel is inactive.
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For any g 2 fA;Bg, the independent Rks conditional price response p^gkk (qgk) and rev-
enue function r^gkk (qgk) are dened as before (see section 3.2); that is, given the equilibrium
tari¤s we and retail prices pe:
p^gkk (qgk)  arg max
fpkjDgk(pk;pej )=qgkg
X
m2fA;Bg
(pmk   wemk   )Dmk(pk;pej )
and
r^gkk (qgk) =
X
m2fA;Bg
(p^gkmk (qgk)  )q^gkmk(qgk);
where
q^gkmk(qgk)  Dmk

p^gkk (qgk);p
e
j

:
By contrast, when negotiating with the independentMh, the integrated Rj now takes
into account the upstream margin on the sales of brand i through Rk. As it is supplied
at cost by Mi, its conditional price response p^
hj
j (qhj) and the revenue function r^
hj
j (qhj)
are therefore modied and given by:
p^hjj (qhj)  arg max
fpj jDhj(pj ;pek)=qhjg
(
(pij   c  )Dij(pj;pek) +
 
phj   wehj   

Dhj(pj;p
e
k)
+ (weik   c)Dik(pj;pek)
)
and
r^hjj (qhj) 
X
m2fA;Bg
h
(p^hjmj (qhj)  )q^hjmj(qhj)
i
+ (weik   c) q^hjik (qhj);
where, for m 2 fA;Bg:
q^hjmj(qhj)  Dmj

p^hjj (qhj);p
e
k

:
To ensure the existence of a smooth retail behavior, we adapt the assumptions of the
baseline model as follows:
Assumption F3.
(i) For any wholesale prices w = (wik; whj; whk) 2 R  fc;1g2, there exists a unique
retail price equilibrium pR (w) = (pRj (w) ;p
R
k (w)), with the convention that p
R
gl =
1 if channel g   l is inactive, which:
(a) is uniquely characterized by the rst-order conditions of the programs
pRj (w) = arg max
pj
I
 
pj;p
R
k (w) ; w

and pRk (w) = arg max
pk
R
 
pRj (w) ;pk; w

;
(b) increases with the wholesale price wik, that is, for any g 2 fA;Bg and any
l 2 f1; 2g:
@pRgl
@wik
> 0;
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(ii) For the channels involvingMh, the conditional price responses, p^h11 (qh1) and p^
h2
2 (qh2)
are both unique and di¤erentiable, the diversion ratios, h112 and 
h2
21 satisfy
0  h112 ; h221 < 1;
and the equilibrium quantities satisfy qeh1 2 Int (Qh1) and qeh2 2 Int (Qh2).
Finally, we respectively denote by
RI (w)  I
 
pR (w) ; w

and RR (w)  R
 
pR (w) ; w

the prots (gross of xed fees) of the vertically integrated rm and of the independent
retailer in the retail price equilibrium pR (w), for w = (wik; whj; whk) 2 R fc;1g2.
F.3.1 Bargaining equilibria
No relationship between I and Rk When the vertically integrated rm does not
supply its rival retailer, the merger has no impact, neither on the equilibrium outcome
nor on the o¤-equilibrium outcomes in case of a negotiation break-down: the integrated
rm always supplies its own subsidiary at cost, and the previous reasoning can be used to
check that the independent manufacturer always o¤ers cost-based tari¤s to any available
partner. The prots of the independent rms are therefore the same as pre-merger, and
the prot of the integrated rm is simply the sum of the prots that its subsidiaries would
obtain pre-merger. Hence, we have:
 Bilateral monopoly:
^mI = 
m, ^mM = 
m and ^mR = (1  ) m:
 Exclusive dealing:
^EDI = 
ED, ^EDM = 
ED and ^EDR = (1  ) ED:
 Downstream foreclosure:
^DFI = 2 (1  ) DF + m, ^DFM = 
 
2DF   m and ^DFR = 0:
 Single exclusion of channel i  k:
^ikI = (1  ) SEm + ^R, ^ikM = 
 
SEm + 
SE
s   ^R

and ^ikR = (1  ) SEs :
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Interlocking relationships
Consider now the case where all channels are active.
 The independent manufacturers tari¤s are cost-based: wIRhj = wIRhk = c.
Consider rst the negotiation between the two independent rms, Mh and Rk. In this
negotiation, the two rms take the other three equilibrium contracts and the equilibrium
prices set by the vertically integrated retailer Rj as given. Choosing a wholesale price
whk is thus equivalent, for the pair Mh   Rk, to choosing a quantity qhk sold by Rk at
the retail competition stage, taking into account that Rk will choose the prices p^hkk (qhk)
maximizing its prot. The equilibrium quantity qIRhk thus maximizes:
r^hkk (qhk)  cqhk   wIRik q^hkik (qhk) +
 
wIRhj   c

q^hkhj (qhk) :
In addition, when choosing its retail prices (i.e., choosing qhk given p^hkk (qhk)), Rk
maximizes its own prot, that is:
r^hkk (qhk)  whkqhk   wIRik q^hkik (qhk) :
From Assumption F3(ii), the equilibrium quantity qIRhk must satisfy the rst-order
conditions associated with these two optimization programmes; we thus have: 
r^hkk
0
(qhk) = c+ w
IR
ik
 
q^hkik
0
(qhk) +
 
wIRhj   c

hkkj 
r^hkk
0
(qhk) = whk + w
IR
ik
 
q^hkik
0
(qhk) :
Combining these conditions yields, using as before the notation uIRgl = w
IR
gl   c for the
upstream margin on channel g   l, for g 2 fA;Bg and l 2 f1; 2g:
uIRhk = 
hk
kju
IR
hj : (28)
Consider now the negotiation between Mh and I (for the sales of brand h through
Rj). When choosing its retail prices or quantities, I now takes into account the margin
uIRik earned on its sales to Rk. Therefore, choosing a wholesale price whj is thus equivalent,
for the pair Mh  I, to choosing a quantity qhj sold through Rj at the retail competition
stage, taking into account that I will choose the prices p^hjj (qhj) maximizing its prot.
The equilibrium quantity qIRhj thus maximizes:
22
r^hjj (qhj)  cq^hjij (qhj)  cqhj +
 
wIRhk   c

q^hjhk (qhj) :
In addition, when choosing its retail prices (i.e., choosing the quantity qhj given p^
hj
j (qhj)),
22Recall that the revenue r^hjj (qhj) takes into account the margin u
e
ik earned by I on Mis sales to Rk,
given by q^hjik (qhj).
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I maximizes:
r^hjj (qhj)  cq^hjij (qhj)  whjqhj:
From Assumption F3(ii), the equilibrium quantity qIRhj satises both associated rst-order
conditions, and combining them yields:
uIRhj = 
hj
jku
IR
hk (29)
From Assumption F3(ii), the diversion ratios are positive and lower than 1; hence,
conditions (28) and (29) yield a unique solution: uIRhj = u
IR
hk = 0; that is, the tari¤s
negotiated between Mh and I and between Mh and Rk continue to be cost-based in
equilibrium.
 The tari¤ negotiated between the integrated rm and the independent retailer exhibits
a positive margin: uIRik > 0. Consider now the negotiation between the integrated rm
I and the independent retailer Rk over the tari¤ tij. Although only one wholesale price,
wik, varies in that negotiation (I and Rj taking all other equilibrium tari¤s as given), any
change in that wholesale price a¤ects all retail prices in the continuation game, as the
integrated Rj now observesthe tari¤ before setting its prices and thus reacts to it. The
prots of the integrated rm I and of the independent retailer Rk (gross of xed fees) are
thus respectively given by RI (wik; c; c) and 
R
R (wik; c; c). Using the envelope theorem, we
have:
@RI
@wik
(w)

w=(wik;c;c)
= Dik
 
pR (w)

+
X
g2fA;Bg
(pgj   c  )
X
m2fA;Bg
@Dgj
@pmk
 
pR (w)
 @pRmk
@wik
(w)
+ (wik   c)
X
m2fA;Bg
@Dik
@pmk
 
pR (w)
 @pRmk
@wik
(w) ;
@RR
@wik
(w)

w=(wik;c;c)
=  Dik
 
pR (w)

+ (pik   wik   )
X
m2fA;Bg
@Dik
@pmj
 
pR (w)
 @pRmj
@wik
(w)
+ (phk   c  )
X
m2fA;Bg
@Dhk
@pmj
 
pR (w)
 @pRmj
@wik
(w) :
When negotiating over the wholesale price wik, I and Rk maximize their joint prot,
which amounts to maximizing the total industry prot (asMh obtains its own prot only
through xed fees):
R (w)  RI (w) + RR (w) ;
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taking into account the impact that any change in wik has on retail prices, pR (wik; c; c),
in the continuation equilibrium. The equilibrium wholesale price thus solves:
wIRik = arg max
wik
R (wik; c; c) :
For the sake of exposition, we assume here that this optimization program is well-behaved:
Assumption G. For any wholesale prices w = (wik; whj; whk) 2 R  fc;1g2, the joint
bilateral prot of the integrated rm and the independent retailer in the continuation
equilibrium, R (w), is quasi-concave in wik.
It follows that, in equilibrium, I charges a positive margin on its sales to Rk. To see
this, it su¢ ces to note that, for wik = c, we have:
@R
@wik
(w)

w=(c;c;c)
=
X
g2fA;Bg

pRgj (w)  c  
 X
m2fA;Bg
@Dgj
@pmk
 
pR (w)
 @pRmk
@wik
(w)
+
X
g2fA;Bg

pRgk (w)  c  
 X
m2fA;Bg
@Dgk
@pmj
 
pR (w)
 @pRmj
@wik
(w)
> 0;
where the inequality stems from product substitution (@Dgk=@pmj > 0 and @Dgj=@pmk >
0 for any g;m 2 fA;Bg), Assumption F3(i:b) and the fact that each retailer charges at
least one positive downstream margin:
 This is obvious for Rk, as (i) charging non-positive margins on both brands can-
not constitute Rks retail price response, as this would yield a non-positive prot,
whereas deviating to slightly positive margins would generate instead a positive
prot; and (ii) starting from a situation in which Rk would charge a positive mar-
gin on one brand, say brand g, and a negative one on the other brand, say brand
m, Rk would protable deviate by eliminating the negative margin (i.e., increasing
pmk to c + ), keeping the positive margin unchanged (i.e., maintaining pgk to the
same level): this would avoid the loss on brand m, and moreover boosts the sales
of brand g, on which Rk earns a positive margin.
 The same observation applies to I when wik = c, as Is entire prot then comes
from its retail activities.
Hence, starting from wik = c, the rms wish to increase wik. The quasi-concavity of
the joint bilateral prot R then implies that the negotiated price is strictly above cost:
wIRik > c. As the integrated Rj internalizes the impact of its pricing decisions on the
margin uIRik earned by Mi, it follows that it prices less aggressively than pre-merger.
 Equilibrium xed fees. Consider rst the negotiation between Mh and I over Fhj. As
before Mh derives all of its prot from the xed fees, Fhj + F IRhk . If the negotiation
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succeeds, then I gets IRI   Fhj + F IRik , where
IRI  RI
 
wIRik ; c; c

:
If instead the negotiation fails, then it gets hjI + F
IR
ik , where (as Rk, being unaware of
the negotiation break-down, sticks to pRk
 
wIRik ; c; c

):
hjI  maxpij
(
(pij   c  )D
 
pij;1;pRk
 
wIRik ; c; c

+
 
wIRik   c

D
 
pRk
 
wIRik ; c; c

; pij;1
 ) :
The xed fee is therefore F IRhj = 
hj
I , where 
hj
I  IRI   hjI .
Consider now the negotiation between Mh and Rk over Fhk. Once again, Mh derives
all of its prot from the xed fees, F IRhj + Fhk. If the negotiation succeeds, then Rk gets
IRR   Fhk   F IRik , where
IRR  RR
 
wIRik ; c; c

:
If instead the negotiation fails, then it gets hkR  F IRik , where (as I, being unaware of the
negotiations outcome, sticks to pRj
 
wIRik ; c; c

):
hkR  max
pik
f pik   wIRik   D  pik;1;pRj (wIRik ; c; c)g:
The xed fee is therefore F IRhk = 
hk
R , where 
hk
R  IRR   hkR .
Finally, consider the negotiation between I and Rk over Fik. If the negotiation suc-
ceeds, I gets IRI +Fik  F IRhj and Rk gets IRR  Fik  F IRhk . If the negotiation fails, both
retailers now know that it has failed; hence, Is and Rks prots become respectively
given by SEm   F IRhj and SEs   F IRhk . The xed fee is thus equal to
F IRik = 
ik
R   (1  ) ikI ;
where ikI  IRI   ikI and ikR  IRR   ikR .
 Equilibrium prots. The equilibrium prots of the integrated rm, I, the independent
manufacturer, Mh, and the independent retailer, Rk, are therefore respectively equal to:
^IRI  ikI + 

IRR   ikR + hjI   ikI

^IRM  

IRI + 
IR
R   hjI   hkR

^IRR  IRR   
 
2IRR   hkR   ikR

+ (1  )  IRI   ikI 
Upstream foreclosure
Suppose now that only the integrated manufacturer is active and sells on both markets.
 The tari¤ negotiated between the integrated rm and the independent retailer exhibits
a positive margin: ueik > 0. The prots of the integrated rm and of the independent
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retailer (gross of xed fees) are now respectively given by
RI (wik;1;1) =

pRij (wik;1;1)  c  

Dij
 
pR (wik;1;1)

+ (wik   c)Dik
 
pR (wik;1;1)

and
RR (wik;1;1) =
 
pRik (wik;1;1)  wik   

Dik
 
pR (wik;1;1)

;
where pR (wik;1;1) =
 
pRij (wik;1;1) ;1; pRik (wik;1;1) ;1

. When negotiating the
wholesale price wik, I and Rk seek to maximize their joint prot, R (wik;1;1), which,
using the envelope theorem, satises:
@R
@wik
(w)

w=(c;1;1)
=

pRij (w)  c  
 @Dij
@pik
 
pR (w)
 @pRik
@wik
 
pR (w)

+

pRik (w)  wik   
 @Dik
@pij
 
pR (w)
 @pRij
@wik
 
pR (w)

> 0;
where the inequality stems from product substitution (@Dik=@pik < 0, but @Dik=@pij > 0
and @Dij=@pik > 0), Assumption F3(i:b), and the fact that both rmsmargins are
positive (otherwise, the rms including I, which makes no upstream prot when wik = c
would make no prot). It follows from Assumption G (the quasi-concavity of R) that
the negotiated wholesale price, wUFik , is strictly above cost. Internalizing the impact of
its pricing decisions on the margin uUFik > 0, Rj prices less aggressively than pre-merger.
 Equilibrium prots. If the negotiation succeeds, I gets UFI + Fik whereas Rk gets
UFR   Fik, where
UFI  RI (wUFik ;1;1) and UFR  RR(wUFik ;1;1):
If instead the negotiation fails, I gets m and Rk gets nothing. The individual prots of
the integrated rm and of the independent retailer are therefore respectively given by:
^UFI  m + (UFI + UFR   m) and ^UFR  (1  ) (UFI + UFR   m):
Single exclusion of channel h  k
Suppose now that all channels are active but channel h  k.
 The independent manufacturers tari¤ is cost-based: whkhj = c. The same reasoning as
for the case of interlocking relationships can be used to show that (29) still holds, with
the caveat that, as qhk is now constrained to be zero (and therefore 
hj
jk = 0), it directly
yields uhkhj = 0.
 The tari¤ negotiated between the integrated rm and the independent retailer exhibits a
positive margin: uhkik > 0. When negotiating the wholesale price wik, I and Mk now seek
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to maximize R (wik; c;1), which, using the envelope theorem, satises:
@R
@wik
(w)

w=(c;c;1)
=
X
g2fA;Bg

pRgj (w)  c  
 @Dgj
@pik
 
pR (w)
 @pRik
@wik
(w)
+

pRik (w)  c  
 X
m2fA;Bg
@Dik
@pmj
 
pR (w)
 @pRmj
@wik
(w)
> 0;
where, as before, the inequality stems from product substitution (@Dik=@pmj > 0 and
@Dgj=@pik > 0 for any g;m 2 fA;Bg), Assumption F3(i:b) and the fact that each retailer
charges at least one positive downstream margin. Hence, starting from wik = c, the
rms wish to increase wik. Assumption G (the quasi-concavity of R) then implies that
the negotiated price is strictly above cost: whkik > c, and so the integrated Rj prices less
aggressively than pre-merger.
 Equilibrium xed fees and prots. Consider rst the negotiation between I and Rk over
Fik. If the negotiation succeeds, I gets hkI + Fik   F hkhj and Rk obtains hkR   Fik, where:
hkI = 
R
I (w
hk
ik ; c;1) and hkR = RR(whkik ; c;1):
If the negotiation fails, Rk is excluded (and its prot is thus equal to 0) whereas I obtains
2DF   F hkhj . The Nash bargaining rule thus yields:
hkR   Fik = (1  )
 
hkR   2FD + hkI

;
implying that the xed fee is equal to
Fik = 2
FD   hkI + 
 
hkR   2FD + hkI

:
Consider now the negotiation between I andMh over Fhj. If the negotiation succeeds,
I and Mh respectively obtain ^I   Fhj + F hkik and Fhj. If it fails, Mh is excluded and I
gets ^hjI + F
hk
ik , where:
^hkI = max
p
I(p;1; pRik
 
whkik ; c;1

;1;whkik ; c;1):
Hence, F hkhj = (^I   ^hjI ).
The equilibrium prots are therefore equal to:
^hkI  

^R + ^
hj
I

+ 2 (1  ) DF
^hkM  

^I   ^hjI

^hkR  (1  )
 
^I + ^R   2DF

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Single exclusion of channel h  j
Suppose now that all channels are active but channel h  j.
 The independent manufacturers tari¤ is cost-based: whjhk = c. Once again, the same
reasoning as for the case of interlocking relationships can be used to show that (28) still
holds, with the caveat that, as qhj is now constrained to be zero (and therefore 
hk
kj = 0);
it directly yields uhjhk = 0.
 The tari¤ negotiated between the integrated rm and the independent retailer exhibits a
positive margin: uhjik > 0. When negotiating the wholesale price wik, I and Mk now seek
to maximize R (wik; c;1), which, using the envelope theorem, satises:
@R
@wik
(w)

w=(c;1;c)
=

pRij (w)  c  
 X
m2fA;Bg
@Dij
@pmk
 
pR (w)
 @pRmk
@wik
(w)
+
X
g2fA;Bg

pRgk (w)  c  
 X
m2fA;Bg
@Dgk
@pmj
 
pR (w)
 @pRmj
@wik
(w)
> 0;
where the inequality stems again from product substitution (@Dij=@pmk > 0 and @Dgk=@pmj >
0 for any g;m 2 fA;Bg), Assumption F3(i:b) and l 2 f1; 2g) and the fact that each re-
tailer charges at least one positive downstream margin. Hence, starting from wik = c, the
rms wish to increase wik. Assumption G (the quasi-concavity of R) then again implies
that the negotiated price is strictly above cost: whjik > c. Internalizing the impact of its
pricing decisions on the upstream margin whjik , the integrated Rj prices less aggressively
than pre-merger.
 Equilibrium xed fees and prots. Consider rst the negotiation between I and Rk over
Fik. If the negotiation succeeds, I gets 
hj
I + Fik and Rk obtains 
hj
R   Fik   F hjhk , where:
hjI = 
R
I (w
hj
ik ;1; c) and hjR = RR

whjik ;1; c

:
If the negotiation fails, I and Rk obtain ED and ED F hjhk respectively. Nash bargaining
thus yields:
hjI + F
hj
ik   ED = 

hjI + 
hj
R   2ED

:
Consider now the negotiation between Mh and Rk over Fhk. If the negotiation suc-
ceeds, Mh gets Fhk and Rk gets 
hj
R   Fhk   F hjik : If the negotiation fails, Mh is excluded
and Rk obtains ^
hj
R   F hjik ; where
^hjR = maxp
R

pRij

whjik ;1; c

;1; p;1;whjik ;1; c

:
Hence, Nash bargaining yields F hjhk = (
hj
R   ^hjR ).
The equilibrium prots, I = 
hj
I + F
hj
ik , Mh = F
hj
hk and Rk = 
hj
R   F hjik   F hjhk , are
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therefore respectively equal to:
^hjI  ED + 

hjI + 
hj
R   2ED

;
^hjM  

hjR   ^hjR

;
^hjR  (1  )

hjI + 
hj
R   ED

+ 

ED + ^hjR   hjR

:
F.3.2 Post-merger distribution network
We now study the CPNE of the network formation game post-merger. To provide a full
characterization, in what follows we concentrate on the linear demand example. It can
be checked that:
 Equilibrium prots are all positive, implying that no rm can gain from being
excluded from the market; hence, bilateral monopoly cannot be an equilibrium
structure, as the coalition formed by the two (excluded) independent rms would
then benet from activating their channel.
 In addition, ED + m > max2DF ; UFI + UFR 	, which yields:
^EDM > ^
DF
M ; (30)
and
^EDR > ^
UF
R : (31)
Hence, we can rule out two other network structures:
Downstream foreclosure can be ruled out, as exclusive dealing would instead
enable Rk to earn a positive prot and Mh to increase its prot from ^DFM to
^EDM , their coalition could protably deviate by activating their own channel
(instead of, or in addition to the channel h  j).
Upstream foreclosure can also be ruled out, as exclusive dealing would enable
Mh to earn a positive prot and Rk to increase its prot from ^UFR to ^
ED
R ,
their coalition could protably deviate by activating their own channel (instead
of, or in addition to the channel i  k).
We now turn to the other ve distribution networks. As before, without loss of gen-
erality, we can assume that inactive channels, being declared inactive by both involved
parties, cannot be activated by unilateral deviations.
Interlocking relationships
We consider the possible deviations, starting with unilateral deviations.
 Unilateral deviations. Interlocking relationships constitute a Nash equilibrium of the
network formation game if none of the three rms has an incentive to deviate; as (i) the
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integrated rm always maintains its own channel but can terminate any of the channels
i k and h  j, (ii) each independent rm can terminate the channel h k and one other
channel (h  j for Mh and i  k for Rk), and (iii) equilibrium prots are all positive, we
must have:
^IRI  max
n
^EDI ; ^
ik
I ; ^
hj
I
o
, ^IRM  max
n
^hjM ; ^
hk
M
o
and ^IRR  max
n
^ikR ; ^
hk
R
o
:
For a linear demand, the relevant conditions are ^IRI  ^hjI for  >  and  2 
IR () ; IR ()

, and ^IRM  ^hjM otherwise, where  ' 0:881 and IR () (resp.,
IR ()) is a decreasing (resp., increasing) function of . These conditions amount to:
  IR (; ) ;
where:
(i) IR (; ) is a strictly decreasing function of ;
(ii) there exists IR () 2 (0; ), where  ' 0:407,23 such that: IR (; )   () if
and only if   IR ().
 Deviations by coalitions involving I. Suppose now that interlocking relationships con-
stitute a Nash equilibrium, and consider deviations by a coalition involving the integrated
rm I. As I can unilaterally close the channels h  j and i  k, such a coalition can be
useful only if it closes the remaining channel, h   k. As Mh and Rk can each achieve
this, there is no need to consider the grand coalition of all three rms: the smaller coali-
tions, I  Mh and I   Rk, could implement the same deviation and would be subject
to fewer self-enforcement constraints. Furthermore, the coalition partner cannot benet
from closing only that channel, (otherwise, interlocking relationships would not consti-
tute a Nash equilibrium), and it cannot benet either from being completely shut down;
it follows that the only relevant options are a coalition withMh deviating to downstream
foreclosure or a coalition with Rk deviating to upstream foreclosure. It can be checked
that for,   IR (; ), such deviations are never protable for the coalition partner.
 Deviations by the coalition Mh   Rk. The only remaining coalition is that of the
two independent rms, and the relevant deviations are those that cannot be achieved
unilaterally by eitherMh or Rk (otherwise, interlocking relationships would not constitute
a Nash equilibrium) and do not exclude completely one of the two rms (otherwise, that
rm would be harmed by the deviation). Hence, the only relevant deviation is a switch
to exclusive dealing (by closing the channels i k and h  j). However, it can be checked
23IR () actually remains equal to  as long as   , before decreasing and tending towards 0 as 
further increases towards 1.
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that, whenever   IR (; ), following the deviation Rk would have an incentive to
re-open its channel with I.
Therefore, we have:
Result 1 Interlocking relationships constitute a CPNE of the post-merger network for-
mation game if and only if   IR (; ).
Exclusive dealing
As in the pre-merger case, exclusive dealing is always a Nash equilibrium; we thus focus
on deviations by coalitions. As the coalition formed byMh andRk cannot achieve anything
other than closing their only active channel, there are only three relevant coalitions:
 coalition I Rk: as upstream foreclosure is never protable for Rk, the only relevant
option is the exclusion of h  j;
 coalition I  Mh: as downstream foreclosure is never protable for Mh, the only
relevant option is the exclusion of i  k;
 grand coalition: the only options that cannot be achieved by subcoalitions are
interlocking relationships and the exclusion of h  k.
We consider these various deviations in turn.
 Deviation by the coalition I Rk. A deviation by the coalition I Rk to the exclusion of
h  j is self-enforcing whenever it is protable: unilaterally, I can only revert to exclusive
dealing, and Rk can only switch to upstream foreclosure, which is less protable than
exclusive dealing. The deviation is moreover strictly protable for I:
^hjI  ^EDI () ED + 

hjI + 
hj
R   2ED

 ED
() hjI + hjR  2ED;
which always holds as I chooses wik precisely so as to maximize the industry prot, and
so hjI + 
hj
R = 
R

whjik ;1; c

> R (1;1; c) = 2ED.
Therefore, exclusive dealing constitutes a CPNE if and only if the deviation is not
acceptable by Rk, that is, if:
^hjR < ^
ED
R () (1  )

hjI + 
hj
R   ED

+ 

ED + ^hjR   hjR

< (1  )ED
() (1  )

hjI + 
hj
R

  

hjR   ^hjR

< (2  3) ED;
which amounts to
 > ED (; ) ;
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where ED (0; ) = ED (1; ) = 1, ED (; ) = 1 for   ED = 3=10 and, for  > ED,
max

 () ; IR (; )
	
< ED (; ) < 1 for any  2 [0; 1].24
 Deviations by the coalition I Mh. A deviation by the coalition I Mh to the exclusion
of i  k is not protable when  > ED (; ); indeed, we then have:
^ikI < ^
ED
I () (1  ) SEm + ^R < ED;
^ikh < ^
ED
M () SEm + SEs   ^R < ED:
 Deviations by the grand coalition. A deviation by the grand coalition to interlocking
relationships is self-enforcing only if this network constitutes a CPNE outcome, which
requires   IR (; ) < ED (; ), a contradiction. A deviation to the exclusion of
h  k is acceptable by Mh only if
^hkM  ^EDM () ^I   ^hjI  ED;
which is never the case for a linear demand.
Therefore, we have:
Result 2 Exclusive dealing constitutes a CPNE of the post-merger network formation
game if and only if  > ED (; ).
Single exclusion of channel h  j
 Unilateral deviations. Starting from the exclusion of h j, as no rm can benet from
being completely excluded, and Rk prefers exclusive dealing to upstream foreclosure, the
only relevant unilateral deviations are for I or Rk to close the channel i  k; hence, this
distribution network constitutes a Nash equilibrium if and only if
^hjI  ^EDI and ^hjR  ^EDR :
The above analysis of exclusive dealing shows that these conditions amount to  
ED (; ).
We now turn to deviations by coalitions. The coalitions Mh   Rk and I   Rk cannot
achieve more than what Rk can already achieve through unilateral deviations, and the
grand coalition cannot achieve more than what can be achieved by the smaller coalition
I  Mh; in addition, for that coalition the only deviations that cannot be achieved by
24Specically, it can be checked that ED (; ) always exceeds 0:808, whereas
max

IR (; ) ;  ()
	  IR (0; ) =  (0) ' 0:612.
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unilateral deviations are those that activate the channel h  j: interlocking relationships,
downstream foreclosure, and the exclusion of i  k.
 Deviation to interlocking relationships. For a deviation to interlocking relationships
(i.e., adding the channel h  j) to be protable we must have:
^IRI  ^hjI and ^IRM  ^hjM ;
with at least one of the two inequalities being strict. As shown above, these conditions
amount to   IR (; ), in which case the deviation is moreover self-enforcing, as
interlocking relationships constitutes a CPNE.
 Deviation to downstream foreclosure. A deviation to downstream foreclosure is not self-
enforcing, asMh would have a incentive to deviate unilaterally to exclusive dealing (which
is feasible, as in equilibrium Rk is willing to deal with Mh).
 Deviation to the exclusion of i k. This deviation is never self-enforcing: as ^ikI  ^IRI ,
I would then re-open its channel with Rk.
This establishes:
Result 3 The single exclusion of h   j constitutes a CPNE of the post-merger network
formation game if and only if IR (; ) <   ED (; ).
Single exclusion of channel i  k
For the single exclusion of i  k to constitute a Nash equilibrium, the integrated rm
and the independent manufacturer should not want to shut down their channel:
^ikI  ^EDI () (1  ) CNm + ^R  ED
and ^ikM  ^EDM () CNm + CNs   ^R  ED:
The rst condition is satised if and only if   ik (; ), where the threshold ik (; ) is
decreasing in  and , while the second is equivalent to    (). However, a deviation
by the coalition I   Rk to interlocking relationships is protable and self-enforceable
whenever:
^IRI  max
n
^EDI ; ^
ik
I ; ^
hj
I
o
and ^IRR  max
n
^ikR ; ^
hk
R ; 0
o
:
It can be checked that the most stringent of these conditions is ^IRI  ^hjI , and that it
holds whenever   minik (; ) ;  ()	. Hence, we have:
Result 4 The single exclusion of i  k cannot constitute a CPNE.
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Single exclusion of channel h  k
Suppose that the coalition Mh   Rk deviates and activates the channel h   k; three
types of deviation are possible:
 A deviation to interlocking relationships is protable if ^IRf  ^hkf for f = M;R,
with at least one strict inequality, and it is self-enforcing if ^IRM  ^hjM and ^IRR 
^ikR . It can be checked that the most stringent of these four conditions is
^IRM  ^hjM : (32)
 A deviation to exclusive dealing is instead protable if ^EDf  ^hkf for f = M;R,
with at least one strict inequality, and it is self-enforcing if ^EDM  max
n
^ikM ; ^
DF
M
o
and ^EDR  max
n
^hjR ; ^
UF
R
o
. It can be checked that the most stringent of these
six conditions is
^EDR  ^hjR : (33)
 Finally, a deviation to the exclusion of h j is protable if ^hjf  ^hkf for f = M;R,
with at least one strict inequality, and it is self-enforcing if ^hjM  ^IRM and ^hjR 
max
n
^EDR ; ^
UF
R
o
. It can be checked that, out of these ve conditions, the relevant
ones are
^hjM  ^IRM and ^hjR  ^EDR ;
which hold whenever neither (32) nor (33) holds. Hence, we have:
Result 5 The single exclusion of h  k cannot constitute a CPNE.
Impact of the vertical merger on the distribution network
The above analysis leads us to conclude that, following a vertical merger between
Mi and Rj, the network formation game has a unique CPNE, the equilibrium network
structure consisting of:
 exclusive dealing whenever  > ED (; ), which is possible if  > ED = 0:3.
 (single) exclusion of h  j whenever IR (; ) <   ED (; ); and
 interlocking relationships whenever   IR (; ),
where the thresholds IR (; ) and ED (; ) are characterized by:
  IR (; ) () f^IRI  ^hjI and ^IRM  ^hjMg;
  ED (; ) () ^EDR  ^hjED:
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F.3.3 Impact on consumer surplus and total welfare
When  > ED (; ), the merger does not a¤ect the equilibrium distribution network,
which consists of exclusive dealing, and it does not a¤ect prices either, as the relevant
wholesale prices remain equal to marginal costs; hence, the merger has no impact on
consumer surplus and total welfare.
When   minIR (; ) ;  ()	, again the merger does not a¤ect the equilibrium
distribution network, which there consists of interlocking relationships, and it still does
not a¤ect the wholesale prices charged by the independent manufacturer, which remain
at cost; however, the merger raises the wholesale price charged by the integrated rm
to the independent retailer (i.e., weik > 0), and moreover induces the integrated retailer
to price less aggressively. As a result, the merger increases equilibrium retail prices, and
reduces both consumer surplus and total welfare.
When IR (; ) <  <  () (which implies that  > IR ()), the merger not only
raises the wholesale price charged to the independent retailer by the integrated rm (and
makes the integrated retailer less aggressive), but it moreover reduces the set of available
channels, from four (interlocking relationships) to three (exclusion of the channel h  j).
It thus reduces again consumer surplus and total welfare.
When instead  ()    ED (; ), the merger expands the set of channels by
inducing the integrated rm to supply the rival retailer, although at a wholesale price
above cost, but it also makes the integrated retailer less aggressive. Di¤erent cases arise:
 if   IR (; ) (which implies that   IR ()), the merger fully expands the
distribution network (interlocking relationships); for a linear demand, this product
expansion e¤ect dominates and the merger enhances both consumer surplus and
total welfare.
 if instead  > IR (; ), the merger only adds the channel i k to the set of products
(exclusion of h j only); for a linear demand, the softening of the integrated retailer
then dominates and the merger reduces consumer surplus. Furthermore, there exists
a threshold W (; ), satisfying
max

IR (; ) ;  ()
	
< W (; ) < ED (; ) ;
such that the merger is welfare-improving (resp., welfare-reducing) when  < W (; )
(resp.,  > W (; )).
These insights are illustrated by Figure 4.25
25Figure 4 has been drawn for  = 0:5. The upper area, where the equilibrium market structure is
una¤ected by the merger, exists for  > ED = 0:3.
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mr
But prices increase, thus CS and W decrease.
Prices, CS and W unchanged.
CS and W increase
CS and W decrease.
CS and W decreaseCS decreases but
W increases
Figure 4: Impact of a vertical merger
G Observable contracting
G.1 Proof of Proposition 12
Part (i). Fix a bargaining equilibrium with observable two-part tari¤s in which retail
price responses depend only on wholesale prices, B = pR (w) ; te;pe	, and, for every
i 2 I and every j 2 J :
 let
eMi 
X
k2J
[(wik   ci)Dik (pe) + F eik] ;
eRj 
X
h2I
 
pehj   wehj   j

Dhj (p
e)  F ehj

;
denote the equilibrium prots of Mi and Rj;
 let pR  1;we i;j;we j denote the continuation retail price equilibrium in the event
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that the negotiation between Mi and Rj breaks down, and
ijMi 
X
k2Jnfjg

(wik   ci)Dik
 
pR
 1;we i;j;we j+ F eik ;
ijRj 
X
h2Infig
 
pRhj
 1;we i;j;we j  wehj   jDhj  pR  1;we i;j;we j  F ehj ;
respectively denote the resulting prots for Mi and Rj;
 and for every ij 2 ij, let
F^
ij
ij 
(
eRj   ijRj if ij = M ji ,
   eMi   ijMi if ij = Rij,
reect the benet of the bilateral relationship for ijs rm.
These fees balance each other in expectation:
Lemma G.1 (bargaining fees: observable two-part tari¤s) For every i 2 I and
every j 2 J :
Eij
h
F^
ij
ij
i
= 0:
Proof. We have:
Eij
h
F^
ij
ij
i
= ijF^
Mji
ij + (1  ij) F^
Rij
ij
= ij

eRj   ijRj

  (1  ij)
 
eMi   ijMi

= 0;
where the last equality follows from the Nash bargaining rule (equation (4)).
Let
 
p^

2 denote the price vector such that p^
 = pe for every  2  and, for every
j 2 J , let t^jj = (t^ijij )i2I denote the tari¤s t^ijij = fweij; F eij + F^ ijij g; note that the wholesale
and retail prices are the same as in the bargaining equilibrium B: for every i 2 I and every
j 2 J , w^ijij = weij regardless of which agent ij is selected to make an o¤er in the bilateral
negotiation between Mi and Rj, and p^ij = p
e
ij regardless of which side gets to make the
o¤er in any of the bilateral negotiations. We now show that (pR(w); (^t)2; (p^)2)
constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium of game  O.
We rst note that this candidate equilibrium gives all rms the same expected prots
as the bargaining equilibrium B: the price responses are the same retail prices as in B,
and the equilibrium wholesale prices coincide with the bargaining equilibrium ones; hence
equilibrium retail prices (and thus channel prots) are the same as in B. Furthermore,
the tari¤ t^M
j
i
ij gives Rj its disagreement prot in the bargaining equilibrium B, ijRj , and
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conversely t^
Rij
ij gives Mi its disagreement prot in the bargaining equilibrium B, ijMi ;
hence, the expected tari¤ gives each rm the same prot as in B.
In stage 2, for any given negotiated wholesale prices w the price responses pR (w)
constitutes a Nash equilibrium; hence, each Rj is willing to stick to its equilibrium price
response if the others do so. Turning to stage 1, consider the bilateral negotiation between
Mi and Rj, for some i 2 I and j 2 J . Their agents, M ji and Rij, expect all other agents
to negotiate the equilibrium tari¤s, which are of the form t^hkhk = fwehk; F ehk+ F^ hkhk g, where
Ehk [F^
hk
hk ] = 0. Hence, when signing a tari¤ tij = fwij; Fijg they anticipate the expected
joint prot of their two rms to be equal to:
RMi Rj (wij) 

pRij
 
wij;w
e
 i;j;w
e
 j
  ci   jDij  pR  wij;we i;j;we j
+
X
k2Jnfjg

(weik   ci)Dik
 
pR
 
wij;w
e
 i;j;w
e
 j

+ F eik

(34)
+
X
h2Infig
( 
pRhj
 
wij;w
e
 i;j;w
e
 j
  wehj   j
Dhj
 
pR
 
wij;w
e
 i;j;w
e
 j
  F ehj
)
;
which coincides with the bilateral joint prot that Mi and Rj seek to maximize in the
bargaining equilibrium B. It follows that M ji and Rij choose wij = weij, regardless of
which side gets to make the o¤er. In addition, the selected agent, ij, sets the xed fee
so as to leave the other agent indi¤erent between accepting or rejecting the o¤er, which,
as noted above, is achieved by charging F eij + F^
ij
ij .
Part (ii). Fix a subgame perfect equilibrium of game  O in two-part tari¤s in which
retail price responses depend only on wholesale prices, and which side gets to make the
o¤er only a¤ects the equilibrium xed fees, and not the equilibrium wholesale prices; the
equilibrium is thus of the form E = fp^Rj (w); (^t = fw^; F^g)2; (p^ = p^)2g. Consider
now the xed fees Fe = (F eij)(i;j)2IJ where, for every i 2 I and every j 2 J :
F eij = Eij
h
F^
ij
ij
i
= ijF^
Mji
ij + (1  ij) F^
Rij
ij : (35)
We now show that fp^R(w); te = fwe;Feg;pe = p^g constitutes a bargaining equilibrium.
By construction, in stage 2, for any vector of negotiated wholesale prices w, the prices
responses pR(w) = (pRj (w))j2J do constitute a Nash equilibrium. We now turn to stage
1, and study the bilateral negotiation between Mi and Rj, for some i 2 I and j 2 J .
In the equilibrium E , the tari¤ o¤ered by the selected agent, ij, maximizes the expected
prot of its rm, among those that are acceptable by the other agent. As prots can
easily be shared through the xed fees (which do not a¤ect retailerspricing decisions),
it follows that the wholesale price w^ij maximizes the expected joint prot of Mi and Rj,
given all the other equilibrium tari¤s and the retail price responses. As the equilibrium
wholesale prices negotiated with the other rms, (wik)k 6=j and (whj)h6=i, do not depend
on which side gets to make the o¤ers, and the equilibrium expected xed fees are equal
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to (F eik)k 6=j and (F
e
hj)h6=i, it follows that wij = w^ij maximizes 
R
Mi Rj (wij), given by (34).
To conclude the proof, it su¢ ces to note that, by construction, the xed fees given by
(35) share the gains from trade according to the Nash bargaining rule.
G.2 Proof of Proposition 13
Fix a symmetric equilibrium in which wholesale prices are all equal to wO, and retail
prices are thus equal to pO = pR
 
wO

. By construction, this price satises, for any i 2 I
and any j 2 J :
pO 2 arg max
pij
(  
pij   wO   

Dij
 
pij;p
O
 i;j;p
O
 j

+
P
h2Infig
 
pO   wO   Dhj  pij;pO i;j;pO j
)
:
Letting qO = Dij
 
pO

and dO = pO  wO    respectively denote the symmetric equilib-
rium quantity and the symmetric downstream margin, we thus have:
0 = qO + dO
X
h2I
@Dhj
@pij
 
pO

= qO + dO
X
h2I
@Dij
@phj
 
pO

;
where the rst equality stems from the optimality condition for pij and the second one
follows from symmetry. As qO > 0 and an increase in all of Rjs prices reduces the demand
Dij, it follows that the equilibrium downstream margins are positive:
dO > 0: (36)
Consider now the bilateral negotiation betweenMi and Rj, for some i 2 I and j 2 J .
Following a unilateral deviation in wij, Rj chooses its prices so as to maximize its variable
prot, which (ignoring xed fees) is given by:
j = (pij   wij   )Dij
 
pj;p
R
 j
 
wij;w
O
 i;j;w
O
 j

+
X
h2Infig
 
phj   wO   

Dhj
 
pj;p
R
 j
 
wij;w
O
 i;j;w
O
 j

:
Using the envelope theorem, the resulting prot, Rj
 
wij; w
O
 i;j; w
O
 j

, satises:
@Rj
@w
ij
 
wO

=  qO + dO
X
h2I
X
k2Jnfjg
X
g2Infig
@Dhj
@pgk
 
pO
 @pRgk
@w
ij
 
wO

: (37)
In their bilateral negotiation, Mi and Rj choose wij so as to maximize their (variable)
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joint prot, which can be expressed as:
i + j = 
R
j
 
wij;w
O
 i;j;w
O
 j

+ (wij   c)Dij
 
pR
 
wij;w
O
 i;j;w
O
 j

+
X
k2Jnfjg
 
wO   cDik  pR  wij;wO i;j;wO j :
Hence, letting uO = wO   c and QRMi (w) denote the symmetric equilibrium upstream
margin and the total quantity sold byMi (through all retailers) in the continuation Nash
equilibrium pR (w), the equilibrium wholesale price wij = wO satises:
@Rj
@w
ij
 
wO

+ qO + uO
@QRMi
@wij
 
wO

= 0:
From (37), the sum of the rst two terms is positive; as Mis total quantity decreases
when it increases any of its wholesale prices, it follows that upstream margins are positive:
uO > 0 () wO > c: (38)
As pR (w) increases in w, this in turn implies that the equilibrium retail prices are above
the competitive level:
pO = pR
 
wO

> pR (c) = p:
Alternatively, the (variable) joint prot of Mi and Rj can be expressed as:
 
X
h2Infig
h  
X
k2Jnfjg
k = 
R
 
wij;w
O
 i;j;w
O
 j
  uO X
h2Infig
QRMh
 
wij;w
O
 i;j;w
O
 j

 dO
RX
k2Jnfjg
QRRk
 
wij;w
O
 i;j;w
O
 j

;
where R (w), QRMh (w) and Q
R
Rj
(w) respectively denote the industry prot, the total
quantity sold by Mh (through all retailers) and the total quantity sold by Rj (on all
brands) in the continuation Nash equilibrium pR (w). It follows that the equilibrium
wholesale price wij = wO satises:
@R
@wij
 
wO

= uO
X
h2Infig
@QRMh
@wij
 
wO

+ dO
RX
k2Jnfjg
@QRRk
@wij
 
wO

> 0;
where the inequality stems from (36) and (38), together with the property that, from
Assumption AO, an increase in wij leads to an increase in the total quantities sold by
every other manufacturer Mh, for h 6= i, and by every other retailer Rk, for k 6= j.
To conclude the proof, let ^R (p) and ~ (w) respectively denote the industry prot
obtained when all retail prices are equal to p, and the industry prot in the continuation
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equilibrium when all wholesale prices are equal to w. By construction, we have:
^R
 
pR (w)

= ~R (w)
and, by symmetry:
d^R
dp
 
pO
 dpR
dw
 
wO

=
d~R
dw
 
wO

=
X
i2I
X
j2J
@R
@wij
 
wO

> 0:
As pR (w) increases with w, it follows that:
d^R
dp
 
pO

> 0:
The assumed concavity of this industry prot function then implies that pO lies below
the monopoly level:
pO < pM :
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